Showing posts with label Higher Education. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Higher Education. Show all posts

Monday, March 30, 2015

Wall Street’s new student loan scheme: Subprime loans are coming to financial aid

Monday, Mar 30, 2015

Slimy new loan options proliferate, as Wall Street looks to do for education what it did to the economy 

Jeff Bryant

Wall Street wants to own your education destiny.

To the old saying about “death and taxes,” you can now add another: debt.

In fact, in contemporary America, debt is likely becoming at least as all-encompassing as the other two.

An increasingly powerful force behind the debt explosion is not what you might expect: not cars, not homes, not healthcare. It’s education.

Since the Great Recession, federal and state authorities have been disinvesting from their obligations to educate the citizenry. So now, nearly every state spends less on higher education than it did in 2007. And most states continue to spend less on K-12 education than they did in 2007. Federal government expenditures on education are also in decline.

So the burden of financing education has increasingly fallen on local governments and individuals, who have responded by borrowing money to pay for schooling.

Education debt is rapidly becoming a cradle to grave omnipresence – from parents taking out kindergarten loans, to taxpayers shouldering the ballooning costs of exotic school bonds, to senior citizens staving off bankruptcies caused by college debts.

With edu-debt levels mounting higher and higher at every turn, cash-strapped parents, municipal governments and education institutions have turned to solutions from Wall Street.

According to at least one investment news source, banks are increasingly reluctant to back infrastructure investments like schools, so the financial industry is rushing in to fill the void. “The severely restricted capacity of banks to provide long-term debt for infrastructure deals comes at a time when the need for infrastructure spending across the globe is soaring,” the report notes. “A great deal of debt will go to the bond markets. But they will not be the full solution by any means.”

Instead, an emerging “private loan space” is introducing “a number of new vehicles.”

An alphabet soup of new financial vehicles – SLABS, CABS, PPPs, ISAs – that’s been created in the edu-debt sphere spells disaster, as Wall Street tightens its control of how – or even whether – the nation educates its future workers and citizens.

Turning Students Into SLABS

A lot has been written about college student loan debt, now nearly $1.2 trillion and counting. But too little attention has focused on Wall Street’s role in the run-up.

Recall, when Wall Street speculators wanted a market for subprime mortgages, they created high-risk derivative securities that bundled the mortgages to sell as investments. The speculators have done the same for student loans.

These student loan asset-backed securities, or SLABS, have a performance history that has “been very good, and investors’ rate of return has been excellent,” according to an article in Wikipedia.

SLABS are “hot,” a Wall Street Journal headline exhorted its readers in 2013. “Investors are flocking to SLABS,” a more recent article on the Huffington Post reports.

A post on the blog for left-leaning advocacy Demos explains, “Before the SLABS binge, most private student loans were actually made in connection with the college financial aid office, which helped ensure students weren’t taken for a ride, or weren’t borrowing more than they needed to. Between 2005 and 2007, the percentage of loans to students made without any school involvement grew from 40 percent to over 70 percent.”

It’s not hard to see the allure of SLABS. Student loans seem to be an endless stream of revenue as colleges and universities continue to increase tuition, economic conditions and employment transience feed the unemployed back into continuing education, and political leaders urge everyone to attend college. The income stream is nearly guaranteed to pay off because the loans are next to impossible to discharge in bankruptcy.

A Huffington Post article by Chris Kirkham states, SLABS offer “seemingly unlimited growth potential at virtually zero risk. The burden of college loan repayment falls entirely on students’ backs, shielding corporations from the consequences of default.”

Indeed, any attempt to write off the massive student debt would not only have to contend with government reluctance to lose such a profitable revenue source, but would also meet deep-pocketed opposition from the financial industry.

But SLABS are only a subset of Wall Street’s continuously expanding man spread in the edu-debt sector.

Selling Schools on CABS And Charters

Much less attention has focused on how government and education institutions are becoming more and more saddled with debt.

According to the website Governing.com, “Many local governments across the U.S. face steep budget deficits as they struggle to pay off debts accumulated over a number of years. As a last resort, some filed for bankruptcy.”

School district bankruptcies are occurring with alarming frequency, USA Today reported last year. “California saw a record number of school districts in fiscal distress in 2012; currently, eight school districts have negative certifications, meaning that based on current projections, the school districts will not meet their financial obligations for fiscal 2014 or 2015. Another 41 school districts may run out of money by fiscal 2016.”

