Exit Geithner

The Modern Day Metternich
by DEAN BAKER


Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s departure from the Obama Administration invites comparisons with Klemens von Metternich. Metternich was the foreign minister of the Austrian Empire who engineered the restoration of the old order and the suppression of democracy across Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. This was an impressive diplomatic feat given the popular contempt for Europe’s monarchical regimes. In the same vein, protecting Wall Street from the financial and economic havoc they brought upon themselves and the country was an enormous accomplishment.

Just to remind everyone, during his tenure as head of the New York Fed and then Treasury Secretary, most, if not all, of the major Wall Street banks would have collapsed if the government had not intervened to save them. This process began with the collapse of Bear Stearns, which was bought up by J.P. Morgan in a deal involving huge subsidies from the Fed. The collapse of Lehman Brothers, a second major investment bank, started a run on the three remaining investment banks that would have led to the collapse of Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs if the Fed, FDIC, and Treasury did not take extraordinary measures to save them.

Citigroup and Bank of America both needed emergency facilities established by the Fed and Treasury explicitly for their support, in addition to all the below-market loans they received from the government at the time. Without this massive government support, there can be no doubt that both of them would currently be operating under the supervision of a bankruptcy judge.

Of the six banks that dominate the U.S. banking system, only Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan could have conceivably survived without hoards of cash rained down on them by the federal government. Even these two are question marks, since both helped themselves to trillions of dollars of below-market loans, in addition to indirectly benefiting from the bailout of the other banks that protected many of their assets.

Had it not been for Geithner and his sidekicks we would have been permanently rid of an incredibly bloated financial sector that haunts the economy like a horrible albatross. Along with the salvation of the Wall Street banks, Geithner also managed to restore their agenda of deficit reduction.

Even though the economy is still down more than 9 million+ jobs from its full employment level, none of the important people in Washington are talking about measures that would hasten job creation. Instead the focus is exclusively on deficit reduction, a process that is already slowing growth and putting even more people out of work. While lives that are being ruined today by the weak economy, Geithner helped create a policy agenda where the focus of debate is the budget projections for 2022.

These projections are hugely inaccurate. Furthermore the actual budget for 2022 is largely out of the control of the politicians currently in power, since the Congresses elected in 2016, 2018, 2020 and 2022, along with the presidents elected in 2016 and 2020, may have some different ideas. Nonetheless, the path laid out by Geithner’s team virtually ensures that these distant budget targets will serve as a distraction from doing anything to help the economy now.

There are two important points that should be quashed quickly in order to destroy any possible defense of Timothy Geithner. It is often asserted that we were lucky to escape a second Great Depression. This is nonsense.

The first Great Depression was not simply the result of bad decisions made in the initial financial crisis. It was the result of 10 years of failed policy. There is zero, nothing, nada that would have prevented the sort of massive stimulus provided by World War II from occurring in 1931 instead of 1941. We know how to recover from a financial collapse; the issue is simply political will.

This is demonstrated clearly by the case of Argentina, which had a full-fledged collapse in December of 2001. After three months of free fall, its economy stabilized in the second quarter of 2002. It came roaring back in the second half of the year and had made up all of the lost ground by the middle of 2003. Its economy continued to grow strongly until the 2009 when the world economic crisis brought it to a standstill. There is no reason to believe that our policymakers are less competent than those in Argentina; the threat of a second Great Depression was nonsense.

Finally the claim that we made money on the bailouts is equally absurd. We lent money at interest rates that were far below what the market would have demanded. Most of this money, plus interest, was paid back. However claiming that we therefore made a profit would be like saying the government could make a profit by issuing 30-year mortgages at 1.0 percent interest. Surely most of the loans would be repaid, with interest, but everyone would understand that this is an enormous subsidy to homeowners.

In short, the Geithner agenda was to allow the Wall Street banks to feed at the public trough until they were returned to their prior strength. Like Metternich, he largely succeeded. Of course democracy did eventually triumph in Europe. Let’s hope that it doesn’t take quite as long here.

