Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Show all posts

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Salary triples for Goldman CEO Blankfein

Salary triples for Goldman CEO Blankfein
By Agence France-Presse
Saturday, January 29th, 2011

WASHINGTON — US banking powerhouse Goldman Sachs said Friday it was more than tripling the salary of chief executive Lloyd Blankfein to $2 million in 2011 from $600,000 last year.

The four other top executives of Wall Street's premier investment bank will also see their basic salaries triple from the present $600,000: chief operating officer Gary Cohn, finance director David Viniar, and two vice presidents Michael Evans and John Weinberg will each earn $1.85 million, Goldman said in a document published Friday.

Such sums do not include the year-end bonuses which regularly multiply salaries at the top US banks by several times.

Last year Blankfein pulled in a bonus of $9 million.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

The 10 Greediest People of the Year

They came, they saw, they took it all. Welcome to the world where thieves have no honor, and those who hone their talents hammering the rest of us are lavishly rewarded.
By Sam Pizzigati, Campaign for America's Future
Posted on December 20, 2010

Hard times can be good times -- for the aggressively avaricious. Where others see pain, they see opportunity. In desperation, they delight. The grimmer the economic outlook, the more ghastly their grabbing.

And who grabbed the most outrageously in 2010? We offer below our annual take on America's ten greediest of the year.

10/ Nick Saban: A coach's fabulous crimson ride

America’s college football coaches seem to have made an end run around the Great Recession. In 2006, only 10 of the about 120 big-time college football coaches took home at least $2 million a year. The 2010 total: 38.

The king of them all: the University of Alabama’s Nick Saban, with a 2010 takehome at $6,087,349, six times the college football coaching average. Only five coaches in all of professional sports will this year make more than Saban.

Forbes has labeled Saban the “most powerful coach in sports,” and his many perks -- everything from two cars to a contract clause that lets him exit Alabama at any time without taking a financial penalty -- amply confirm that assessment.

Financial penalties, meanwhile, are abounding throughout the rest of Alabama's public sector. Budget cuts have forced some colleges in the state to up tuition as much as 23 percent. The state’s overall education budget dropped 9.5 percent in 2010, and local school boards now see no way to “avoid major layoffs.”

Saban, for his part, has been blasting the “greed” of sports agents who sneak college athletes cash in hopes of cashing out big themselves when the athletes turn pro. In August, Saban called these agents no better “than a pimp.”

A pimp, responded one national sports writer, displays a “willingness to physically exploit young people” the pimp claims “to protect” and, “above all, a love of money.” That definition, continued Fox Sports analyst Mark Kriegel, just might fit Nick Saban, Alabama’s most “highly paid state employee.”

9/ Howard Schultz: How to brew a bigger fortune

A decade ago, after running coffee giant Starbucks for 13 years, Howard Schultz stepped down as CEO to take life a bit easier as the company’s “chief global strategist.” Early in 2008, with Starbucks struggling mightily in the marketplace, Schultz took back his CEO slot.

The struggles continued. Massive layoffs would soon slash the chain's workforce by 19 percent. Schultz would feel the pain. He started trumpeting “the shared sacrifice I want to make” -- and pledged to take almost no personal salary.

But CEOs, wink, wink, only get a small fraction of their total pay from straight salary. The Starbucks corporate board, behind the sacrificing scenes, was actually turbocharging the Schultz pay package with a mammoth grant of stock options, delivered at just the moment Starbucks shares were hovering at a rock-bottom low.

Starbucks valued those options, at the time of their granting, at $12.4 million. By May 2010, after a Wall Street mini-boom, the value of the shares had soared to $46.8 million. More good news for Schultz: He scored another $26 million last year exercising options he had been granted way back in 1998 and 1999.

And what about Starbucks shareholders? Those who bought their shares in 2007, right before the Great Recession, still have no gain to show for their investment.

8/ Daniel Akerson: Competing at a mythic level

The chief executive of General Motors since this past September, Daniel Akerson, earlier this month gave his first “high-profile speech” as the automaker’s CEO. The prime takeaway from his address? The feds, said Akerson, need to ease up on the bailout pay limits still in effect for his fellow top GM executives.

”We have to be competitive,” Akerson told the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. “We have to be able to attract good people.”

