Showing posts with label Merrill Lynch. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Merrill Lynch. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Bank of America: Too Crooked to Fail

The bank has defrauded everyone from investors and insurers to homeowners and the unemployed. So why does the government keep bailing it out?
by: Matt Taibbi ~ Rolling Stone

Illustration by Victor Juhasz
At least Bank of America got its name right. The ultimate Too Big to Fail bank really is America, a hyper-gluttonous ward of the state whose limitless fraud and criminal conspiracies we'll all be paying for until the end of time. Did you hear about the plot to rig global interest rates? The $137 million fine for bilking needy schools and cities? The ingenious plan to suck multiple fees out of the unemployment checks of jobless workers? Take your eyes off them for 10 seconds and guaranteed, they'll be into some shit again: This bank is like the world's worst-behaved teenager, taking your car and running over kittens and fire hydrants on the way to Vegas for the weekend, maxing out your credit cards in the three days you spend at your aunt's funeral. They're out of control, yet they'll never do time or go out of business, because the government remains creepily committed to their survival, like overindulgent parents who refuse to believe their 40-year-old live-at-home son could possibly be responsible for those dead hookers in the backyard.

It's been four years since the government, in the name of preventing a depression, saved this megabank from ruin by pumping $45 billion of taxpayer money into its arm. Since then, the Obama administration has looked the other way as the bank committed an astonishing variety of crimes – some elaborate and brilliant in their conception, some so crude that they'd be beneath your average street thug. Bank of America has systematically ripped off almost everyone with whom it has a significant business relationship, cheating investors, insurers, depositors, homeowners, shareholders, pensioners and taxpayers. It brought tens of thousands of Americans to foreclosure court using bogus, "robo-signed" evidence – a type of mass perjury that it helped pioneer. It hawked worthless mortgages to dozens of unions and state pension funds, draining them of hundreds of millions in value. And when it wasn't ripping off workers and pensioners, it was helping to push insurance giants like AMBAC into bankruptcy by fraudulently inducing them to spend hundreds of millions insuring those same worthless mortgages.

But despite being the very definition of an unaccountable corporate villain, Bank of America is now bigger and more dangerous than ever. It controls more than 12 percent of America's bank deposits (skirting a federal law designed to prohibit any firm from controlling more than 10 percent), as well as 17 percent of all American home mortgages. By looking the other way and rewarding the bank's bad behavior with a massive government bailout, we actually allowed a huge financial company to not just grow so big that its collapse would imperil the whole economy, but to get away with any and all crimes it might commit. Too Big to Fail is one thing; it's also far too corrupt to survive.

All the government bailouts succeeded in doing was to make the bank even more prone to catastrophic failure – and now that catastrophe might finally be at hand. Bank of America's share price has plunged into the single digits, and the bank faces battles in courtrooms all over America to avoid paying back the hundreds of billions it stole from everyone in sight. Its credit rating, already downgraded to a few rungs above junk status, could plummet with the next bad analyst report, causing a frenzied rush to the exits by creditors, investors and stockholders – an institutional run on the bank.

They're in deep trouble, but they won't die, because our current president, like the last one, apparently believes it's better to project a false image of financial soundness than to allow one of our oligarchic banks to collapse under the weight of its own corruption. Last year, the Federal Reserve allowed Bank of America to move a huge portfolio of dangerous bets into a side of the company that happens to be FDIC-insured, putting all of us on the hook for as much as $55 trillion in irresponsible gambles. Then, in February, the Justice Department's so-called foreclosure settlement, which will supposedly provide $26 billion in relief for ripped-off homeowners, actually rewarded the bank with a legal waiver that will allow it to escape untold billions in lawsuits. And this month the Fed will release the results of its annual stress test, in which the bank will once again be permitted to perpetuate its fiction of solvency by grossly overrating the mountains of toxic loans on its books. At this point, the rescue effort is so sweeping and elaborate that it goes far beyond simply gouging the tax dollars of millions of struggling families, many of whom have already been ripped off by the bank – it's making the government, and by extension all of us, full-blown accomplices to the fraud.

Anyone who wants to know what the Occupy Wall Street protests are all about need only look at the way Bank of America does business. It comes down to this: These guys are some of the very biggest assholes on Earth. They lie, cheat and steal as reflexively as addicts, they laugh at people who are suffering and don't have money, they pay themselves huge salaries with money stolen from old people and taxpayers – and on top of it all, they completely suck at banking. And yet the state won't let them go out of business, no matter how much they deserve it, and it won't slap them in jail, no matter what crimes they commit. That makes them not bankers or capitalists, but a class of person that was never supposed to exist in America: royalty.

Self-appointed royalty, it's true – but just as dumb and inbred as the real thing, and every bit as expensive to support. Like all royals, they reached their position in society by being relentlessly dedicated to the cause of Bigness, Unaccountability and the Worthlessness of Others. And just like royals, they spend most of their lives getting deeper in debt, and laughing every year when our taxes go to covering their whist markers. Two and a half centuries after we kicked out the British, it's really come to this?
***
Bank of America started out in San Francisco in 1904 as an emblem of American capitalism. Founded by a first-generation Italian-American named Amadeo Giannini – it was even originally called the Bank of Italy – the bank set out to serve immigrants denied credit by other banks, and it was instrumental in helping to rebuild the city after the devastating earthquake of 1906.

But like many of the truly bad ideas in history, the present-day version of Bank of America was the product of a testosterone overdose. The concept of an overmassive, acquiring-everything-in-sight, bicoastal megabank was hatched in the terminal inferiority complex of a greed-sick asshole – actually two greed-sick assholes, both of them CEOs of Southern regional banks, who launched a cartoonish arms race of bank acquisitions that would ultimately turn the American business world upside down.

The antagonists were Hugh McColl Jr. and Ed Crutchfield, the respective leaders of North Carolina National Bank (which would take over Bank of America) and First Union (which turned into Wachovia), both based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Obsessed with each other, these two men transformed their personal competition into one of the most ridiculous and elaborate penis-measuring contests in the history of American business – even engaging in the garish Freudian spectacle of vying to see who would have the tallest skyscraper in Charlotte. First Union kicked things off in 1971 by erecting the 32-story Jefferson First Union Tower, then the biggest building in town – until McColl's bank built the 40-story NCNB Plaza in 1974. Then, in the late Eighties, Crutchfield topped McColl with the city's first post­modern high-rise, One First Union Center, at 42 stories. That held the prize until 1992, when McColl went haywire and put up the hideous 60-story Bank of America Corporate Center, a giant slab of gray metal affectionately known around Charlotte as the "Taj McColl." When asked by reporters if he was pleased that his 60-story monster overwhelmed his rival's 42-story weenie, McColl didn't hesitate. "Do I prefer having the tall one?" he said. "Yes."

For a time, this ridiculous rivalry between two strutting Southern peacocks was restrained by the law – specifically, the McFadden-Pepper Act of 1927 and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These two federal statutes, which made it illegal for a bank holding company to own and operate banks in more than one state, were effectively designed to prevent exactly the Too Big to Fail problem we now find ourselves faced with. The goal, as Sen. Paul Douglas explained at the time, was "to prevent an undue concentration of banking and financial power, and instead keep the private control of credit diffused as much as possible."

But these laws didn't sit well with Hugh McColl. To him, size was everything. "We realized that if we didn't leave North Carolina," he explained later in his career, "we would never amount to anything – that we would not be important." Note that he didn't say the ban on expansion prevented him from turning a profit or earning good returns for his shareholders – only that it put a limit on his sense of self-importance. So McColl and his banking minions set out to break down the interstate banking laws. First, in 1981, they used a legal loophole in Florida law to buy a bank branch there – evading the federal ban on out-of-state owners. Then, following a Supreme Court decision in 1985 that allowed banks to cross state lines within a designated region, he and Crutchfield went on a conquering spree worthy of a Mongol horde, buying up a host of banks in other Southern states. McColl, a silver-haired ex-Marine who would eventually be celebrated for bringing a "military approach" to his business, went to ridiculous lengths to play up the manly conquest aspect of his bank's merger frenzy, rewarding key employees with crystal hand grenades. By 1995, McColl had acquired more than 200 banks and thrifts across the South, while Crutchfield had snapped up 50.

A few years later, after Congress repealed most of the barriers to interstate banking, McColl took over Bank of America, realizing his dream of creating what one trade publication called "the first ocean-to-ocean bank in the nation's history." Later, after McColl retired, his successors kept up his acquisitive legacy, buying notorious mortgage lender Countrywide Financial in 2008, and using some of the $25 billion in federal bailout funds they received to acquire dying investment bank Merrill Lynch. Both firms were infamous for their exotic gambles and their systematic cutting of regulatory corners – meaning that the shopping spree had burdened Bank of America with a huge portfolio of doomed trades and criminal conspiracies.

But to McColl, it was all worth it – because he would never have been important if he hadn't also been big. "I have no regrets about building it large," he said in 2010, when asked if he considered all the monster consolidations a mistake in light of the crash of 2008. "I may have some regrets about not building it larger."

This deeply American terror of not always having the absolutely hugest dick in the room is what put us in the inescapable box called Too Big to Fail. When the bailouts were dreamed up to save Bank of America, the government was essentially committing public resources to preserve this lunatic spending spree – which means two successive presidential administrations have now spent nearly half a decade and hundreds of billions of tax dollars defending the premise that Hugh McColl should always be allowed to have the "taller one."

And why? The rationale for allowing that merger spree in the first place was based on a phony assumption: that big banks would somehow be more efficient and more profitable than small ones. "The whole premise of a Citibank or a Chase or a Bank of America is wrongheaded," says Susan Webber, an analyst who writes one of the most popular and respected financial blogs under the pseudo­nym Yves Smith. "Studies consistently show that after a certain size threshold, bank efficiency taps out. In fact, it turns out that all those cost savings the banks were supposed to enjoy from being bigger were actually based on cutting corners and fraud."