Geithner Intercedes to Give Wall Street Under the Table $25B Bailout

A 25 Billion Dollar Secret: The NY Fed, Goldman & The AIG Cover-Up
How The FRBNY's President Tim Geithner And Chairman Stephen Friedman Demanded Par For Goldman Sachs And The Rest Of Wall Street And Then Tried To Cover It All Up...

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Why did the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), whose Chairman was Stephen Friedman (a Goldman Sachs board member who resigned from the New York Fed earlier this year when it was revealed that he had made $5 million by purchasing shares in GS with the knowledge that AIG would be paying counterparties at par and that Goldman would be getting a $13 billion windfall -- when no one else had this information) and whose President was none other than current Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, why did this New York Fed choose to pay AIG's counterparties 100 cents on the dollar when AIG itself had been negotiating for steep haircuts with claimants, AND why did they then pressure AIG executives to keep quiet about the decision even discouraging AIG from disclosing the 'par-payments' to its shareholders in required SEC filings?

We'll leave the decision itself (which was fraudulent, borderline criminal, and the reasoning given - a complete joke), for another post and focus on the cover-up.  Certainly it riled up Congressman Darrell Issa who fired off an angry letter last Friday to AIG management and the New York Fed, demanding the following from both:

1. Emails, phone logs and meeting notes of the following people: Timothy Geithner, Stephen Friedman, Tom Baxter, and Sarah Dahlgren; 
2. Term sheets, including drafts, relating to AIG’s payments to its CDS counterparties;
3. Emails, phone logs and meeting notes referring or relating to public disclosure of AIG’s payments to its CDS counterparties including disclosure to the SEC.

Issa continues in his letter:

It is also disturbing that, at the time this secret deal was made, FRBNY Chairman Stephen Friedman, a member of the board of Goldman Sachs, purchased more than 50,000 shares of Goldman Sachs before knowledge of the FRBNY’s bailout of Goldman Sachs and other AIG counterparties became public knowledge.  According to news reports, this transaction has earned Mr. Friedman over $5 million in profit.

Finally, according to one AIG executive quoted in news reports, the FRBNY may have attempted to manage public disclosure of its decision to pay AIG’s counterparties at par by pressuring the company not to file pertinent documents with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”):

They’d tell us that they don’t think that this or that should be disclosed.  They’d say, “Don’t you think your counterparties will be concerned?”  It was much more about protecting the Fed.

These allegations raise serious questions about the transparency, accountability and wisdom of the FRBNY’s actions. The American people have a right to know the full details behind the FRBNY’s decision to stop negotiations with AIG’s counterparties and pay them billions of dollars of taxpayer money.

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DB here.  It's not difficult to understand what happened, and it most certainly was not a coincidental result of independent decisions made during the heat of the crisis.  We've actually known it was the Fed for awhile.  Ever since House testimony from AIG CEO Ed Liddy confirming that "The Fed made us do it."  The problem at the time was that we didn't know which Fed.

Now we know: Geithner and Friedman interceded on behalf of Goldman and Wall Street (Merrill received $6.2 billion, Societe General - a whopping $16.5 billion) to deliver a stealth bailout, one that wouldn't need Congressional approval, and even better wouldn't require the counterparties to pay any of it back NOR would it require that they issue shares, warrants or any other instrument to AIG (taxpayers) in return for more than $32 billion in free money.

As example, Lehman counterparties got 11 cents.  AIG creditors in bankruptcy court might have gotten 25 cents, if they were lucky given the state of the asset markets at the time.  AIG itself was negotiating for 50 cents, but your friend and steward of your currency, Treasury Secretary Turbo-Tax, and his boss Stephen Friedman thought 100 would be the best number for everyone involved, leading to a windfall for AIG counterparties of at least $16 billion.  In real terms, anything over 25 cents was a gift and thus the real giveaway was somewhere in the range of $25 billion, notwithstanding the author's calculations.  And if that weren't enough, then Geithner and Friedman succeeded in covering up their secret for 9 months, until Bloomberg through dogged effort and FOIA determination finally got the scoop.  Read the following passage from Bloomberg carefully:

Part of a sentence in the document was crossed out.  It contained a blank space that was intended to show the amount of the haircut the banks would take, according to people who saw the term sheet.  After less than a week of private negotiations with the banks, the New York Fed instructed AIG to pay them par, or 100 cents on the dollar.  The content of its deliberations has never been made public.