Getting “good people” to fill jobs below GM’s executive level, on the other hand, apparently doesn’t matter all that much. GM salaried employees, Akerson has decided, will not see any increases this coming year in their base salaries. New assembly line workers at GM, for their part, are now making only $14 an hour, half the rate they would have been making before GM’s meltdown.

Akerson is currently making $1.7 million in cash annually, on top of $5.3 million in stock for the next three years. Before GM’s meltdown, the automaker’s CEO, Rick Wagoner, was raking in a much more “competitive” $10.2 million.

“Competitive” might not actually be the right word here. In the year Wagoner all by himself was collecting $10.2 million, Toyota’s top 32 execs -- a group that included CEO Katsuaki Watanabe -- were together pulling in only $19.9 million.

7/ Don Blankenship: Dirty business as usual

Outside the nation’s coal fields, few Americans knew Don Blankenship, the CEO at Massey Energy, before last April. But that all changed after an explosion that month left 29 Massey miners dead. Reporters would soon grill Blankenship about the mine’s long history of safety violations, over 500 in 2009 alone.

“Violations,” the Massey chief coldheartedly retorted, “are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process.”

Almost as normal as windfall paychecks for Don Blankenship. The Massey CEO took home nearly $34 million in 2005, about quadruple the industry standard. Over the last three years, he has waltzed away from his office with another $38.2 million. But the real waltzing is only now beginning.

The 60-year-old Blankenship is retiring at the end of this year with a pension valued at $5.7 million, another $12 million in severance, still another $27.2 million in deferred pay, title to a company-owned house, and a two-year consulting agreement that pays $5,000 a month for no more than 32 hours work.

Blankenship may even exit, once all this year's stats have come in, with a 2010 “performance” bonus that factors in safety.

How can a coal company CEO with 29 dead miners get a safety bonus? Massey’s flagship safety standard, “Non-Fatal Days Lost,” merely multiplies “the number of employee work-related accidents times 200,000 hours, divided by the total employee hours worked.” Death doesn’t factor in.

6/ David Cote: King of America's corporate political cash

Coal can kill. Uranium, too. Workers who handle uranium, notes labor journalist Mike Elk, “suffer rates of cancer 10 times higher than the general public.”

That’s one big reason why the union local that represents workers at a Honeywell uranium facility in Illinois this past June rejected a management proposal to eliminate retiree medical care and boost -- to $8,500 a year -- the out-of-pocket health care costs active workers have to pay.

A disappointed Honeywell, one of the nation’s top defense contractors, promptly locked the Illinois uranium workers out. Those workers, ever since then, have been trying to meet face to face with Honeywell CEO David Cote.

The week after Thanksgiving, the locked-out workers even traveled to Washington, D.C., where Cote, a member of President Obama’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility, was discussing with his fellow commissioners a variety of proposals to slash federal spending.

Cote, who took home $13.2 million last year and $28.7 million the year before, has been spending big himself -- on political contributions. Under his direction, Honeywell has emerged as the nation’s top corporate political giver.

Cote’s agenda? Making sure the budget-cutters in Washington keep hands off defense contracts. As one alternative, press reports indicate, he’s pushing a freeze on the pay that goes to America’s servicemen and women.

5/ David Tepper: This hedge needs clipping

Nobody made more money last year than America’s top hedge fund managers, and no hedge fund manager made more than David Tepper. This 53-year-old former junk bond trader at Goldman Sachs hit a $4 billion jackpot essentially betting, in the middle of the global financial meltdown, that Uncle Sam wouldn't let Wall Street's biggest banks go under.

Tepper is currently doing his best to single-handedly reboot America’s still depressed residential real estate market. In June, he spent $43.5 million to pick up a summer home in the Hamptons that used to belong to former New Jersey governor and Goldman Sachs CEO Jon Corzine. The 6.5-acre beachfront spread sports six bedrooms, a tennis court, and a heated pool -- and rented last summer for $900,000.

The $43.5 million Tepper shelled out ended up the highest price paid this year for a Hamptons home. The total also amounted to about half the record $88 million the hedge fund industry raised for the homeless this past May at the 2010 Robin Hood Foundation dinner, Wall Street's single biggest annual charity gala.

One official at the foundation dubbed that $88 million an act of “extraordinary generosity.” Others might define “extraordinary” a bit differently. David Tepper and the rest of the hedge fund industry’s top 25 last year together pocketed $25.3 billion. They averaged, each and every business day, over $100 million.