And man, what a lot of fraud!
***
In the end, it all comes back to mortgages. Though Bank of America would ultimately be charged with committing a dizzyingly diverse variety of corporate misdeeds, the bulk of the trouble the bank is in today arises from the Great Mortgage Scam of the mid-2000s, which caused the biggest financial bubble in history.

The shorthand version of the scam is by now familiar: Banks and mortgage lenders conspired to create a gigantic volume of very risky home loans, delivering outsize mortgages to dubious borrowers like immigrants without identification, the unemployed and people with poor credit histories. Then the banks took those dicey home loans and sprinkled them with bogus math, using inscrutable financial gizmos like collateralized mortgage obligations to rechristen the risky home loans as high-grade, AAA-rated securities that could be sold off to unions, pensioners, foreign banks, retirement funds and any other suckers the banks could find. In essence, America's financial institutions grew vast fields of cheap oregano, and then went around the world marketing their product as high-grade weed.

The holy trinity of Bank of America, Countrywide and Merrill Lynch represented the worst conceivable team of financial powers to get hold of this scam. It was a little like the Wall Street version of Michael Bay's nonclassic Con Air, in which the world's creepiest serial killer, most demented terrorist and most depraved redneck are all thrown together on the same plane. In this case, it was the most careless mortgage lender (the spray-tanned huckster Angelo Mozilo from Countrywide, who was named the second-worst CEO of all time by Portfolio magazine), the most dangerous mortgage gambler (Merrill, whose CEO was the self-worshipping jerkwad John Thain, the ex-Goldman banker who bought himself an $87,000 area rug as his company was cratering in 2008) and the most relentless packager of mortgage pools (Bank of America), all put together under one roof and let loose on the world. These guys were so corrupt, they even shocked one another: According to a federal lawsuit, top executives at Countrywide complained privately that Bank of America's "appetite for risky products was greater than that of Countrywide."

The three lenders also pioneered ways to sell their toxic pools of mortgages to suckers. Bank of America's typical marketing pitch to a union or a state pension fund involved a double or even triple guarantee. First, it promised, in writing, that all its loans had passed due diligence tests and met its high internal standards. Next, it promised that if any of the loans in the mortgage pool turned out to be defective or in default, it would buy them back. And finally, it assured customers that if all else failed, the pools of mortgages were all insured, or "wrapped," by bond insurers like AMBAC and MBIA.

It sounded like a can't-lose deal. Not only did the bank offer a written guarantee of the high quality of the loans it was selling, it also promised to buy back any bad loans, which were often insured to boot. What could go wrong?

As it turned out, everything. From tits to toes, the mortgage pools created, packaged and sold by Countrywide, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America were a complete sham: worthless and often falling apart virtually from the day they were delivered.

First of all, despite the fact that the banks had promised that all the loans in their pools met their internal lending standards, that turned out to be completely untrue. An SEC­ investigation later found out, for instance, that Countrywide essentially had no standards for whom to lend to. As a federal judge put it, "Countrywide routinely ignored its official underwriting guidelines to such an extent that Countrywide would underwrite any loan it could sell." Translation: Countrywide gave home loans to anything with a pulse, provided they had a sucker lined up to buy the loan.

How did they make these loans in the first place? By committing every kind of lending fraud imaginable – particularly by entering fake data on home loan applications, magically turning minimum-wage janitors into creditworthy wage earners. In 2006, according to a report by Credit Suisse, a whopping 49 percent of the nation's subprime loans were "liar's loans," meaning that lenders could state the incomes of borrowers without requiring any proof of employment. And no one lied more than Countrywide and Bank of America. In an internal e-mail distributed in June 2006, Countrywide's executives worried that 40 percent of the firm's "reduced documentation loans" potentially had "income overstated by more than 10 percent... and a significant percent of those loans would have income overstated by 50 percent or more."

"What large numbers of Countrywide employees did every day was commit fraud by knowingly making and approving loans they knew borrowers couldn't repay," says William Black, a former federal banking regulator. "To do so, it was essential that the loans be made to appear to be relatively less risky. This required pervasive documentation fraud."

So what happened when institutional investors realized that the loans they had bought from Countrywide were nothing but shams? Instead of buying back the bad loans as promised, and as required by its own contracts, the bank simply refused to answer its phone. A typical transaction involved U.S. Bancorp, which in 2005 served as a trustee for a group of investors that bought 4,484 Countrywide mortgages for $1.75 billion – only to discover their shiny new investment vehicle started throwing rods before they could even drive it off the lot. "Soon after being sold to the Trust," U.S. Bancorp later observed in a lawsuit, "Countrywide's loans began to become delinquent and default at a startling rate." The trustees hired a consultant to examine 786 loans in the pool, and found that an astonishing two-thirds of them were defective in some way. Yet, confronted with the fraud, Countrywide failed to repurchase a single loan, offering "no basis for its refusal."

And what about that ostensible insurance that Bank of America sold with its bundles of mortgages? Well, those policies turned out not to be worth very much, since so many of the loans defaulted that they blew the insurers out of business. If you went bust buying bad mortgages from Bank of America, chances are, so did your insurer. At best, you two could now share a blanket in the poorhouse.

Many of the nation's largest insurers, in fact, are now suing the pants off Bank of America, claiming they were fraudulently induced to insure the bank's "high lending standards." AMBAC, the second-largest bond insurer in America, went bankrupt in 2010 after paying out some $466 million in claims over 35,000 Countrywide home loans. After analyzing a dozen of the mortgage pools, AMBAC found that a staggering 97 percent of the loans didn't meet the stated underwriting standards. That same year, the Association of Financial Guaranty Insurers, a trade group representing firms like AMBAC, told Bank of America that it should be repurchasing as much as $20 billion in defective mortgages.

Some of these institutional investors were at least partial accomplices to their own downfall. In the boom era of easy money, financial professionals everywhere were chasing the lusciously high yields offered by these bundles of subprime mortgages, and everyone knew the deals weren't exactly risk-free. But ultimately, Bank of America was knowingly selling a defective product – and down the road, that product was bound to blow up on somebody innocent. "A teacher or a fireman goes to work and saves money for their retirement via their pensions," says Manal Mehta, a partner at the hedge fund Branch Hill Capital who spent two years researching Bank of America. "That pension fund buys toxic securities put together by Wall Street that were designed to fail. So when that security blows up, wealth flows directly from that pension fund into the hands of a select few."

This is the crossroads where Bank of America now lives – trying to convince the government to allow it to remain in business, perhaps even asking for another bailout or two, while it avoids paying back untold billions to all of the institutional customers it screwed, the list of which has grown so long as to almost be comical. Last year, the bank settled with a group of pension and retirement funds, including public employees from Mississippi to Los Angeles, that charged Bank of America and Merrill with misrepresenting the value of more than $16 billion in mortgage-backed securities. In the end, the bank paid only $315 million.

In the first half of last year, Bank of America paid $12.7 billion to settle claims brought by defrauded customers. But countless other investors are still howling for Bank of America to take back its counterfeit product. Allstate, the maker of those reassuring Dennis Haysbert-narrated commercials, claims it got stuck with $700 million in defective mortgages from Countrywide. The states of Iowa, Oregon and Maine, as well as the United Methodist Church, are suing Bank of America over fraudulent deals, claiming hundreds of billions in collective losses. And there are similar lawsuits for nonmortgage-related securities, like a revolting sale of doomed municipal securities to the state of Hawaii and Maui County. In that case, Merrill Lynch brokers allegedly dumped $944 million in auction-rate securities on the Hawaiians, even though the brokers knew that the auction-rate market was already going bust. "Market is collapsing," a Merrill executive named John Price admitted in an internal e-mail, before joking about having to give up pricey dinners at a fancy Manhattan restaurant. "No more $2K dinners at CRU!!"

In the end, says Mehta, Bank of America's fraud resulted in "one of the biggest reverse transfers of wealth in history – from pensioners to financiers. What the 99 percent should understand is that Wall Street knowingly inflated the bubble by engaging in rampant mortgage fraud – and then profited from the collapse of their own exuberance by devising a way to shift the losses to countless pension funds, endowments and other innocent investors." The assembled worldwide collection of swindled pensioners and unions and investors is a little like the crowd that storms the basketball court in the Will Ferrell movie Semi-Pro when the home team's owner welshes on his promise to hand out free corn dogs if the score tops 125 points. Corn dogs, Bank of America! Where are the freaking corn dogs!
***
Incredible as it sounds, owing practically everyone in the world billions of dollars apiece is only half of Bank of America's problem. The bank didn't just flee the scene of its various securities rip-offs. It also made a habit out of breaking the law and engaging in ethical lapses on a grand scale, all over the globe. Once your money ends up in their pockets, they just slither off into the night, no matter their legal or professional obligations.

Case in point: With all those hundreds of thousands of mortgages the bank bought, it simply stopped filing basic paperwork – even the stuff required by law, like keeping chains of title. A blizzard of subsequent lawsuits from pissed-off localities reveals that the bank used this systematic scam to avoid paying local fees. Last year, a single county – Dallas County in Texas – sued Bank of America for ducking fees since 1997. "Our research shows it could be more than $100 million," Craig Watkins, the county's district attorney, told reporters. Think of that next time your county leaves a road unpaved, or is forced to raise property taxes to keep the schools open.

But the lack of paperwork also presented a problem for the bank: When it needed to foreclose on someone, it had no evidence to take to court. So Bank of America unleashed a practice called robo-signing, which essentially involved drawing up fake documents for court procedures. Two years ago, a Bank of America robo-signer named Renee Hertzler gave a deposition in which she admitted not only to creating as many as 8,000 legal affidavits a month, but also to signing documents with a fake title.