Edward Grebeck, CEO of Stamford, Connecticut-based debt consulting firm Tempus Advisors, says the most serious breach by the government was to keep the process of approving the bank payments secret.  “It’s inexcusable,” says Grebeck, who teaches a course on CDSs at New York University. “Everybody should be privy to the negotiations that went on. We can’t have bailouts like this happening behind closed doors.”

The deliberations of the New York Fed are not made public. In this case, even the identities of the AIG counterparties weren’t disclosed until March 2009, when U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd, head of the Senate Finance Committee, demanded they be made public.  Bloomberg News has filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking copies of the term sheets related to AIG’s counterparty payments, along with e-mails and the logs of phone calls and meetings among Geithner, Friedman and other New York Fed and AIG officials. The request is pending.

The Federal Reserve has been reluctant to publish information on its efforts to stabilize the financial system since the crisis began. The Fed has loaned more than $2 trillion, yet it refuses to name the recipients of the loans, or cite the amount they borrowed, saying that doing so may set off a run by depositors and unsettle shareholders.

William Poole, a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, defends the New York Fed’s action.  “I think the Federal Reserve was trying to stop the spread of fear in the market,” Poole says. “The market was having enough trouble dealing with Lehman. If you add, on top of that, AIG paying off some fraction of its liabilities, a system which is already substantially frozen would freeze rock-solid.”

Still, officials at AIG object to the secrecy that surrounded the transactions. One top AIG executive who asked not to be identified says he was pressured by New York Fed officials not to file documents with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission that would divulge details.  “They’d tell us that they don’t think that this or that should be disclosed,” the executive says. “They’d say, ‘Don’t you think your counterparties will be concerned?’ It was much more about protecting the Fed.”

‘An Outrage’

Friedman’s role remains controversial. In December 2008, weeks after the payments to the banks were authorized in November, Friedman bought 37,300 shares of Goldman stock at $80.78 a share, according to SEC filings. On Jan. 22, he bought 15,300 more at $66.61.  Both purchases took place before the payments to Goldman Sachs were publicly disclosed under pressure from Senator Dodd in March. On Oct. 26, Goldman Sachs stock closed at $179.37 a share, meaning Friedman had paper profits of $5.4 million.  

Jerry Jordan, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, says Friedman should have resigned from the New York Fed as soon as it became clear that Goldman stood to benefit from its actions.   “It’s an outrage,” Jordan says. “He needed to either resign from the Fed board or from Goldman and proceed to sell his stock.”

Friedman remains a member of Goldman’s board and held a total of 98,600 shares of the firm’s stock as of Jan. 22.

Vickrey says that one reason the New York Fed should have insisted on discounted payments for AIG’s CDSs is that the banks likely had hedges against their insured CDOs or had already written down their value. On March 20, Goldman Sachs CFO David Viniar said in a conference call with investors that Goldman was protected.  “We limited our overall credit exposure to AIG through a combination of collateral and market hedges,” Viniar said. “There would have been no credit losses if AIG had failed.”

In any event, former St. Louis Fed President Poole says the entire process should have been public and transparent. “There should be a high bar against not disclosing,” Poole says. “The taxpayer has every right to understand in detail what happened.”

Read the rest of the article HERE

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So even Fed voting member and counterparty-negotiation apologist, William Poole decries the secrecy.  And he was likely not aware of the par-payment cover-up since Friedman and Geithner kept it all within the New York Fed family.

In any other time, a sitting Treasury Secretary who interceded on behalf of Wall Street to screw taxpayers out of tens of billions, would not be sitting long.  But Democrats control both the House and Senate, so there are no investiagtions (Issa's letter aside).  Traditional media is content not to rock the boat for President Banks Obama lest they be shunned by their peers, and ultimately, 99% of TV and print journalists don't understand the issues well enough to complain with any conviciton, especially against the merry backdrop of the Dow rising and their deflated 401ks beginning to show life.