4/ Lloyd Blankfein: Getting the most from our tax dollars

Lloyd Blankfein, the chief exec at Wall Street’s biggest bank, has had a stunning century. Since 2000, Bloomberg News calculates, Blankfein has earned a whopping $125 million in cash bonuses and enough additional stock awards to leave him with a personal stash of Goldman shares worth over $300 million.

And the goodies keep coming. This January, Blankfein will pick up another $24.3 million in stock, as a delayed payout from previous years. He’ll also pick up millions more in soon-to-be-announced bonuses for 2010.

News of these bonuses, Wall Street analyst Jeanne Branthover predicts, will leave the public “outraged” and Wall Streeters “excited” -- that “there’s still a reason to be working so hard.”

How hard is Lloyd Blankfein working? He simply never misses an opportunity, however small, to make a buck off taxpayers. This year’s prime example: the fees that Goldman Sachs has fixed on Build America Bonds, the federal program that's helping states and localities raise money for construction job projects.

Local governments, in tough times, often have to cut back on such projects because they can't afford to pay the interest on new bond offerings. With Build America Bonds, the federal government is paying 35 percent of this interest.

Investment banks charge municipalities fees to bring their bonds to investors. Goldman’s fees typically range up to 0.625 percent of each bond issue. But Goldman has been charging, on Build America Bonds, up to 0.875 percent. Why so much? Goldman, Blankfein told Congress, had to “educate the market.”

3/ Mark Hurd: Unfurling a platinum parachute

The truly greedy don’t just grab -- at the expense of those they overpower. And the truly greedy don’t just feel entitled to grab all they can get. The truly greedy feel invincible while they’re grabbing away, just like former Hewlett-Packard CEO Mark Hurd.

Hurd gained the HP reins in 2005. He proceeded to pocket $134.2 million, through 2009, mainly be wheeling and dealing his way through dozens of mergers that killed nearly 40,000 jobs.

HP’s board cheered Hurd on, every step of the way, until this past August when news surfaced that the married CEO had wined and dined a former erotic actress, handed her a huge and undeserved marketing contract, and then fudged HP's books to cover up his indiscretions.

That arrogance would cost Hurd his job, but not much else. Hurd left HP with a severance package that may total $40 million and almost immediately landed a comfy new gig as president of business software giant Oracle. His new contract will bring Hurd, in his first Oracle year, as much as $11 million -- and a boss, Oracle CEO Larry Ellison, who just happens to be his buddy.

2/ Larry Ellison: How dare we call him ruthless

Mark Hurd has shown himself to be a whiz at the merge-and-purge corporate CEO two-step. But the master of that merger two-step -- snatch a rival’s customers, then fire its workers -- has always been Oracle chief executive Larry Ellison, the third-richest man in America.

Oracle has bought out 66 companies over the years, and Ellison, the Wall Street Journal estimates, has collected $1.84 billion in compensation just the last ten years alone. But Oracle's chief started this past year out vowing to change his ways.

In January, after consummating a $7.4 billion takeover of Sun Microsystems, Ellison had “We’re Hiring” buttons handed out at the news conference to announce the deal -- and then royally denounced a news report that Oracle would be axing half of Sun’s 27,600 workers.

“Those who wrote this should be ashamed of themselves,” Ellison ranted. “The truth is, we are going to hire about 2,000 new people to beef up the Sun businesses -- about twice as many as we will let go.”

The truth turned out to be anything but. Five months later, with no fanfare, an Oracle filing with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission revealed that the company was taking a huge severance write-off for personnel reductions. As many as 8,600 jobs, one analyst calculated, would be history.

1/ Andrew Clark: Education really does pay

Just a few years ago, at the height of America’s subprime frenzy, bankers and mortgage lenders were making mega millions hoodwinking vulnerable old people into refinancing their homes at unconscionably high interest rates.

Today, in an economy still reeling from that fraud, a new high-growth industry -- the for-profit higher ed sector -- is hoodwinking vulnerable young people into taking on taxpayer-financed student loans they can’t possibly repay.

And now this industry, facing federal regulations that aim to rein in its deceit, is waging a massive media campaign based on the phony premise that Washington wants to make it “harder to get the education” students “need to succeed.”

No one is personally profiting more from this for-profit higher ed industry chutzpah than the CEO of the San Diego-based Bridgepoint Education, an enterprise that specializes, of late, in going after returning military veterans. That CEO, Andrew Clark, last year took home $20.5 million.