Yet here's how seriously fucked the financial markets are: Even the most vocal critics of Bank of America consider the mass, factory-style production of tens of thousands of fake legal documents per month not that big a deal. "Robo-signing is like focusing on Bernie Madoff's accountant," quips April Charney, a well-known foreclosure lawyer who has spent large chunks of the past two decades in battle with Bank of America.

Robo-signing is not the disease – it's a symptom of Bank of America's entire attitude toward the law. A bank that's willing to commit whole departments to inventing legal affidavits might also, for instance, intentionally ding depositors with bogus overdraft fees. (A class action suit accused Bank of America of heisting some $4.5 billion from its customers this way; the bank settled the suit for a mere 10 cents on the dollar.)

Or it might give up trying to win government contracts honestly and get involved with rigging municipal bids – a mobster's crime, for which the accused used to do serious time, back when the bids were for construction and garbage instead of municipal bonds, and the defendants were Eye-talians in gold chains instead of Ivy Leaguers in ties and Chanel glasses. We now know that Bank of America routinely conspired with other banks to make sure it paid low prices for the privilege of managing the moneys of various cities and towns. If the city of Baltimore or the University of Mississippi or the Guam Power Authority issued bonds to raise money, the bank would huddle up with the likes of Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley and decide whose "turn" it was to win the bid. Bank of America paid a $137 million fine for its sabotage of the government-contracting process – and in an attempt to avoid prosecution, it applied to the Justice Department's corporate leniency program, essentially confessing its criminal status: As plaintiff attorneys noted, the application "means that Bank of America is an admitted felon." Think about that when you hear about all the bailouts the bank has gotten in the past four years. A street felon who gets out of jail can't even vote in some states – and yet Bank of America is allowed to receive billions in federal aid and dominate the electoral process with campaign contributions?

Some of the bank's other collusive schemes are even more ambitious. Last year, the bank was sued, alongside some of its competitors, for conspiring to rig the London Interbank Offered Rate. Many adjustable-rate financial products are based on LIBOR – so if the big banks could get together and artificially lower the rate, they would pay out less to customers who bought those products. "About $350 trillion worth of financial products globally reference LIBOR," says one antitrust lawyer familiar with the case. "Which means," she adds in a striking understatement, "that the scale of this conspiracy is extremely large."

What's most striking in all of these scams is the corporate culture of Bank of America: These guys are just dicks. Time and again, they go out of their way to fleece their own customers, without a trace of remorse. In classic con-artist behavior, Bank of America even tried to rip off homeowners a second time by gaming President Obama's HAMP program, which was designed to aid families who had already been victimized by the banks. In a lawsuit filed last year, homeowners claim they were asked to submit a mountain of paperwork before receiving a modified loan – only to have the bank misplace the documents when it was time to pay up. "The vast majority tell us the same thing," says Steve Berman, an attorney for the plaintiffs. "Bank of America claims to have lost their paperwork, failed to return phone calls, made false claims about the status of their loans and even took actions toward foreclosure without informing homeowners of their options." The scheme allowed the bank to bleed struggling homeowners for a few last desperate months by holding out the carrot of federal aid they would never receive.

Even when caught red-handed and nailed by courts for behavior like this, Bank of America has remained smugly unrepentant. As part of an $8.4 billion settlement it entered into with multiple states over predatory lending practices, the bank agreed to provide homeowners with modified loans and promised not to raise rates on borrowers. But no sooner was the deal signed than the bank "materially and almost immediately violated" the terms, according to Nevada Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto. It not only jacked up rates on homeowners, it even instituted a policy punishing any bank employee who spent more than 10 minutes helping a victim get a loan modification.

The bank's list of victims goes on and on. The disabled? Just a few weeks ago, the government charged Bank of America with violating the Fair Housing Act by illegally requiring proof of disability from people who rely on disability income to make their mortgage payments. Minorities? Last December, the bank settled with the Justice Department for $335 million over Countrywide's practice of dumping risky subprime loans on qualified black and Hispanic borrowers. The poor? In South Carolina, Bank of America won a contract to distribute unemployment benefits through prepaid debit cards – and then charged multiple fees to jobless folk who had the gall to withdraw their money from anywhere other than a Bank of America ATM. Seriously, who hasn't this bank conspired to defraud? Puppies? One-eyed Sri Lankans?

Bank of America likes to boast that it has changed its ways, replacing many of the top executives who helped create the mortgage bubble. But the man promoted from within to lead the new team, CEO Brian Moynihan, is just as loathsome and tone-deaf as his previous bosses. As befits a new royal, Moynihan defended a plan to gouge all debit-card users with $5 fees by citing his divine privilege: "We have a right to make a profit." And despite the bank's litany of crimes, Moynihan seems to think we're just overreacting. After all, he gives to charities! "I get a little incensed when you think about how much good all of you do, whether it's volunteer hours, charitable giving we do, serving clients and customers well," he told employees last October. Then, addressing would-be protesters: "You ought to think a little about that before you start yelling at us."

In sum, Bank of America torched dozens of institutional investors with billions in worthless loans, repeatedly refused to abide by contractual obligations to buy them back, evaded hundreds of millions in local fees and taxes, pushed tens of thousands of people into foreclosure using phony documents, ignored multiple court orders to stop its illegal robo-signing, and exploited President Obama's signature mortgage-relief program. The bank fixed the bids on bonds for schools and cities and utilities all over America, and even conspired to try to game the game itself – by fixing global interest rates!

So what does the government do about a rogue firm like this, one that inflates market-wrecking bubbles, commits mass fraud and generally treats the law like its own personal urinal cake? Well, it goes without saying that you rescue that "admitted felon" at all costs – even if you have to spend billions in taxpayer money to do it.
***
Bank of America should have gone out of business back in 2008. Just as the mortgage market was crashing, it made an inconceivably stupid investment in subprime mortgages, acquiring Countrywide and the billions in potential lawsuits that came with it. "They tried to catch a falling knife and lost their hand and foot in the process," says Joshua Rosner, a noted financial analyst. It then spent $50 billion buying a firm, Merrill Lynch, that was rife with billions in debts. With those two anchors on its balance sheet, Hugh McColl's bicoastal dream bank should have gone the way of the dinosaur.

But it didn't. Instead, in the midst of the crash, the government forked over $45 billion in aid to Bank of America – $20 billion as an incentive to bring its cross-eyed bride Merrill Lynch to the altar, and another $25 billion as part of the overall TARP bailout. In addition, the government agreed to guarantee $118 billion in Bank of America debt.

So what did the bank do with that money? First, it sat by while lame-duck executives at Merrill paid themselves $3.6 billion in bonuses – even though Merrill lost more than $27 billion that year. In all, 696 executives received more than $1 million each for helping to crash the storied firm. (The bank wound up hit with a $150 million fine for its failure to inform shareholders about the Merrill losses and bonuses.) Bank of America, meanwhile, paid out more than $3.3 billion in bonuses to itself, including more than $1 million each to 172 executives.

In fact, the real bailouts of Bank of America didn't even begin until well after TARP. In the years since the crash, the bank has issued more than $44 billion in FDIC-insured debt through a little-known Federal Reserve plan called the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. The plan essentially allows companies whose credit ratings are fucked to borrow against the government's good name – and if the loans aren't paid back, the government is on the hook for all of it. Bank of America has also stayed afloat by constantly borrowing billions in low-­interest emergency loans from the Fed – part of $7.7 trillion in "secret" loans that were not disclosed by the central bank until last year. When the data was finally released, we found out that, on just one day in 2008, Bank of America owed the Fed a staggering $86 billion.

That means that when you take out a credit card or a mortgage or a refinancing from Bank of America, you're essentially borrowing from the state; the "private" bank is simply taking a cut as a middleman. "For banks, the cost of capital is the key to success," says former New York governor Eliot Spitzer. "So by lowering their cost of capital to almost zero, the Fed has almost guaranteed that the banks will make big profits."

Another public lifeline is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant, nationalized mortgage lenders. Need to make some cash? Toss a bunch of home loan applications onto a city street, then sell the resulting mortgages to Fannie and Freddie, which are basically a gigantic pile of public money guarded by second-rate managers. Just like the state pensions in Iowa and Maine and Missis­sippi, Fannie and Freddie were targeted for sales of toxic mortgages, and just like those entities, they have sued Bank of America, claiming they were suckered into buying more than $30 billion in shitty securities. But unlike those other suckers, Fannie and Freddie continued to buy crap loans from Bank of America even after it was clear they'd been hoodwinked. Last year, the bank created more than $156 billion in mortgages – nearly $38 billion of which were bought by Fannie. Having the government as an ever-ready customer, standing by to buy mortgages at full retail prices, has always been an ongoing hidden bailout to the banks.

But even the government has its limits. In February, Fannie announced it would no longer keep blindly buying mortgages from Bank of America. Why? Because the bank, already slow to buy back its defective mortgages, had gotten even slower. By the end of last year, the government reported, more than half of all the crappy loans that Fannie wanted to return came from a single bad bank – Bank of America.

But if you think that Fannie cutting off the bank is good news, think again. If it can't get the money it's owed from Bank of America, it'll just go begging to the Treasury. Fannie has already asked for $4.5 billion to cover losses this year – and if Bank of America doesn't pony up, it'll have to reach even deeper into our pockets, making for yet another shadow bailout to the firm.