It's the exact same set of circumstances that allowed Paulson to cram TARP down our throats last fall; Congressional members and the journalists who cover them are too ill-informed about finance to have confidence in taking a critical position against the rampant fear-mongering that ultimately got the bill passed (see this Kanjorski clip).

They fall prey to fear and weakly submit to duplicitous hyperbole (Paulson threatening martial law and blood in the streets), when they should instead be consulting with the objective, critical voices who foresaw the crisis and were prepared with alternative solutions when it finally came (Stiglitz said instead of TARP, create new banks).

Conflict Of Interest Means Geithner Must Recuse Himself from Fed Audit Deliberations

When Will Tim Geithner, Who Has The "Biggest Conflict Of Interest", Recuse Himself Of Fed Audit Deliberations?
05-06-2010

Alan Grayson storms back to the stage by asking just why is Tim Geithner, who has the biggest conflict of interest when it comes to Fed matters, even be allowed to have an opinion on Fed transparency issues. In today's ABC Top Line, Grayson stated:

“When Tim Geithner says that he doesn't want to see the Fed audited, what he's really saying is he doesn't want to see Tim Geithner audited. He was the head of the New York Fed for years and years. This audit would apply to him. And the actions he took -- which he can now take in secret and, when this bill passes, will no longer be secret -- we'll be able to see and understand the decisions that he made that among other things put huge amounts of bailout money into the hands of private interests.”

“It's one of the biggest conflicts of interest I've ever seen.”

Keep in mind that this is the same Fed that when it took over Bear via ML1 said it would have no losses on the collateral it assumed, only to see its Red Roof Inn holdings be foreclosed upon last week as Zero Hedge first discussed. How the Fed's opacity is still a topic of discussion simply does not compute. And that Obama is doing all he can to prevent the Fed transparency initiatives by Paul and Grayson from passing at this point certainly means that should the Fed's dirty laundry be made public that the administration would certainly collapse in a smoldering heap of 0% approval.

Some more painful common sense from Grayson:

“The Fed doesn't want to be audited. Who does? Do you want to be audited? I don't want to be audited, but sometimes it's necessary,” he said. “When you're handing out a trillion dollars at a time -- a trillion dollars at a time, which works out to $3,000 for every man woman and child in this country -- don't we have a right to know what happened to it?”

Grayson added:

“It's central to the bill. We've had secret bailouts from the Fed to private interests now for the past two years without any exposure whatsoever. … We need to know what happened to our money, because when the Fed hands out our money, every dollar in your pocket, every dollar in your checking account, every dollar in your 401(k) becomes that much cheaper and less in value.”

In retrospect it is really much simpler: the Fed will only retain its secrecy as long as it can keep pushing the market higher, and as long as it can force the middle class to empty out their money markets and throw their money into bankrupt retailers trading at one million P/E. Once the market tumbles, it is game over. The Fed knows it, the president knows it, and Geithner certainly knows it. Which is why we expect massive resistance by the Fed and all the "liquidty providers" and "market makers" to allowing the Ponzi formerly known as the market, to reach its true fair value (absent from endless fiscal stimuli and ZIRP insanity)... somewhere in the 400-500 S&P range.

Fed Helping Big Banks Cook Their Books?

An Insolvent System?

By MIKE WHITNEY
On Friday, the Wall Street Journal revealed details of a cover up by the nation’s largest banks that have been engaged in potentially-criminal accounting activities to conceal the amount of debt on their balance sheets. The SEC has been notified of the allegations and has launched a probe to determine whether further action is needed. Among the banks implicated, are Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Citigroup. According to the WSJ:

"Major banks have masked their risk levels in the past five quarters by temporarily lowering their debt just before reporting it to the public, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A group of 18 banks....understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42 per cent at the end of each of the past five quarterly periods, the data show. The banks, which publicly release debt data each quarter, then boosted the debt levels in the middle of successive quarters." ("Big Banks Mask Risk Levels", Kate Kelly, Tom McGinty, Dan Fitzpatrick, Wall Street Journal)