For-profit colleges didn’t pay any particular attention to military vets until 2008. But Congress that year gave veteran tuition benefits a significant hike, and the for-profits rushed to gobble up the newly available tuition dollars. Bridgepoint's military enrollment soared to 9,200 in 2009, up from just 329 three years earlier.

Overall, the New York Times recently reported, Andrew Clark’s Bridgepoint last year spent more on marketing and promotion than on educating its students.

For-profit colleges have hit upon an enormously lucrative business model: Promise vets -- and other potential students -- anything to get them to enroll, even if that means signing them up for courses of little real value or classes, the Times notes, they would be “all but certain” to fail. If students do fail or drop out, no prob. The for-profits get to keep the tuition, courtesy of America’s taxpayers.

Plenty of America's power suits, to be sure, are making more money than Andrew Clark. But none are grabbing with any more gusto.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

CEO Salaries vs. Company Profits

By Focus Editors
America is still picking up the pieces of the worst financial disaster in decades, and the bulk of the damage struck in the financial market. In a time where you might think banks would be keeping their money internal to repair and rebuild their organizations, we have instead gaped in horror as some of these same executives receive multimillion dollar bonuses year after year. In fact, a study performed by the Associated Press in 2008 found that $1.6 billion of total government bail out money (money provided to fledgling organizations intended to keep them from total collapse) went straight to various executives pockets. Today we explore where some of that morally-questionable money went.

Ken Lewis of Bank Of America
The Huffington Post reports that Bank Of America received $25 billion in bail out money in 2008, and an additional $20 billion in 2009 to cover the loss they took when they acquired Merrill Lynch. This massive infusion of government money came only one year before Ken Lewis stepped down from the office of CEO with $83 million in compensation packages. The bank was more eager than some other bailed out companies to pay back its debts to the government, and succeeded in doing so late last year. But thePost makes clear that this was not out of any moral or ethical dedication to their duty, but mostly so that their executives would not be hindered by government pay restrictions imposed on bailed out companies.

Vikram Pandit of Citigroup
In 2008, the same year that Citigroup accepted a $45 billion government bailout, MarketWatch reports that former CEO Vikram Pandit took home a benefits package worth $38.2 million. This package consisted mostly of stocks and options, combined with a $958,333 annual salary. Interestingly enough, Pandit declined the opportunity to be considered for huge bonuses, and committed to working for $1.00 in base pay until the company was back to profitability. Additionally, the CEO reimbursed Citigroup over $170,000 for personal use of the company aircraft.

Martin Sullivan of AIG
CNBC reported that Martin Sullivan retired from the collapsing offices of AIG, but not before pocketing a $47 million stock and benefits package. Only a few months later AIG was approved for $85 billion in government bailout funds. Slate.com reports that this king's ransom was raised from selling off federal securities, bringing the fed down below $200 billion in reserves.

Being the world's largest insurance company, the US government saved AIG to avoid the disastrous outcome on the financial market that would have occurred if the company collapsed. If AIG was allowed to go under, NPR reports that it would have resulted in $185 billion worth of damage to the world financial market, a blow that would have resulted in "substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and a materially weaker economic performance."

Richard Wagoner of General Motors

According to the New York Times, former General Motors CEO Richard Wagoner received a $14.4 million dollar "goodbye" package in 2008. That same year, the US government appropriated $50 billion in bailout money to save the auto manufacturer from tanking. CommonCause.org reports that the majority of this money came from pension and stock benefits, along with a $1.55 million salary.

Daniel Akerson was brought in as Wagoner's replacement, and has gone on record saying that he took the job because he believes in the government's decision to save General Motors. "[The bailout] was absolutely the right decision for this company, for this region, for the manufacturing base of the United Sates," Akerson told the Washington Post. "I wouldn't have agreed to go on the board...if I hadn't agreed with that decision."

Frederick Waddell of Northern Trust
Northern Trust received one of the smallest government bailout appropriations of 2008, totaling just $1.6 billion. This is why it was so shocking to see CEO Frederick Waddell recieve a compensation package of over $6 million that same year. As reported By CommonCause.org, this money came mostly in the form of stock, options, and salary. Under Waddell's leadership, Northern Trust succeeded in paying the off the government bail out in full in under a year. In 2009, the institution issued a press release proudly announcing this accomplishment, and that same year Forbes reported that Waddell's compensation has nearly doubled, increasing to $11.89 million. The raise was no doubt justified by his quick action in repaying the debt.

Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs
Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of the recently indicted Goldman Sachs, reportedly took home over $70 million in 2008 alone. That same year, Goldman Sachs was bailed out to the tune of $10 billion, leading many to question the rationale behind Blankfein's massive compensation. The Huffington Post claims that that this compensation makes over $125 million over the past 10 years.

In 2009, the company was brought up on charges of sub prime mortgage fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission, who claimed that the organization deliberately marketed bad loans in a deceptive manner. The Post reports that Blankfein settled with the SEC in July to the tune of $550 million.

Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase

In what feels like a total slap in the face, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon somehow found the budget room to snag a $28 million bonus package in late 2007 despite JPMorgan Chase being in such poor financial shape that they needed a $25 billion government bail out a mere year later. As if this wasn't bad enough, CNN reports that 2009 brought about another round of bonuses for Dimon, this time in the amount of $16 million.

BusinessWeek announced that President Obama was having dinner with Jamie Dimon to dinner to discuss financial reform at the White House. Since the meeting, no official reports have been released disclosing what was discussed.

Thursday, April 29, 2010

The Prospects for Real Financial Reform Remain Remote

Teapot Tempest Over Goldman Sachs
By ANDREW COCKBURN

Anyone who believes that Goldman Sachs is made up of coldhearted calculating machines, with scant room for any human emotion apart from avarice, should have been monitoring the firm’s most recent global videoconference. This is a quarterly event in which senior executives address the firm’s managing directors assembled at their various far-flung outposts around the planet. These are normally sober events, but this time, so I am reliably informed, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein was given a standing ovation by the hundred or so executives – “reportedly a first time for such emotional release in the reptile cage” reports one close observer of Goldman culture.

The fact that Goldman stock was rising -- the firm was worth an extra $549 million by day's end -- even as Blankfein and various underlings were being grilled by Carl Levin and others on their misdeeds indicates how little the bank has to fear from the people’s wrath, muffled as it is by the administration and congress. After all, the real threat of Blanche Lincoln’s killer provision on derivatives trading, lurking like a nuclear suitcase in the financial “reform” bill, is already rapidly going away.

As I reported last week, Lincoln introduced this provision, which effectively implements the “Volcker rule” – ballyhooed and then forgotten by Obama a while back – excluding the banks from their most profitable line of proprietary trading in derivatives -- in a fit of pique at Tim Geithner. Word in the lobbying community is that her lapse from normal subservience to Wall Street’s command was deeply gratifying to Pat McCarty, Chief Counsel to Lincoln’s Agriculture Committee.

McCarty has reportedly long chafed at crafting legislation implementing the bankers’ dictates, so it was with great pleasure that he, at Lincoln’s request, told the committee, as well as the lobbyists packing the room, that the bill would deprive derivatives traders of access federal bank insurance programs, especially all those nice bailout vehicles such as the Fed’s discount window, not to mention the deposit guarantee from the FDIC, thus effectively driving JP Morgan etc out of the business.

On the other hand it is hardly possible that Lincoln, still less her fellow Democratic senators, have really decided to usher in the communist revolution by wiping out the banks’ major source of trading profits. Nor will the White House or Treasury permit this to happen. We know this because New York Senator Kirsten Gilliband has been telling emissaries from Barclays Plc so, adding that it would never get through the senate anyway. This was very welcome news for the emissaries, conscious as they were that the top five Wall Street banks made $28 billion in profits from derivatives trading last year, and they rushed to pass on the good news to clients.
Lincoln’s populist lunge hasn’t done her much good in Arkansas, where the latest polls put “Bailout Blanche” further behind her primary (May 18) and general election opponents than ever.

For a few days this week it looked as if the senate Democrats could afford to pose as the flails of Wall Street while the Republicans obligingly blocked debate on the reform bill. Now that the Republicans have abandoned that strategy, we can assume that Blanche’s provision will be taken into a back room and quietly smothered in the interests of bipartisanship.