It gets worse. Last fall, some of the bank's biggest creditors and counterparties started to get nervous about the mountain of toxic bets still sitting on Merrill Lynch's books – a generation of ill-considered, complex, exotic derivative trades, bets on bets on bets on shaky subprime mortgages, sitting there on the company balance sheet, waiting to explode. Nobody felt good lending Bank of America money with that dangerous shitpile lying there. So they asked the bank to move a chunk of that mess from Merrill Lynch onto Bank of America's own balance sheet. Why? Because Bank of America is a federally insured depository institution. Which means that the FDIC, and by extension you and me, is now on the hook for as much as $55 trillion in potential losses. Black, the former regulator, calls the transfer an "obscenity. As a regulator, I would have never allowed it. Transferring risk to the insured institution crosses the reddest of red lines."
***
But by far the biggest bailout to Bank of America has come via the sweetheart deals it cut to settle the massive lawsuits filed against it. Some of the deals, which were brokered by the Justice Department and state attorneys general, allowed the bank to get away with paying pennies on the dollar on its mountains of debt. Worst of all was the recent $26 billion foreclosure settlement involving Bank of America and four other major firms. The deal, in which the banks agreed to pay cash to screwed-over homeowners in exchange for immunity from federal prosecution on robo-signing issues, was hailed as a big multibillion-dollar bite out of the banks. President Obama was all but strutting over his beatdown of Wall Street. "We are Americans, and we look out for one another; we get each other's backs," he declared. "We're going to make sure that banks live up to their end of the bargain."

In fact, the government has a lousy track record when it comes to enforcing settlements. The foreclosure deal arrives on the heels of an $8.4 billion investor settlement, whose provisions Bank of America had already been accused of violating, raising rates and abusing homeowners as soon as the deal was struck. The bank also violated a previous settlement with the Federal Trade Commission, illegally slapping $36 million in fees on struggling homeowners after specifically agreeing not to do so. So Bank of America's reward for blowing off its previous settlements for mistreating homeowners was to get another soft-touch deal from the government, which they will presumably be just as free to ignore. Why? Because while state officials have ultimate enforcement authority over the foreclosure settlement, the early enforcement reviews will be handled by "internal quality control groups." In other words, Bank of America itself will be grading its own compliance!

Even if Bank of America coughs up its share of the $26 billion settlement, the deal is woefully inadequate to address the wider fraud that went on in creating and pooling mortgages. "It's like handing a box of tissues to someone whose immune system has been destroyed by AIDS," says Rosner. "It doesn't come close to addressing the scale of the problem." Many Wall Street observers think that without the waiver from federal prosecution provided by the settlement, Bank of America would have faced billions in lawsuits for robo-signing offenses alone.

Oh, and one more thing, since we're talking about avoiding bills: Bank of America didn't pay a dime in federal taxes last year. Or the year before. In fact, they got a $1 billion refund last year. They claimed it was because they had pretax losses of $5.4 billion in 2010. They paid out $35 billion in bonuses and compensation that year. You do the math.

And here's the biggest scam of all: After all that help – all the billions in bailouts, the tens of billions in Fed loans, the hundreds of billions in legal damages made to disappear, the untold billions more of unpaid bills and buybacks – Bank of America is still failing. In December, the bank's share price dipped below $5, and after being cut off by Fannie in February, the bank announced a truly shameless plan to jack up fees for depositors by as much as $25 a month – what one market analyst called a "measure of last resort."

The company reported positive earnings last year, with net income of $84 million, but analysts aren't convinced. David Trainer, a MarketWatch commentator, switched his rating of Bank of America to "very dangerous" in part because its accounting is wildly optimistic. Among other things, the bank's projections assume a growth rate of 20 percent every year for the next 18 years. What's more, the bank has set aside only $8.5 billion for buybacks of those crap corn-dog loans from enraged customers – even though some analysts think the number should be much higher, perhaps as high as $27 billion. Because more lawsuits are so likely, says Mehta, it's "virtually impossible to decipher if Bank of America requires more equity, or even another tax­payer bailout."

But the only number that really matters is this one: $37 billion. That's the total bonus and compensation pool this broke-ass, state-dependent, owing-everybody-in-sight bank paid out to its employees last year. This, in essence, is the business model underlying Too Big to Fail: massive growth based on huge volumes of high-risk loans, coupled with lots of fraud and cutting corners, followed by huge payouts to executives. Then, with the company on the verge of collapse, the inevitable state rescue. In this whole picture, the only money that's ever "real" is the fat bonuses the executives cash out of the bank at the end of each year. "Fraud is a sure thing," says Black. "The firm fails, unless it is bailed out, but the controlling officers walk away wealthy."

The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill approved by Congress last year was supposed to fix the problem of Too Big to Fail, giving the government the power to take over and disband troubled megafirms instead of bailing them out. "The way to cut our Gordian financial knot is simple," MIT economist Simon Johnson wrote in The New York Times. "Force the big banks to become smaller." But few in the financial community believe that will ever happen. "If Bank of America crashes, the first thing that would happen is Dodd-Frank would be revealed as a fraud," says Rosner. "The Fed and the Treasury would ask Congress for a bailout to 'save the economy.' It's the worst-kept secret on Wall Street."

In a pure capitalist system, an institution as moronic and corrupt as Bank of America would be swiftly punished by the market – the executives would get to loot their own firms once, then they'd be looking for jobs again. But with the limitless government support of Too Big to Fail, these failing financial giants get to stay undead forever, continually looting the taxpayer, their depositors, their shareholders and anyone else they can get their hands on. The threat posed by Bank of America isn't just financial – it's a full-blown assault on the American dream. Where's the incentive to play fair and do well, when what we see rewarded at the highest levels of society is failure, stupidity, incompetence and meanness? If this is what winning in our system looks like, who doesn't want to be a loser? Throughout history, it's precisely this kind of corrupt perversion that has given birth to countercultural revolutions. If failure can't fail, the rest of us can never succeed.

Tuesday, October 25, 2011

It’s True, Bankers Really Do Control the World: Study

by Catherine McLean 
 
 
WINTERTHUR, Switzerland - Here’s a gift to Occupy Wall Street protesters around the world: you now have scholarly proof that banks control the world.

Researchers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, also known as ETH, have published a paper that argues just 147 companies account for a large chunk of the total economic value of all the transnational companies around the world. No exact dollar figures, but it’s obviously a vast sum.

Among the top 50 corporations, 45 operate within the financial industry. Barclays PLC is the most powerful, according to the ETH study, followed by such well-known names as JPMorgan Chase & Co., UBS AG, and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.

The United States takes home first prize with 24 companies cracking the researchers’ top 50 list, followed by the U.K. with 8, France with 5, Japan with 4, and Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands tying with 2 companies each. Canada has one company in the researchers’ top 50: Sun Life Financial, Inc. secures the 35th spot.

The research shows “a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions,” authors Stefania Vitali, James Glattfelder and Stefano Battiston wrote in their study entitled: The network of global corporate control.

“This core can be seen as an economic 'super-entity' that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers.”

While the authors note that many in the worlds of academia and the media already believe the world’s economy is run by a small number of companies, there was no actual data to back it up. So they set out to study the elaborate ownership structures of 43,060 transnational companies, eventually uncovering more than one million ownership ties within that network.

The authors believe this level of control among a small number of players has a significant impact on the world’s economic health. The 147 companies in the “core” control 40 per cent of the total economic value of all transnational corporations.

“The top ranked actors hold a control ten times bigger than what could be expected based on their wealth,” the authors noted.

The intense interconnection and concentration of power weakens market competition as players form blocs, according to the study. There’s another drawback to those close links, particularly among the banks: when one runs into problems its woes spread quickly to the others.

Critics say the study doesn’t take into account that fund managers don’t always choose to control a company’s strategy via their investment, among other complaints.

Nevertheless, the study is sure to warm the hearts of Wall Street protestors camping out on these cold fall days.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: Bank of America’s Death Rattle


 
 
Bob Ivry, Hugh Son and Christine Harper have written an article that needs to be read by everyone interested in the financial crisis.  The article (available here) is entitled: BofA Said to Split Regulators Over Moving Merrill Derivatives to Bank Unit. The thrust of their story is that Bank of America’s holding company, BAC, has directed the transfer of a large number of troubled financial derivatives from its Merrill Lynch subsidiary to the federally insured bank Bank of America (BofA).  The story reports that the Federal Reserve supported the transfer and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) opposed it.  Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has written an appropriately blistering attack on this outrageous action, which puts the public at substantially increased risk of loss.

I write to add some context, point out additional areas of inappropriate actions, and add a regulatory perspective gained from dealing with analogous efforts by holding companies to foist dangerous affiliate transactions on insured depositories.  I’ll begin by adding some historical context to explain how B of A got into this maze of affiliate conflicts.

Ken Lewis’ “Scorched Earth” Campaign against B of A’s Shareholders

Acquiring Countrywide: the High Cost of CEO Adolescence
During this crisis, Ken Lewis went on a buying spree designed to allow him to brag that his was not simply bigger, but the biggest.  Bank of America’s holding company – BAC – became the acquirer of last resort.  Lewis began his war on BAC’s shareholders by ordering an artillery salvo on BAC’s own position.  What better way was there to destroy shareholder value than purchasing the most notorious lender in the world – Countrywide.  Countrywide was in the midst of a death spiral.  The FDIC would soon have been forced to pay an acquirer tens of billions of dollars to induce it to take on Countrywide’s nearly limitless contingent liabilities and toxic assets.  Even an FDIC-assisted acquisition would have been a grave mistake.  Acquiring thousands of Countrywide employees whose primary mission was to make fraudulent and toxic loans was an inelegant form of financial suicide.  It also revealed the negligible value Lewis placed on ethics and reputation. 

But Lewis did not wait to acquire Countrywide with FDIC assistance.  He feared that a rival would acquire it first and win the CEO bragging contest about who had the biggest, baddest bank.  His acquisition of Countrywide destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars of shareholder value and led to massive foreclosure fraud by what were now B of A employees.