The article has set off alarm bells on Wall Street because of the similarity between Lehman Bros. "repo 105" transactions and these new signs of obfuscation by other large banks.  "Repo 105" is an accounting device that Lehman used to hide $50 billion in debt off its balance sheet in an attempt to mislead investors about the true state of its financial health. The WSJ story suggests that the practice may be more widespread than originally thought. The "repo 105" scandal is further complicated by suspicions that Lehman was assisted in its effort by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which, at the time, was headed by the present Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner. Here is a short recap of what transpired between the Geithner's NY Fed and Lehman according to ex-regulator William Black and former NY governor Eliot Spitzer from an article on Huffington Post:

"The FRBNY [i.e.,  New York Fed]  knew that Lehman was engaged in smoke and mirrors designed to overstate its liquidity and, therefore, was unwilling to lend as much money to Lehman. The FRBNY did not, however, inform the SEC, the public, or the Office of Thrift Supervision (which regulated an S&L that Lehman owned) of what should have been viewed by all as ongoing misrepresentations. 

The Fed's behavior made it clear that officials didn't believe they needed to do more with this information. The FRBNY remained willing to lend to an institution with misleading accounting and neither remedied the accounting nor notified other regulators who may have had the opportunity to do so...... We now know from Valukas and from former Treasury Secretary Paulson that the Treasury and the Fed knew that Lehman was massively overstating its on-book asset values." (Time for the Truth"  William Black and Eliot Spitzer, Huffington Post) 

So the question is whether the NY Fed helped other banks conceal important financial information from investors, too. And--if that's the case--then how can the public be confident that the biggest banks in the country are truly solvent?

According to the WSJ: "An official at the Federal Reserve Board noted that the Fed continuously monitors asset levels at the large bank-holding companies, but the financing activities captured in the New York Fed's data fall under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates brokerage firms."

The Fed's explanation is a tacit denial of its responsibility to regulate or report suspicious accounting practices to the appropriate agencies. The response is not just "buck passing", but also suggests collusion. So far, there's no clear link between the Fed and  the shady bookeeping at the banks. But many now believe that -- in the case of Lehman -- the Fed acted as an "enabler",  either by serving as a counterparty in repo 105 deals or by looking the other way while the transactions were executed.  Either way, the situation demands an independent investigation.

To put the WSJ article in context, it helps to review the details of the Lehman case. Here's an excerpt from an article by Eric Dash in the NY Times:

"Newly released report on the collapse of Lehman Brothers ... sheds surprising new light on Lehman’s dealings with the New York Fed. Lehman engaged in a series of transactions with the New York Fed that were similar to the ones that drew criticism from the bankruptcy court examiner who investigated its collapse.... 

“The report by Mr. Valukas nonetheless raises fresh questions about the role of the New York Fed in supporting Lehman during the frantic months leading up to its collapse. It suggests that Lehman executives believed the Fed would be able to help the bank avert disaster and provide it with a business opportunity... 

“Lehman, desperate for financing, seized its chance. It packaged billions of dollars of troubled corporate loans into an investment called Freedom CLO. Then, in a series of transactions, it shifted Freedom back and forth to the New York Fed, in exchange for cash. Those moves helped make Lehman look healthier. 

“Essentially, Lehman was able to temporarily warehouse illiquid investments that were worrying its investors at the New York Fed in return for cash. The Fed created this facility immediately after the near collapse of Bear Stearns. Some suspect that other banks engaged in similar maneuvers.” ("Fed Helped Bank Raise Cash Quickly", Eric Dash, New York Times)

So why did "Lehman executives believe the Fed would be able to help the bank avert disaster and provide it with a business opportunity"? Most likely, because that had been standard operating procedure. The Fed was merely acting as it had before. Lehman used the repo market to amplify leverage to maximize profits, (the same as the other banks) and when they couldn't find a counterparty to accept their garbage collateral, the Fed would step in and provide short-term loans and "warehouse" their toxic assets. In essence,  the Fed was helping to defraud  investors who believed the banks reports were accurate. Here's Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism who sums it up perfectly:

"The NY Fed, and thus Timothy Geithner, were at a minimum massively derelict in the performance of their duties, and may well be culpable in aiding and abetting Lehman in accounting fraud and Sarbox violations...…at a minimum, the NY Fed helped perpetuate a fraud on investors and counterparties. This pattern further suggests the Fed, which by its charter is tasked to promote the safety and soundness of the banking system, instead, via its collusion with Lehman management, operated to protect particular actors to the detriment of the public at large. And most important, it says that the NY Fed, and likely Geithner himself, undermined, perhaps even violated, laws designed to protect investors and markets." 