The Interrogation of Lloyd Blankfein

"Goldman Puts Its Own Interests Ahead of the Interests of Its Clients"
By MIKE WHITNEY

T
uesday's hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations laid the groundwork for future criminal prosecutions of Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein and his chief lieutenants whose reckless and self-serving actions helped to precipitate the financial crisis. Committee chairman Senator Carl Levin (a former prosecutor) adroitly managed the proceedings in a way that narrowed their scope and focused on four main areas of concern. Through persistent questioning, which bordered on hectoring, Levin was able to prove his central thesis:
1. That Goldman puts its own interests before those of its clients.
2. That Goldman knowingly misled it clients and sold them "crap" that it was betting against.
3. That Goldman made billions trading securities that pumped up the housing bubble.
4. That Goldman made money trading securities that triggered a market crash and led to the deepest recession in 80 years.
The hearings lasted for 8 hours and included interviews with seven Goldman executives. Every senator had the opportunity to make a statement and question the Goldman employees. But the day belonged to Carl Levin. Levin was well-prepared, articulate and relentless. He had a game-plan and he stuck to it. He peppered Goldman's Blankfein with question after question like a prosecuting attorney cross-examining a witness. He never let up and never veered off topic. He knew what he wanted to achieve and he succeeded. Here's a clip from his opening statement:
"The evidence shows that Goldman repeatedly put its own interests and profits ahead of the interests of its clients and our communities.....It profited by taking advantage of its clients' reasonable expectation that it would not sell products that it didn't want to succeed.... 
Goldman's actions demonstrate that it often saw its clients not as valuable customers, but as objects for its own profit....Goldman documents make clear that in 2007 it was betting heavily against the housing market while it was selling investments in that market to its clients. It sold those clients high-risk mortgage-backed securities and CDOs that it wanted to get off its books in transactions that created a conflict of interest between Goldman's bottom line and its clients' interests." (Senator Carl Levin's opening statement for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)
Levin's entire statement is worth reading, but these two paragraphs distill his plan for exposing Goldman. He was determined to "go small" and repeat the same points over and over again. And it worked. From a purely strategic point of view, Levin's battleplan was flawless. The Goldman execs never knew what hit them. They swaggered into the chamber thinking they'd breeze through the hearings and have a few laughs over cocktails afterwards, and left with their heads in their hands. They were outmatched and outmaneuvered.
Senator Carl Levin:
"These findings are deeply troubling. They show a Wall Street culture that, while it may once have focused on serving clients and promoting commerce, is now all too often simply self-serving. The ultimate harm here is not just to clients poorly served by their investment bank. It's to all of us. The toxic mortgages and related instruments that these firms injected into our financial system have done incalculable harm to people who had never heard of a mortgage-backed security or a CDO, and who have no defenses against the harm such exotic Wall Street creations can cause....
These facts end the pretense that Goldman's actions were part of its efforts to operate as a mere "market-maker," bringing buyers and sellers together. These short positions didn't represent customer service or necessary hedges against risks that Goldman incurred as it made a market for customers. They represented major bets that the mortgage securities market - a market Goldman helped create - was in for a major decline. Goldman continues to deny that it shorted the mortgage market for profit, despite the evidence... 
The firm cannot successfully continue to portray itself as working on behalf of its clients if it was selling mortgage related products to those clients while it was betting its own money against those same products or the mortgage market as a whole. The scope of this conflict is reflected in an internal company email sent on May 17, 2007, discussing the collapse of two mortgage-related instruments, tied to WaMu-issued mortgages, that Goldman helped assemble and sell. The "bad news," a Goldman employee says, is that the firm lost $2.5 million on the collapse. But the "good news," he reports, is that the company had bet that the securities would collapse, and made $5 million on that bet. They lost money on the mortgage related products they still held, and of course the clients they sold these products to lost big time. But Goldman Sachs also made out big time in its bet against its own products and its own clients." (Sen. Carl Levin)
Levin had all the facts at his fingertips and put them to good use. Goldman's execs were on their heels from the start and never really regained their footing. Even worse, the hearings showed that Goldman cannot be trusted. Their reputation is in ruins. Levin proved that if Goldman has junk in its portfolio, it won't hesitate to dump it on its clients and then pass around high-fives at the prop-desk. Here's a typical exchange between Levin and the former head of Goldman's mortgage department, Dan Sparks:
SEN. CARL LEVIN: June 22 is the date of this e-mail. "Boy, that Timberwolf was one shitty deal." How much of that "shitty deal" did you sell to your clients after June 22, 2007?
DAN SPARKS: Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answer to that. But the price would have reflected levels that they wanted to invest...
SEN. CARL LEVIN: Oh, of course.
DAN SPARKS: ... at that time.
SEN. CARL LEVIN: But you didn't tell them you thought it was a shitty deal.
DAN SPARKS: Well, I didn't say that.
SEN. CARL LEVIN: Who did? Your people, internally. You knew it was a shitty deal, and that's what your...
DAN SPARKS: I think the context, the message that I took from the e-mail from Mr. Montag, was that my performance on that deal wasn't good.
SEN. CARL LEVIN: How about the fact that you sold hundreds of millions of that deal after your people knew it was a shitty deal? Does that bother you at all; you sold the customers something?
DAN SPARKS: I don't recall selling hundreds of millions of that deal after that.
Levin was just as tough on Blankfein, reiterating the same question over and over again: "Is there not a conflict when you sell something to somebody, and then you bet against that same security, and you don't disclose that to the person you're selling it to? Do you see a problem?"