But there are two truly scary parts of the story of B of A’s acquisition of Countrywide that have received far too little attention.  B of A claims that it conducted extensive due diligence before acquiring Countrywide and discovered only minor problems.  If that claim is true, then B of A has been doomed for years regardless of whether it acquired Countrywide.  The proposed acquisition of Countrywide was huge and exceptionally controversial even within B of A.  Countrywide was notorious for its fraudulent loans.  There were numerous lawsuits and former employees explaining how these frauds worked.

B of A is really “Nations Bank” (formerly named NCNB).  When Nations Bank acquired B of A (the San Francisco based bank), the North Carolina management took complete control.  The North Carolina management decided that “Bank of America” was the better brand name, so it adopted that name.  The key point to understand is that Nations/NCNB was created through a large series of aggressive mergers, so the bank had exceptional experience in conducting due diligence of targets for acquisition and it would have sent its top team to investigate Countrywide given its size and notoriety.  The acquisition of Countrywide did not have to be consummated exceptionally quickly.  Indeed, the deal had an “out” that allowed B of A to back out of the deal if conditions changed in an adverse manner (which they obviously did).  If B of A employees conducted extensive due diligence of Countrywide and could not discover its obvious, endemic frauds, abuses, and subverted systems then they are incompetent.  Indeed, that word is too bloodless a term to describe how worthless the due diligence team would have had to have been.  Given the many acquisitions the due diligence team vetted, B of A would have been doomed because it would have routinely been taken to the cleaners in those earlier deals.

That scenario, the one B of A presents, is not credible.  It is far more likely that B of A’s senior management made it clear to the head of the due diligence review that the deal was going to be done and that his or her report should support that conclusion.  This alternative explanation fits well with B of A’s actual decision-making.  Countrywide’s (and B of A’s) reported financial condition fell sharply after the deal was signed.  Lewis certainly knew that B of A’s actual financial condition was much worse than its reported financial condition and had every reason to believe that this difference would be even worse at Countrywide given its reputation for making fraudulent loans.  B of A could have exercised its option to withdraw from the deal and saved vast amounts of money.  Lewis, however, refused to do so.  CEOs do not care only about money.  Ego is a powerful driver of conduct, and CEOs can be obsessed with status, hierarchy, and power.  Of course, Lewis knew he could walk away wealthy after becoming a engine of mass destruction of B of A shareholder value, so he could indulge his ego in a manner common to adolescent males.  

Acquiring Merrill Lynch: the Lure of Liar’s Loans
Merrill Lynch is the quintessential example of why it was common for the investment banks to hold in portfolio large amounts of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  Some observers have jumped to the naïve assumption that this indicates that the senior managers thought the CDOs were safe investments.  The “recipe” for an investor maximizing reported income differs only slightly from the recipe for lenders.
  1. Grow rapidly by
  2. Holding poor quality assets that provide a premium nominal yield while
  3. Employing extreme leverage, and
  4. Providing only grossly inadequate allowances for future losses on the poor quality assets
Investment banks that followed this recipe (and most large U.S. investment banks did), were guaranteed to report record (albeit fictional) short-term income.  That income was certain to produce extreme compensation for the controlling officers.  The strategy was also certain to produce extensive losses in the longer term – unless the investment bank could sell its losing position to another entity that would then bear the loss.

The optimal means of committing this form of accounting control fraud was with the AAA-rated top tranche of CDOs.  Investment banks frequently purport to base compensation on risk-adjusted return.  If they really did so investment bankers would receive far less compensation.  The art, of course, is to vastly understate the risk one is taking and attribute short-term reported gains to the officer’s brilliance in achieving supra-normal returns that are not attributable to increased risk (“alpha”).  Some of the authors of Guaranteed to Fail call this process manufacturing “fake alpha.”

The authors are largely correct about “fake alpha.”  The phrase and phenomenon are correct, but the mechanism they hypothesize for manufacturing fake alpha has no basis in reality.  They posit honest gambles on “extreme tail” events likely to occur only in rare circumstances.  They provide no real world examples.  If risk that the top tranche of a CDO would suffer a material loss of market values was, in reality, extremely rare then it would be impossible to achieve a substantial premium yield.  The strategy would diminish alpha rather than maximizing false alpha.  The risk that the top tranche of a CDO would suffer a material loss in market value was highly probable.  It was not a tail event, much less an “extreme tail” event.  CDOs were commonly backed by liar’s loans and the incidence of fraud in liar’s loans was in the 90% range.  The top tranches of CDOs were virtually certain to suffer severe losses as soon as the bubble stalled and refinancing was no longer readily available to delay the wave of defaults.  Because liar’s loans were primarily made to borrowers who were not creditworthy and financially unsophisticated, the lenders had the negotiating leverage to charge premium yields.  The officers controlling the rating agencies and the investment banks were complicit in creating a corrupt system for rating CDOs that maximized their financial interests by routinely providing AAA ratings to the top tranche of CDOs “backed” largely by fraudulent loans.  The combination of the fake AAA rating and premium yield on the top tranche of fraudulently constructed (and sold) CDOs maximized “fake alpha” and made it the “sure thing” that is one of the characteristics of accounting control fraud (see Akerlof & Romer 1993; Black 2005).  This is why many of the investment banks (and, eventually, Fannie and Freddie) held substantial amounts of the top tranches of CDOs.  (A similar dynamic existed for lower tranches, but investment banks also found it much more difficult to sell the lowest tranches.) 

Merrill Lynch was known for the particularly large CDO positions it retained in portfolio.  These CDO positions doomed Merrill Lynch.  B of A knew that Merrill Lynch had tremendous losses in its derivatives positions when it chose to acquire Merrill Lynch.

Given this context, only the Fed, and BAC, could favor the derivatives deal
Lewis and his successor, Brian Moynihan, have destroyed nearly one-half trillion dollars in BAC shareholder value.  (See my prior post on the “Divine Right of Bank Profits…”)  BAC continues to deteriorate and the credit rating agencies have been downgrading it because of its bad assets, particularly its derivatives.  BAC’s answer is to “transfer” the bad derivatives to the insured bank – transforming (ala Ireland) a private debt into a public debt.

Banking regulators have known for well over a century about the acute dangers of conflicts of interest.  Two related conflicts have generated special rules designed to protect the bank and the insurance fund.  One restricts transactions with senior insiders and the other restricts transactions with affiliates.  The scam is always the same when it comes to abusive deals with affiliates – they transfer bad (or overpriced) assets or liabilities to the insured institution.  As S&L regulators, we recurrently faced this problem.  For example, Ford Motor Company attempted to structure an affiliate transaction that was harmful to the insured S&L (First Nationwide).  The bank, because of federal deposit insurance, typically has a higher credit rating than its affiliate corporations.

BAC’s request to transfer the problem derivatives to B of A was a no brainer – unfortunately, it was apparently addressed to officials at the Fed who meet that description.  Any competent regulator would have said: “No, Hell NO!”  Indeed, any competent regulator would have developed two related, acute concerns immediately upon receiving the request.  First, the holding company’s controlling managers are a severe problem because they are seeking to exploit the insured institution.  Second, the senior managers of B of A acceded to the transfer, apparently without protest, even though the transfer poses a severe threat to B of A’s survival.  Their failure to act to prevent the transfer contravenes both their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and should lead to their resignations.

Now here’s the really bad news:

First, this transfer is a superb “natural experiment” that tests one of the most important questions central to the health of our financial system.  Does the Fed represent and vigorously protect the interests of the people or the systemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) – the largest 20 banks?  We have run a real world test.  The sad fact is that very few Americans will be surprised that the Fed represented the interests of the SDIs even though they were directly contrary to the interests of the nation.  The Fed’s constant demands for (and celebration of) “independence” from democratic government, combined with slavish dependence on and service to the CEOs of the SDIs has gone beyond scandal to the point of farce.  I suggest organized “laugh ins” whenever Fed spokespersons prate about their “independence.”

Second, I would bet large amounts of money that I do not have that neither B of A’s CEO nor the Fed even thought about whether the transfer was consistent with the CEO’s fiduciary duties to B of A (v. BAC).  We took depositions during the S&L debacle in which senior officials of Lincoln Savings and its affiliates were shocked when we asked “whose interests were you representing – the S&L or the affiliate?”  They had obviously never even considered their fiduciary duties or identified their actual client.  We blocked a transaction that would have caused grave injury to the insured S&L by taking the holding company (Pinnnacle West) off the hook for its obligations to the S&L.  That transaction would have passed routinely, but we flew to the board of directors meeting of the S&L and reminded them that their fiduciary duty was to the S&L, that the transaction was clearly detrimental to the S&L and to the benefit of the holding company, and that we would sue them and take the most vigorous possible enforcement actions against them personally if they violated their fiduciary duties.  That caused them to refuse to approve the transaction – which resulted in a $450 million payment from the holding company to the S&L.  (I know, $450 million sounds quaint now in light of the scale of the ongoing crisis, but back then it paid for our salaries in perpetuity.)

Third, reread the Bloomberg column and wrap your mind around the size of Merrill Lynch’s derivatives positions.  Next, consider that Merrill is only one, shrinking player in derivatives.  Finally, reread Yves’ column in Naked Capitalism where she explains (correctly) that many derivatives cannot be used safely.  Add to that my point about how they can be used to create a “sure thing” of record fictional profits, record compensation, and catastrophic losses.  This is particularly true about credit default swaps (CDS) because of the grotesque accounting treatment that typically involves no allowances for future losses. (FASB:  you must fix this urgently or you will allow a “perfect crime.”).  It is insane that we did not pass a one sentence law repealing the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000.  Between the SDIs, the massive, sometimes inherently unsafe and largely opaque financial derivatives, the appointment, retention, and promotion of failed anti-regulators, and the continuing ability of elite control frauds to loot with impunity we are inviting recurrent, intensifying crises.