California schools trying to stave off insolvency have increasingly turned to the financial sector for help. Writing at the Web of Debt blog site, Ellen Brown explains how financial brokers have promoted “something called ‘capital appreciation bonds’ (CABs) as a tool. … CABs have now been issued by more than 400 California districts, some with repayment obligations of up to 20 times the principal advanced (or 2,000 percent).”

Adding to the edu-debt burden is the rush to finance charter schools. Recently, the Bloomberg news agency reported, “US charter schools are issuing a record amount of municipal debt … The institutions, privately run with public funding, have sold $1.6 billion of securities in 2014.”

Charter schools are notorious for closing suddenly, often on very short notice, leaving school districts holding the bag for the remaining costs and outstanding debts. Over 65 percent of the time, charter school closures are due to financial problems or “mismanagement,” according to research quoted in the Huffington Post.

A Plague Of PPPs

In higher education, the recent announcement that Sweet Briar College in Virginia would have to close due to financial insolvency stunned current and former students. But Sweet Briar’s imminent demise is likely just the first of many more college financial failures to come, according to a recent Op-Ed by a former Department of Education official Dennis Cariello in The Hill.

Cariello points to a recent study by Bain & Co. that concludes over 60 percent of American colleges and universities are on an “unsustainable financial path” or at financial risk.

To a considerable extent, Sweet Briar was done in by bad loan arrangements made with the private financial sector. As an expert for the Roosevelt Institute explains, “It is closing because it signed some terrible deals to get what must have felt like ‘needed’ money at the time.”

Is Sweet Briar “the canary in the coal mine?” the Roosevelt piece asks, and points to the University of California system, the University of Michigan, and American University that are also examples where “banks are certainly making obscene profits … and passing debt on to students through increased costs.”

A report from Inside Higher Education explains the extent of the financial wheeling-and-dealing in public higher ed. “Burdened by aging campuses, several years of backlogged maintenance projects, increased competition for students (and the tuition revenue that comes with them), and little hope that states are going to fund the construction they need, either through appropriations or by issuing their own debt, public colleges and universities are likely to issue their own debt to finance the renovation of their facilities.”

Among the many options public universities are considering for funding are more “public-private partnerships [PPPs], whereby private developers get the capital to construct facilities and then universities strike long-term leases to occupy the space.”

No doubt, these long-term PPPs present other opportunities for the financial industry to divert public money to private debt holders who can further capitalize on the venture by securitizing the debts, sticking education institutions – and therefore, students and taxpayers – with unsustainable levels of debt.

With SLABS, CABS, PPPs already in the mix, it’s hard to see how the plague of edu-debt schemes could get any worse. But it can.

Investor Impunity Enforced by ISAs

The ultimate solution in the private edu-debt sphere emerged recently when conservative ex-governor of Indiana, now president of Purdue University, Mitch Daniels proposed to the U.S. Congress that, “Instead of taking out a traditional college loan, students would have the option of finding an investor – possibly a Purdue alum – to finance their degree in exchange for a share of their future income.”

Daniels is not the only proponent of these arrangements. According to the reporter, Republican Florida Sen. Marco Rubio and former House Rep. Tom Petri from Wisconsin introduced legislation last year to help create the legal framework for these kinds of schemes. The bills did not advance.

But like what so often happens, quirky proposals from conservatives that appear like blips on the outer edge of the crazy radar, actually have a huge think tank machinery behind them. As a report from an Indiana news outlet explains, the financial vehicles Daniels alluded to are what’s known in the biz as Income Share Arrangements (ISAs). The reporter sourced the concept of ISAs to 1955 and University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman, the god of right-wing privatization advocates.

Beth Akers, a fellow with centrist think tank Brookings, has argued ISAs should “play a role” in financing student loan debt. She posits that the central problem with higher education is there is “almost no incentive” for students to choose schools and courses of study that pay off down the road in terms of lucrative salaries. A broad market for ISAs could change that by enabling students to “collateralize their financing with future earnings, just as home buyers collateralize their mortgage with the house itself.”

“Income share agreements … are quietly gaining a following among critics of the nation’s staggering student-debt problem,” Slate’s Alison Griswold observes. “New companies such as Upstart, Pave, and Lumni have turned to the investing-in-people model.”