At first, Blankfein acted like he'd never considered the question before, as if "putting himself in his client's shoes" was something that never even entered his mind. His look of utter bewilderment was revealing. Then he launched into the excuses, the evasions, and the elaborate, long-winded ruminations that one expects from schoolboys and hucksters. But Levin never gave and inch. He kept pushing until Blankfein finally gave up and responded.

"No," he stammered, "In the context of market-making that's not a conflict."

Blankfein's answer was a triumph for Levin, and he knew it. To the millions of people watching the sequence on TV, Blankfein's denial was as good as an admission of guilt. It showed that Wall Street kingpins don't share the same morals as everyone else. In fact, Blankfein seemed genuinely confused that morality would even be an issue. After all, it wasn't for him.

Levin covered some old ground, pointing to Goldman's dealings with Washington Mutual's Long Beach unit which was a "conveyor belt" for garbage subprimes which frequently blew up just months after they were issued. It's clear that Goldman knew the mortgages were junk that were “polluting the financial system”, but that made no difference. Goldman feels that it's responsible to its shareholders alone, not the people who bailed it out.

All in all, it was a bad day for the holding company that's come to embody everything that's wrong with Wall Street. Goldman entered the hearings as the most successful financial institution in the country, and left with its reputation in tatters and its future uncertain. Its CEO came across as shifty and jesuitical while his executives seemed arrogant and uncooperative. At no point during the hearings did any of the Goldman throng look at ease with themselves or their answers. They remained rigid and sullen throughout. On top of that, they were unable to defend themselves against the main charge, that they don't mind sticking it to their clients if it means a bigger slice of the pie for themselves.

The truth is, the Golden boys were handled quite capably by an elderly statesman who took them to the woodshed and gave them a good hiding. Levin's stunning performance is likely to draw attention to the upcoming SEC proceedings and, hopefully, build momentum for more subpoenas, indictments, arrests, and long prison sentences.

Saturday, April 24, 2010

e-Mails Show Goldman Sachs Sought Profit from Housing Downturn

Goldman Sachs e-Mails Show Bank Sought to Profit from Housing Downturn
by Zachary Goldfarb

A Senate investigation into the financial crisis has found that Goldman Sachs, the storied Wall Street investment bank, sought to profit from the historic decline in housing prices by betting against the U.S. mortgage market.

Goldman Sachs "made more than we lost because of shorts," Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein said in a November 2007 e-mail. The documents show that Goldman, at times, made big, profitable bets against the housing market -- sometimes betting against mortgage investments that it had sold to investors.

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, said four internal e-mails released Saturday contradict Goldman's assertion that it didn't seek to profit from the housing downturn. "Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market," Levin said.

In a November 2007 e-mail, Goldman chief executive Lloyd Blankfein wrote that the firm "lost money" on the housing market, "then made more than we lost because of shorts."

The release of the documents comes as Goldman Sachs is preparing its most detailed defense yet to allegations that it misled clients in its mortgage securities business, arguing that the firm was unsure whether housing prices would rise or fall and did not take any action at odds with the interests of its clients.

An internal Goldman document, prepared for senior executives and obtained by The Washington Post, describes debates among top executives in 2006 and 2007 over whether the firm should make investment decisions based on the belief that the mortgage market would continue to prosper.

The document details meetings and e-mails that ultimately resulted in a decision to reduce the company's exposure to the mortgage market, especially subprime loans, by making new investments that would pay off if housing prices fell.