I’ll close with a suggestion and request to reporters. Please find out who within the Fed approved this deal and the exact composition of the assets and liabilities that were transferred.

Friday, April 15, 2011

US banks to settle on financial crisis penalties

(Bastards!--jef)


US banks to settle on financial crisis penalties: report
By Agence France-Presse
Friday, April 15th, 2011

NEW YORK (AFP) – Several major US banks are close to an agreement with the Wall Street regulator to settle fraud allegations related to the "toxic" mortgages behind the 2008 financial crisis, a report said Friday.

An initial agreement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could be settled next week, the Wall Street Journal said, citing sources close to the case, noting penalties would likely vary for different institutions.

Among the banks in negotiations with the SEC are JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America and UBS.

Few of the settlements are likely to top the $550-million penalty imposed on the Goldman Sachs Group in 2010 over allegations it misled investors over a mortgage investment program, the Journal said.

The financial crisis that stemmed from trillions of dollars in risky mortgages promoted by the top Wall Street firms has engulfed the globe and cost millions of jobs in the years since.

That mortgage bubble grew, burst and infected banks' balance sheets thanks to the magnifying effect of complex financial derivatives, noted an official US report issued earlier this year.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, after reviewing millions of pages of documents and interviewing around 700 witnesses, concluded in January that bankers, lawmakers, regulators and irresponsible borrowers all helped plunge the world into financial panic.

"This financial crisis was avoidable. The crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not Mother Nature or computer models gone haywire," the report said.

Monday, December 20, 2010

The Tax-Payers' Tab: a Cool $9 Trillion and Then Some

(Remember this when they start hacking away at social security.--jef)

***

Fed Finally Forks Up Documents Showing It Funded Wall Street's Off-Balance Sheet Vehicle
By PAM MARTENS

On December 1, the Fed was forced to release details of 21,000 funding transactions it made during the financial crisis, naming names and dollar amounts. Disclosure was due to a provision sparked by Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont. The voluminous data dump from the notoriously secret Fed shows just how deeply the Federal Reserve stepped into the shoes of Wall Street and, as the crisis grew and the normal channels of lending froze, the Fed effectively replaced Wall Street and money centers banks in terms of financing.  

The Fed has thus far reported, without even disclosing specifics of its lending from its discount window, which it continues to draw a dark curtain around, that it supplied, in total, more than $9 trillion to Wall Street firms, commercial banks, foreign banks, corporations and some highly questionable off balance sheet entities. (Much smaller amounts were outstanding at any one time.)

A careful review of these data makes it highly likely the GAO will be releasing some startling findings come next July 2011. That’s when  the American people will have a much clearer picture of how the Federal Reserve shoveled taxpayer money to Wall Street by the trillions.  As a result of Senator Sanders’ legislative efforts, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is to complete an audit by next summer of the Fed’s lending programs during the financial crisis. 
The data starkly show a comatose Wall Street being resuscitated with whatever financial might the Federal Reserve could pump into its tangled web of funding vehicles.  It also points to how the Fed was dispersing sums which dwarfed the U.S. Treasury’s $700 billion TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) bailout program while allowing the TARP to take the media heat for obscene funding of Wall Street.

The Fed has made the task of seeing the big picture of what it was up to exceptionally difficult by segregating its multi-prong funding into a dizzying array of spread sheets. Nonetheless, a few things jump off the pages. On the spread sheet for the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (a program to provide overnight loans to key brokerage firms, known as primary dealers because they assist the Fed in open market operations) are astronomical sums that Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch were drawing from the Fed on a regular basis from the Spring of 2008 to the Spring of 2009 (and potentially well beyond).  The three firms borrowed almost equal sums which cumulatively totaled over $6 trillion, and that does not include their borrowing from other Fed facilities. In its current release the Fed cut off these data as of May 12, 2009 while the program lasted until February 1, 2010, making the full extent of this funding unknown at present.  Calls to the Fed on this point had not been answered at CounterPunch’s press time.

Citigroup owns one of the largest commercial banks in the country, Citibank.  One could reason that the bank’s solvency had come under serious question at that time and it needed massive liquidity to meet depositor withdrawals from its bank as well as to fund its $2 trillion balance sheet (with another $1 trillion in off-balance-sheet vehicles).  Why Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch, which are large investment banks and retail brokerage firms, needed funds of this magnitude raises many questions.  

Runs on banks, which invest depositor funds in illiquid assets like real estate and corporate loans, are typically met with a government liquidity response.  Brokerage firms, on the other hand, hold stocks and bonds which can typically be sold in seconds with the proceeds “settling” (available to pay out) 3 business days later.

Liquidity problems were likely aggravated at Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch because they each cater to both institutional clients and retail mom and pop investors.  While the mom and pop accounts should have had little trouble cashing out of most stocks, municipal bonds and well known corporate bonds, less liquid securities in institutional accounts may have found their markets frozen for trading and needed interim financing  -- this may have included problematic commercial paper positions in some money market funds used by the big brokerage firms for both retail and institutional clients.

This mystery is further intensified by one Fed spread sheet showing that the largest Wall Street firms deposited a total of $2.1 trillion in stocks as collateral in order to obtain liquid funds from the Fed. Depositing stocks as collateral began on the day Lehman died and was done in large size by Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup.  Raising additional red flags, tens of billions of dollars in stocks were posted as collateral by the London operations of Morgan, Merrill and Citi.  

Was this publicly traded stock from the firms’ proprietary trading desks, otherwise known as the in-house casino?  Was it illiquid private equity in which the firms had their money tied up?  Was it equity tranches from the dubious Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)? If it was either of the latter, how could it have been properly priced as collateral?  The Fed describes the equity as follows: “Securities representing ownership interest in a private corporation….”  Without knowing the details of these securities, or the other unspecified junk bonds used as collateral, we don’t know the extent of the trash the Fed was swapping for cash with Wall Street.  

Merrill Lynch was rescued in a buyout by Bank of America on September 15, 2008, the same day that Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy.  

The Fed risking $9 trillion of taxpayer money to bail out positions of dubious worth is highlighted further in the spread sheet for the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, which loaned $38 billion more than TARP, or a total of $738 billion to fund not just U.S. corporations but foreign banks as well, potentially because they were ensnarled in Wall Street’s off-balance-sheet funding schemes.  Most alarming, a significant portion of this went to conduits that hide liabilities of Wall Street firms off their balance sheets, leaving Wall Street short of capital for emergencies just like this one, and shareholders in the dark about the true risk of the company’s balance sheet.

The Commercial Paper Funding Facility was announced by the Fed on October 7, 2008, 3 weeks after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  Its first funding day was October 27, 2008 and its last funding day was January 25, 2010.  One of the borrowers on both its first day and last day of funding and many days in between was an entity called Hudson Castle, whose cumulative borrowings were over $50 billion from the Fed for commercial paper it sponsored for three off-balance-sheet conduits: Belmont Funding LLC, Ebbets Funding LLC, and Elysian Funding LLC.

On April 12 of this year, Louise Story and Eric Dash, writing for the New York Times, reported that while Hudson Castle was set up to appear to be an independent business, its board was controlled by Lehman; Lehman owned a quarter of the firm; and it was staffed with former Lehman employees. The reporters had gotten their hands on an internal 2001 Lehman memo indicating that the arrangement would maximize Lehman’s control over Hudson Castle “without jeopardizing the off-balance-sheet accounting treatment.”  The memo noted further that Lehman would serve “as the internal and external ‘gatekeeper’ for all business activities conducted by the firm.” The internal document was authored by Kyle Miller, who worked at Lehman at the time but went over to Hudson Castle to become its president.  According to the article, until 2004, Lehman had an exclusivity agreement with Hudson Castle, but the deal ended in 2004, with Lehman reducing its board seats from five to one.

Lehman was far from alone in having employees leave to set up conduits which conveniently benefited their former Wall Street employer by moving debt off the balance sheet.  It was the norm, not the exception.  

A July 2010 staff report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, titled “Shadow Banking,” noted the following about the shadow system in which conduits played a significant role:
“The liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve and other government agencies’ guarantee schemes were a direct response to the liquidity and capital shortfalls of shadow banks and, effectively, provided either a backstop to credit intermediation by the shadow banking system or to traditional banks for the exposure to shadow banks….
“…this [shadow banking] system of public and private market participants has evolved and grown to a gross size of nearly $20 trillion in March 2008, which was significantly larger than the liabilities of the traditional banking system. However, market participants as well as regulators failed to synthesize the rich detail of otherwise publicly available information on either the scale of the shadow banking system or its interconnectedness with the traditional banking system…At a size of roughly $16 trillion in the first quarter of 2010, the shadow banking system remains an important, albeit shrinking source of credit for the real economy…”
In other words, the leverage in the system was not coming just from mortgage securitizations and esoteric derivatives but from off-balance-sheet debt parking schemes quite similar to that used by Enron. 
On May 6 of this year, Viral Acharya, a Professor of Finance at NYU’s Stern School of Business, gave enlightening testimony on conduits to the House Committee on Financial Services’ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.  Professor Acharya reported as follows:
“Our analysis makes it clear that from an economic standpoint conduits are ‘unregulated’ banks that operate in the shadow banking world, but with recourse to regulated entities, mainly commercial banks, that have access to government safety net.  Our results also indicate that when these unregulated banks do not have such recourse (extendible notes and SIVs), they struggle to survive a systemic crisis…In particular, the structure of credit guarantees to asset-backed commercial paper conduits was designed by commercial banks to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements.  Such possibilities – whereby government-insured banks effectively operate at higher leverage by putting assets off-balance sheet but granting them recourse – deserve regulatory scrutiny, especially when they operate at a scale that conduits did.”
Because asset-backed commercial paper is short term in duration with typically long-term assets, commercial banks like Citigroup (which is one of the largest players in the conduit   field)  provide liquidity guarantees to make the commercial paper investor whole if the paper can’t be rolled over at maturity.  With Citigroup’s solvency in serious doubt at the peak of the financial crisis, its tentacles of backstopping conduits and issuing boatloads of commercial paper itself is likely to have played a pivotal role in seizing up this market.  This might explain why we see corporate names like McDonalds, Caterpillar and Harley-Davidson selling commercial paper directly to the Fed according to the spreadsheets released on December 1.