So if the NY Fed had no moral qualms about its "repo 105" dealings with Lehman, than why would hesitate to do the same thing for the other banks?   Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge answers the question like this:

"We contend that Repo 105 type book-cooking and quarter end balance sheet window dressing was a prevalent phenomenon among all the banks. The fact that over the past two and a half years this resulted in a differential from the peak quarterly assets of over $65 billion is unbelievable, and the fact that this had slipped through the regulators' fingers is inexcusable..... 

“We are confident that armed with this data, the SEC will be able to provide a prompt and logical response to why the primary dealers have such a peculiar pattern in downshifting their assets toward quarter end, and much more relevantly, who the counterparties are that would consistently take the other side of these quarter end window-dressing trades." ("Evidence That Primary Dealers Have Collectively Engaged In Repo 105 And Qtr-End Book Cooking Type Schemes For Years" zero hedge,  4-9-10)

Durden's logic looks good. If Lehman was being aided in its "book cooking" by the NY Fed, then the other banks were probably being helped, as well. It looks like Geithner left his fingerprints everywhere. 

If we add these new developments to the fact that the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) "mark to market" rule has been suspended (allowing banks to arbitrarily assign whatever value they choose to the own illiquid assets) and, the fact that the Federal Reserve still refuses to allow an independent audit of the dodgy collateral it accepted from the banks in exchange for Treasuries and other loans; then it still looks like the banking system is either teetering or insolvent.

And don't expect the Securities and Exchange Commission to get to the bottom of this either. SEC chairman Mary Schapiro is a proven financial industry loyalist who has no intention of upsetting her Wall Street overlords by digging too deep or issuing subpoenas. If she pursues the investigation at all, it will only be to placate the public and to apply liberal amounts of whitewash to the whole matter.

The Big Break Up

Why Paul Krugman is Wrong on Too Big to Fail
By DEAN BAKER

It’s not often that I disagree with Paul Krugman, but there are occasions where at least one of us is wrong. And the treatment of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks is one of them.

Krugman argued in a column last week that breaking up the TBTF banks is not a necessary part of financial reform. Krugman pointed to the example of Canada as a country with a well-regulated financial system. Canada did not experience a financial crisis in 2008 in spite of the fact that five big banks essentially account for the whole of the Canadian banking system. On the other side, Krugman noted that the collapse of large numbers of small banks can also create a crisis, pointing to the chain of bank collapses at the start of the Great Depression.

These are valid points, but to paraphrase Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz: “We’re not in Canada anymore.” While Canadian banking regulation appears to have been effective thus far (we may want to see how they cope with a yet-to-deflate housing bubble before pronouncing it a success), Canada is a very different country from the United States. In Canada, they have had universal Medicare for 40 years. As the first President Bush used to say, it is a kindler, gentler country.

This matters for financial regulation, because there is a level of independenceand integrity on the part of the regulators in Canada that does not exist in the United States. The line in Washington is that if you want to talk to someone from Goldman Sachs, call the Treasury Department.

The close connection between the industry and the regulators matters because regulation will always require judgment calls. It also matters because regulation means limiting bank profits. The regulations are by definition about preventing banks from carrying on lines of business that are profitable.

Going back to the last crisis, our regulators should have cracked down on the junk mortgages that were being issued by the millions to buy homes at bubble-inflated prices. But this would have meant clamping down on banks that were making huge profits issuing the loans. It also would have meant clamping down on the investment banks that were making huge profits packaging them into securities and selling these securities all over the world.

To take an even more extreme case, the recent analysis of the Lehman bankruptcy showed that the New York Federal Reserve Bank helped to hide Lehman’s insolvency for months. It accepted Lehman’s junk as collateral for short-term loans. This was a direct violation of the Fed’s charter, which only allows it to accept investment grade assets as collateral, a definition that clearly did not include Lehman’s “Repo 105s.”