Goldman has been widely criticized for investing its own money to bet against the housing market while simultaneously urging clients to invest in securities that would increase in value only if the housing market did.

Those concerns over possible double-dealing spiked a week ago as the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a fraud suit against Goldman, alleging that it misled clients by selling them mortgage-related securities secretly designed to fail.

The Senate panel will hold a hearing on investment banks and the financial crisis Tuesday. Blankfein and other executives are scheduled to testify.

In one of the e-mails obtained by the committee, Goldman chief financial officer David Viniar responded to a report that the firm earned $50 million in one day with bets that the housing market would decline.

"Tells you what might be happening to people who don't have the big short," Viniar wrote to his colleagues.

In another e-mail, Goldman executives discussed how one subprime mortgage lender the company worked with was facing "wipeout" and another's collapse was "imminent." Goldman helped these lenders bundle and sell their loans to investors.

But one executive, Deeb Salem, wrote, the "good news" was that Goldman would profit $5 million from a bet against the very same bundles of loans it had helped create.

In an October 2007 e-mail, Goldman Sachs mortgage trader Michael Swenson was gleeful at news that credit-rating companies downgraded mortgage-related investments, which caused losses for investors.

"Sounds like we will make some serious money," the executive wrote.

"Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis," Levin said. "They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients."

The e-mails released Saturday portray a different narrative than the one Goldman has given about its role in the mortgage market.

According to Goldman's 11-page defense, while the firm moved to significantly reduce its losses when the housing market cratered, the bank was confused, like many other financial firms, over how bad the collapse would be and suffered losses as a result.

The document also reprises Goldman's frequent explanation that it was not investing its own money in financial transactions to make a trading profit but to help investors who wanted to do a deal and could not easily find someone to trade with. That role, commonly played by investment banks, is known as being a market maker.

In the paper, Goldman argues that it was a relatively small player in the mortgage market, bringing in only $500 million from its residential mortgage business in 2007, less than 1 percent of the firm's overall revenue.

Still, the bank's mortgage investments were large enough that executives began to worry in 2006 that it was betting too heavily on the health of the housing market.

According to the document, the concerns arose in late 2006, when Dan Sparks, the head of the mortgage unit, wrote to top executives that the "subprime market [was] getting hit hard," with the firm losing $20 million in one day.

On Dec. 14, 2006, chief financial officer Viniar called Goldman's mortgage traders and risk managers into a meeting to discuss investing strategy. They concluded that they would reduce the firm's overall exposure to the subprime mortgage market.

But the prevailing view of executives, as described in the paper, was not that the housing market was headed into a prolonged decline. They were not looking to short the market overall. That would have entailed making such large bets against mortgage securities that the firm would turn a profit if the market as a whole collapsed, which in fact it did.

The document acknowledges that Goldman at times shorted the overall market but describes those periods as temporary while the firm was rebalancing its portfolio to limit losses if mortgage securities were to lose more value.

At some moments, executives were actually considering making new bets, buying potentially undervalued securities that could pay off when the mortgage market turned around. A day after Viniar met with traders and risk managers, he wrote to Tom Montan, co-head of the securities division, saying, "There will be very good opportunities as the markets goes into what is likely to be even greater distress and we want to be in position to take advantage of them."

The back-and-forth over which way the market would go, and how to invest in it, continued into 2007.

On March 14, Goldman co-president Jon Winkelried e-mailed Sparks and others asking what the bank was doing to protect itself from a decline in prices of not just subprime loans, but also other loans traditionally considered less risky. Sparks replied that the firm was trying to have "smaller" exposure to those loans also.

But managing director Richard Ruzika took issue with that answer a few days later, saying that Goldman might be overestimating the decline in housing. "It does feel to me like the market in general underestimated how bad it could get. And now could be overestimating where we are heading," he wrote in an e-mail. "While undoubtedly there will be some continued spillover, I'm not so convinced this is a total death spiral. In fact, we may have terrific opportunities."

Sparks later endorsed that optimistic view, suggesting as late as August 2007 that Goldman begin buying more mortgage securities.

The bank did not immediately follow that path, and by Nov. 30, 2007, Goldman had largely canceled out its exposure to subprime mortgages by increasing its bets that the market would continue to slide, according to the document.

But by that account, Goldman also continued to have $13.5 billion in exposure to safer, prime mortgages. That cost the bank. In 2008, the firm lost $1.7 billion on investments in residential mortgages.