With Citigroup having such a large presence in the conduit market, it strains the imagination how Citigroup’s former top executives, CEO Chuck Prince and Executive Committee Chair,   Robert Rubin,  could have testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on April 8 of this year that they had no idea until months into the crisis that Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) created by Citigroup and roosting off its balance sheet had liquidity puts that could, and did, force billions of the toxic assets back onto the bank’s balance sheet.  SIVs are first cousins to conduits but typically have more leverage.  Citigroup’s SIVs were shielding subprime debt instruments from being reflected on its balance sheet but were forced back on when they became impaired, leading to staggering losses for the bank.

It appears that what was essentially taking place in the Commercial Paper Funding Facility at the Fed was that the taxpayer stood in for the liquidity puts the Wall Street banks had no money to backstop.  

Another well kept secret is that much of the commercial paper backed by dubious “assets” and housed in conduits regularly found its way into both retail and institutional money market funds.  Those funds are supposed to be the safest of the safe and available to redeem at any time without a loss (or never breaking a buck in Street parlance). The Fed’s buck shot approach to spewing money at banks, brokerages, corporations, across the pond, and into the hands of questionable entities, may have been as much to save money market funds from a panic run as to save the Wall Street banks.  Let us hope the GAO conducts a thorough investigation in this area.

Whether it was Credit Default Swaps or Collateralized Debt Obligations squared or conduits or SIVs, two words emerge from the hubris: leverage and greed.  By leveraging the balance sheet, upper management could lay claim to massive compensation and bonuses. 

This picture is encapsulated by an introductory comment by Phil Angelides, Chair of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, at the outset of a hearing on Citigroup on April 8, 2010:   
Chairman Angelides: Really, for the benefit of people watching today, it appears as though that there are about 51 billion dollars in write-offs related to subprime lending. The institution, as I understand it, is one that went from about 670 billion dollars in assets in about 1998 to 2.2 trillion dollars on balance sheet, another 1.2 trillion dollars off-balance sheet by 2007. By 2008, the tangible common equity-to-assets ratio we estimate at 61 to 1, with off-balance-sheet 97 to 1.
It takes only reading comprehension skills and zero Wall Street experience to read the above paragraph and know that this firm would blow up.  How did Robert Rubin, former co-chair of Goldman Sachs and former U.S. Treasury Secretary, not see this at Citigroup.  Mr. Rubin received over $125 million in compensation at Citigroup.  Sandy Weill, the man who built the behemoth and its far flung network of dysfunctional parts and served as its CEO, received over $1 billion.  The taxpayer received the tab.

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Illegal Scams That Should Put Wall St. Bankers Behind Bars

From laundering drug money to gouging you on overdrafts, here are five scams where Wall Street ran afoul of the law.
By Zach Carter, AlterNet
Posted on September 21, 2010

Unchecked greed and financial insanity on Wall Street crashed our economy. Much of that insanity was legal -- bankers lobbied hard for weak regulations, and got what they paid for. But much of that craziness was outright illegal, and in recent months, a number of shocking scams have come to light that could result in huge fines for banks or even put bankers behind bars. Though Wall Street has yet to see serious prosecutions for the current calamity, prosecutions are not at all uncommon after financial crises -- more than 1,000 bankers went to prison after the savings and loan debacle alone.

From laundering drug money to scamming you on overdrafts, here are five recent Wall Street scandals that have "illegal" written all over them. The SEC is attempting to settle civil fraud charges it has filed in many of these cases, but in finance, the only difference between civil fraud and criminal fraud is the burden of proof. If the Justice Department wanted to go after many of these crooked dealers, it could.
1) Wachovia Launders $380 Billion in Drug Money
The financial crisis is full of complex schemes and indecipherable acronyms, but the most astonishing alleged fraud of the entire mess is pretty straightforward: Wachovia allowed Mexican drug cartels to launder $380 billion of drug money through its bank, repeatedly looking the other way and ignoring internal whistleblowers who alerted them to the problem.
This was a clear violation of federal law, but Wachovia appears to be getting away with it. The Justice Department is not seeking an indictment against the company, out of fears that it could destabilize financial markets. Instead, it's reached a "deferred prosecution agreement" -- effectively a settlement -- in which the bank agrees to pay $160 million and promise to never, ever launder drug money again.
Pretty light penalty for, you know, laundering drug money. The fine amounts to about one-half of one-hundredth of a percent of the drug money that DOJ says passed through the bank. Outside the too-big-to-fail world, getting caught laundering billions of dollars in drug money doesn't just earn you hefty fines, it plants you in jail.
And Wachovia wasn't alone. According to the U.N., laundering drug money was common during the darkest days of the financial crisis, as faltering banks sought to get their hands on any money they could find -- regardless of where it came from.
2) Chamber of Commerce Launders AIG's Lobbying Cash
Money laundering has been very profitable for Wall Street, and not just drug money. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is a lobbying front-group for a lot of powerful corporations, and some of its most aggressive members are Wall Street titans. A watchdog group has filed a complaint with the Internal Revenue Service accusing the Chamber and notorious AIG kingpin Maurice "Hank" Greenberg of tax fraud. Greenberg was ousted from AIG in 2005 amid a massive accounting scandal, but not before helping to establish the insurance giant's ridiculous credit default swap wing, which would destroy the company only a few years later.
Greenberg and the Chamber are accused of abusing a charity in order to hide millions of dollars in lobbying expenditures by AIG. In 2003, a foundation handled by Greenberg gave $5 million to the charitable wing of the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber operates a charity called the National Chamber Foundation. The next year, Greenberg's foundation gave another $10 million to the Chamber's charity. In 2003 and 2004, 80 percent of the National Chamber Foundation's budget was coming from Greenberg and AIG. The charity's main function was to serve as a front for AIG lobbying.
Guess what? According to U.S. Chamber Watch, that money was turned over to the Chamber's lobbying arm. At the time, the Chamber was raising tons of money to help reelect President George W. Bush, and AIG was trying to weaken accounting fraud laws. It's illegal for a tax-exempt charity to funnel money to political operations. If the allegations are true, the Chamber's charity would be shut down.
3) The $40 Billion Subprime Lie From Citibank and Robert Rubin
As the subprime mortgage market was falling apart in 2007, Citibank was trying to calm investor fears about a total meltdown -- just like every other big Wall Street bank. Its chief tactic was to highlight that it had "only" $13 billion in subprime mortgage holdings, repeatedly touting the figure publicly.
The statement was true, if you ignored another $40 billion in subprime exposure that the firm held. Lying to shareholders is a major no-no in Corporate America -- it's considered securities fraud, and people can go to jail for it. The SEC is attempting to settle with Citi, but isn't recommending criminal prosecutions or even charging individuals with formal wrongdoing. Instead, the SEC wants to fine Citi shareholders $75 million -- a total slap in the face to basic conceptions of fairness, not to mention American taxpayers. See, if Citi execs did what the SEC says they did, then they were hurting their own shareholders. As punishment, the SEC wants to impose a fine on those same shareholders, the very parties who were wronged.
What's more, the U.S. government took a stake in Citi as part of its epic bailout of the poorly managed financial behemoth. Taxpayers are being asked to help foot the bill for wrongs committed by the executives we bailed out. Thanks a lot, SEC.
The SEC has filed documents indicating that both Citi CEO Chuck Prince and board member Robert Rubin knew about the inaccurate statements, but isn't filing charges against them. The stiffest penalty the SEC wants to impose on a Citi executive under the settlement is a $100,000 fine against Citi CFO Gary Crittenden. Crittenden took home $19.4 million in 2007 alone. I'll bet he's really sweating the rounding error on his bonus.
Fortunately, a federal judge has so far refused to sign off on the SEC's settlement, calling it far too weak given the seriousness of the allegations. The SEC shouldn't just be seeking huge fines against executives, it should be working with prosecutors on criminal cases.
4) Merrill Lynch: Inventing Fake Demand For Subprime Junk
This beauty of a scandal was uncovered by two investigative journalists at ProPublica. Like much of what happened on Wall Street over the past decade, it's complicated, clever and totally corrupt.
During the boom years of the housing bubble, Merrill Lynch was top producer of fancy financial products called "Collateralized Debt Obligations," or CDOs. Thousands of mortgages were packaged together and sliced up into securities called mortgage-backed securities, or MBS. Those MBS, in turn, were cobbled together to create a CDO -- creating a byzantine product that former Merrill CEO John Thain now acknowledges was simply too complex to value -- even supercomputers couldn't figure the damn things out.
But creating gimmick securities and selling them to investors wasn't the scam that caught ProPublica's attention: shady as it was, just about everybody on Wall Street did that. When Merrill sold its CDOs to investors, it divided the big mess into different tiers, known as "tranches," reflecting different levels of risk. The riskiest tranche of the CDO fetched the highest price, because it was the most likely to default, while the "safest" tranche fetched the lowest price. But as investors began to worry about the subprime craze in 2006, they stopped ponying up for the risky bits.
But this lack of demand was no problem for Merrill. When it couldn't offload the tranche from one of these garbage CDOs, it just created a new CDO, and used the new security to buy up the unwanted junk from the old one. The result was a catastrophic daisy chain, in which Merrill was able to keep producing new CDOs by inventing fake demand -- all while subjecting itself to dangerous levels of risk. By 2007, a full 42 of the bank's 92 CDOs included pieces of other CDOs it had previously sold -- 46 percent.
Often, two newly created CDOs would simply swap assets with each other. ProPublica says a full $107 billion worth of CDOs were created and traded assets within days.
Merrill wasn't the only bank to engage in this behavior. According to ProPublica, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and Swiss scandal-magnet UBS all did so as well. But Merrill was the leader, packaging the most CDOs and the most CDOs with gimmicked demand. These practices had a significant effect on the real economy -- they kept mortgage prices inflated and kept the subprime machine moving, allowing the housing bubble to grow larger and more devastating. The SEC is investigating the practice for evidence of fraud.
5) Wells Fargo Overdraft Theft
Ever wonder how you managed to rack up such high overdraft fees? Well, there's a decent chance you didn't. U.S. banks scored an astonishing $38 billion in overdraft revenues in 2009 -- pretty impressive for an industry whose total combined profit was just $12.5 billion that same year. For years, banks have been rearranging the order of their customers' checking transactions, hoping to push account balances down to zero faster so they can charge more fees.
Say you've got $80 in your checking account, and need to pay some bills and run a couple of errands. You spend $30 on gas and another $20 on your water bill. Later, you head to the grocery store and spend $81 -- oops! -- on groceries. Any reasonable person would believe that the last transaction put you over the edge and earned you an overdraft fee, but megabanks aren't reasonable people. Instead, the bank automatically processes your $81 purchase ahead of your previous charges. As a result, you do not get hit with one overdraft fee for your groceries, you get hit with three, because your costliest purchase was processed before the others -- even though you made the cheaper purchases first.
Now, there's no reason why banks can't, say, notify you about your overdrafts before approving them. In the example above, you could have put the tomatoes back on the shelf and saved yourself $39. But reordering transactions is beyond the pale -- if bankers did this with their stock options, it'd be called "backdating" and it could land them in a federal penitentiary.
A judge in California has now said that this practice violated state law, and has ordered Wells Fargo bank to return hundreds of millions of dollars in such ill-gotten gains to its California customers. But Wells Fargo wasn't alone -- every major U.S. bank had overdraft programs that worked the same way Wells Fargo's did.