In these cases, our regulators instead used their judgment to decide that everything was just fine and looked the other way. Remarkably, no regulator was fired for these astounding failures in judgment. In fact, there was probably not even a single regulator who missed a promotion.

In the United States it will always be easy for regulators to look the other way, even when the ultimate consequences prove to be disastrous. By contrast, cracking down on politically connected banks is difficult for regulators. The banks’ executives will call their friends in the administration and Congress to complain about the crazy regulator who is trying to keep them from running their business.

And, you can be sure that the banks will have a story. They pay smart people lots of money to develop those stories. The banks’ mouthpieces will make a conscientious regulator look like a crazed vigilante who just doesn’t understand modern finance. Just ask Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission who was stopped in her effort to regulate credit default swaps back in 1998.

Krugman is right that breaking up the banks does not guarantee good regulation. In addition to his Great Depression example, we also have the S&L disaster of the 80s. The S&Ls were overwhelmingly small institutions with even the largest being far below any conceivable TBTF threshold.

However, a break-up of the big banks will at least give the country some hope that things can change. As it stands now, the big banks are back on their feet, and in some cases more profitable than ever, feasting on the now explicit government guarantee of support in the event of a crisis. By my calculations, this guarantee could be worth as much as $34 billion a year, more than one-third of the gross cost of the health care bill.

There are many aspects of regulatory reform that involve technical issues that the public will not follow. If we have to say what is different the day after financial reform is passed, rules on leverage limits and exchange-traded derivatives will not mean much, especially if they are enforced by people who accept Repo 105s as investment grade collateral.

If we break up Citigroup, Goldman, JP Morgan and the other giants, then we will know that something has changed. This break-up, along with a financial speculation tax, will lead to a qualitatively different financial industry.

"Federal Reserve System 'Corrupt'" says Stiglitz, Nobel Economist

Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-Winning Economist, Says Federal Reserve System 'Corrupt'
First Posted: 03- 3-10 07:00 PM

One of the world's leading economists said Wednesday that the very structure of the Federal Reserve system is so fraught with conflicts that it's "corrupt."

Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief economist at the World Bank, said that if a country had applied for World Bank aid during his tenure, with a financial regulatory system similar to the Federal Reserve's -- in which regional Feds are partly governed by the very banks they're supposed to police -- it would have raised alarms.

"If we had seen a governance structure that corresponds to our Federal Reserve system, we would have been yelling and screaming and saying that country does not deserve any assistance, this is a corrupt governing structure," Stiglitz said during a conference on financial reform in New York. "It's time for us to reflect on our own structure today, and to say there are parts that can be improved."

Stiglitz made the remarks at a conference held by the Roosevelt Institute. He and other speakers, including Harvard Law Professor and federal bailout watchdog Elizabeth Warren and legendary investor George Soros, had bold ideas about reforming the nation's financial system.

After the conference, Stiglitz said that his remarks on the Fed were "maybe a little hyperbole," but then again made the case that if another country had presented a plan to reform its financial system, and included a regulatory regime that copied the makeup of the Federal Reserve system, "it would have been a big signal that something is wrong."

To Stiglitz, the core issue is that regional Fed banks, such as the New York Fed, have clear conflicts of interest -- a result of the banks being partly governed by a board of directors that includes officers of the very banks they're supposed to be overseeing.

The New York Fed, which was led by current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner during the time leading Wall Street firms like Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, AIG, and Goldman Sachs were given hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer bailouts, presently has on its board of directors Jamie Dimon, the head of JPMorgan Chase. He's been there for three years. He replaced former Citigroup chairman Sanford "Sandy" Weill.

"So, these are the guys who appointed the guy who bailed them out," Stiglitz said. "Is that a conflict of interest?" he asked rhetorically.

"They would say, 'no conflict of interest, we were just doing our job,'" he answered. "But you have to look at the conflicts of interest."

A message left for a New York Fed spokeswoman after regular business hours was not returned.

"The reason you talk about governance is because in a democracy you want people to have confidence," Stiglitz said. "This is a structure that will undermine confidence in a democracy."