Saturday, September 4, 2010

Government Policy Caused America's Unemployment Crisis

Submitted by George Washington on 09/03/2010 15:41 -0500
→ Washington’s Blog

The unemployment rate has risen again for the the first time in 4 months. I predicted a growing, long-term unemployment problem last year.

Indeed, even after the government plays with the numbers to make them look better (using inaccurate birth-death models and other tricks-of-the-trade), this is how the current jobs downturn compares with other post-WWII recessions:


In fact, as demonstrated below, the government's actions have directly contributed to the rising tide of unemployment.

The Government Has Encouraged the Offshoring of American Jobs for More Than 50 Years

President Eisenhower re-wrote the tax laws so that they would favor investment abroad. President Kennedy railed against tax provisions that "consistently favor United States private investment abroad compared with investment in our own economy", but nothing has changed under either Democratic or Republican administrations.

For the last 50-plus years, the tax benefits to American companies making things abroad has encouraged jobs to move out of the U.S.

The Government Has Encouraged Mergers

The government has actively encouraged mergers, which destroy jobs.

For example, the Treasury Department encouraged banks to use the bailout money to buy their competitors, and pushed through an amendment to the tax laws which rewards mergers in the banking industry.

This is nothing new.

Citigroup's former chief executive says that when Citigroup was formed in 1998 out of the merger of banking and insurance giants, Alan Greenspan told him, “I have nothing against size. It doesn’t bother me at all”.

And the government has actively encouraged the big banks to grow into mega-banks.

The Government Has Let Unemployment Rise in an Attempt to Fight Inflation

As I noted last year:
The Federal Reserve is mandated by law to maximize employment. The relevant statute states:
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals ofmaximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.
***

The Fed could have stemmed the unemployment crisis by demanding that banks lend more as a condition to the various government assistance programs, but Mr. Bernanke failed to do so.

Ryan Grim argues that the Fed might have broken the law by letting unemployment rise in order to keep inflation low:
The Fed is mandated by law to maximize employment, but focuses on inflation -- and "expected inflation" -- at the expense of job creation. At its  most recent meeting, board members bluntly stated that they feared banks might increase lending, which they worried could lead to inflation.

Board members expressed concern "that banks might seek to reduce appreciably their excess reserves as the economy improves by purchasing securities or by easing credit standards and expanding their lending substantially. Such a development, if not offset by Federal Reserve actions, could give additional impetus to spending and, potentially, to actual and expected inflation." That summary was spotted by Naked Capitalism and is included in a summary of the minutes of the most recent meeting...

Suffering high unemployment in order to keep inflation low cuts against the Fed's legal mandate. Or, to put it more bluntly, it may be illegal.
In fact, the unemployment situation is getting worse, and many leading economists say that - under Mr. Bernanke's leadership - America is suffering a permanentdestruction of jobs.

For example, JPMorgan Chase’s Chief Economist Bruce Kasman told Bloomberg:
[We've had a] permanent destruction of hundreds of thousands of jobs in industries from housing to finance.
The chief economists for Wells Fargo Securities, John Silvia, says:
Companies “really have diminished their willingness to hire labor for any production level,” Silvia said. “It’s really a strategic change,” where companies will be keeping fewer employees for any particular level of sales, in good times and bad, he said.
And former Merrill Lynch chief economist David Rosenberg writes:
The number of people not on temporary layoff surged 220,000 in August and the level continues to reach new highs, now at 8.1 million. This accounts for 53.9% of the unemployed — again a record high — and this is a proxy for permanent job loss, in other words, these jobs are not coming back. Against that backdrop, the number of people who have been looking for a job for at least six months with no success rose a further half-percent in August, to stand at 5 million — the long-term unemployed now represent a record 33% of the total pool of joblessness.
And see this.
In fact, the Fed intentionally curbed lending by banks in an attempt to stem inflation, without addressing whether public banks could provide credit.

The Government Has Allowed Wealth to be Concentrated in Fewer and Fewer Hands

As I  pointed out a year ago:
A new report by University of California, Berkeley economics professor Emmanuel Saez concludes that income inequality in the United States is at an all-time high, surpassing even levels seen during the Great Depression.

The report shows that:
  • Income inequality is worse than it has been since at least 1917
  • "The top 1 percent incomes captured half of the overall economic growth over the period 1993-2007"
  • "In the economic expansion of 2002-2007, the top 1 percent captured two thirdsof income growth."
As others have pointed out, the average wage of Americans, adjusting for inflation, islower than it was in the 1970s. The minimum wage, adjusting for inflation, is lower than it was in the 1950s. See this. On the other hand, billionaires have never had it better.
As I wrote in September:
The economy is like a poker game . . . it is human nature to want to get all of the chips, but - if one person does get all of the chips - the game ends.

In other words, the game of capitalism only continues as long as everyone has some money to play with. If the government and corporations take everyone's money, the game ends.

The fed and Treasury are not giving more chips to those who need them: the American consumer. Instead, they are giving chips to the 800-pound gorillas at the poker table, such as Wall Street investment banks. Indeed, a good chunk of the money used by surviving mammoth players to buy the failing behemoths actually comes from the Fed...
This is not a question of big government versus small government, or republican versus democrat. It is not even a question of Keynes versus Friedman (two influential, competing economic thinkers).

It is a question of focusing any government funding which ismade to the majority of poker players - instead of the titans of finance - so that the game can continue. If the hundreds of billions or trillions spent on bailouts had instead been given to ease the burden of consumers, we would have already recovered from the financial crisis. 
noted in April:
FDR’s Fed chairman Marriner S. Eccles explained:
As in a poker game where the chips were concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the other fellows could stay in the game only by borrowing. When their credit ran out, the game stopped.
***
When most people lose their poker chips - and the game is set up so that only those with the most chips get more - free market capitalism is destroyed, as the "too big to fails" crowd out everyone else.
And the economy as a whole is destroyed. Remember, consumer spending accounts for the lion's share of economic activity. If most consumers are out of chips, the economy slumps.
And unemployment soars.

As former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich wrote yesterday:

Where have all the economic gains gone? Mostly to the top.

***

It’s no coincidence that the last time income was this concentrated was in 1928. I do not mean to suggest that such astonishing consolidations of income at the top directly cause sharp economic declines. The connection is more subtle.

The rich spend a much smaller proportion of their incomes than the rest of us. So when they get a disproportionate share of total income, the economy is robbed of the demand it needs to keep growing and creating jobs.

What’s more, the rich don’t necessarily invest their earnings and savings in the American economy; they send them anywhere around the globe where they’ll summon the highest returns — sometimes that’s here, but often it’s the Cayman Islands, China or elsewhere. The rich also put their money into assets most likely to attract other big investors (commodities, stocks, dot-coms or real estate), which can become wildly inflated as a result.

***

THE Great Depression and its aftermath demonstrate that there is only one way back to full recovery: through more widely shared prosperity.

***

And as America’s middle class shared more of the economy’s gains, it was able to buy more of the goods and services the economy could provide. The result: rapid growth and more jobs. By contrast, little has been done since 2008 to widen the circle of prosperity.

So through it's policies encouraging the offshoring of jobs, mergers, decreasing of economic activity to fight inflation, allowing wealth to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and other policy mistakes (like pretending that there is a "jobless recovery"), the government has channeled water away from U.S. jobs, creating a worsening unemployment drought.

Note for Keynesians: As I have repeatedly explained, the government hasn't spent money on the right kind of things to stimulate employmentSee this and this.

Note for followers of Austrian economic theory: I have repeatedly railed against the government artificially propping up asset prices and leverage, so that malinvestments can't be cleared, and we we have a stagnant, zombie economy which prevents job creation