Griswold points to a study from the conservative American Enterprise Institute which argues, “Because ISA investors earn a profit only when a student is successful, they offer students better terms for programs that are expected to be of high value and have strong incentives to support students both during school and after graduation. This process gives students strong signals about which programs and fields are most likely to help them be successful.”

It’s not at all hard to imagine what this would lead to – academic programs where students are financially “incentivized” to pursue what investors prefer rather than follow their imaginations and ideas. Even if they do take the incentive route, they run the risk of a lifetime of indentured servitude to their financial backers should the market for their chosen career turn sour after they graduate.

The consequences of such a financial arrangement are harmful to businesses too. Want to be that creative writing major that ends up in the marketing field, or that botany student who pursues food and wine retailing? Forget it. The system run by ISAs will likely never incentivize outliers in our employment system that often end up being the drivers of problem solving and creativity in business.

What’s worse, instead of student debt getting “collateralized,” as the Brookings fellow put it, what really becomes the collateral is not a thing, like a house, but a person: the student herself.

One can easily see how a speculative market where math or science majors are tossed onto the gambling table with students who pursued art or humanities studies would play out, and what could have propelled a student’s choices when they’re still teenagers – a quest for personal development and intrinsic reward – becomes a lifelong liability regardless of personal attributes.

The ramifications of a higher education system financed by these kinds of debt mongers would be catastrophic as it worked into K-12, as it surely would.

Are Children Just Numbers?

When Wall Street influence trickles down to K-12, there’s certainly a market opportunity awaiting.

Advocates in the K-12 arena who insist on running every student through a battery of standardized tests every year have given – either unwittingly or intentionally (does it matter?) – the financial industry a huge gift by decreeing that student scores on standardized tests should define students’ learning “output.” Now, everything monetarily related to a child’s education – operations budgets, teacher salaries, classroom costs, government funds, grant money – can be related to a test score output.

This in effect turns student learning – and by extension, the students themselves – into a commodity that can be speculated on. In a financial environment populated with ISA investors, students then become like pork bellies or yen, and schools get turned into test-preparation factories, ignoring subjects and skills that are not assessed.

That could be what Wall Street wants, an education system focused on spitting out products that fit into pre-conceived business models, while less money goes toward educating those “other kids.” But is that really what the rest of us want?

Sunday, June 19, 2011

Whatever Happened to Stability Analysis?

Sunday 19 June 2011

Once upon a time, stability of the general equilibrium was considered an important element in the education of students in economics. Today it seldom receives the attention it deserves and this is regrettable. Stability is one of the most important aspects of neoclassical theory because it addresses the question of just how the mechanism of free competition in the marketplace actually leads to the formation of equilibrium prices.
This crucial aspect of microeconomics is seldom covered adequately (if at all) in recent textbooks and university programs, whether at the undergraduate or post-graduate levels. Most students spend years learning how individual agents maximize, or exploring cases of oligopoly, or playing around with game theory, but when it comes to stability, their teachers skirt the main issues.

As a result, a cloud of confusion persists. Students come to believe that somewhere in the sacred scriptures of the discipline there exists a theory that accurately reproduces just how the market forces of competition guide an economy through a price adjustment process that leads to the formation of equilibrium prices. In fact, if stability analysis received the attention it deserves, students would be able to see that it is the most important failure of general equilibrium theory.
Stability was typically introduced to students as a property of general equilibrium. The equilibrium was stable if the economic forces activated after it was disturbed returned the economy to the original (equilibrium) position. Local stability responded more to this definition, while global stability implied that the equilibrium position would be reached regardless of the starting point.

As Léon Walras explained (at the end of Lesson 11), demonstrating how the mechanism of free competition led to equilibrium prices was essential. But this was easier said than done. Hicks in the 1930s and Samuelson in 1948 were able to make some progress. But Hicks’ contribution in static stability was not associated with any adjustment process. Samuelson showed that stability analysis required an analysis of the evolution of excess demands over time and introduced the typical price adjustment equations used in modern formulations. However, he did not provide the conditions under which such a system of equations would converge to a general equilibrium.

In 1958-9 two papers, by Arrow and Hurwicz and Arrow, Block and Hurwicz, showed how under certain conditions an economy could converge to equilibrium. But these were extreme conditions: gross substitution (GS) for all goods or the validity of the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) at the market level. In the key passage summarizing their results, Arrow and Hurwicz wrote: “none of the results so far obtained contradicts the proposition that under perfect competition, with the customary assumptions as to convexity, etc., the system is always stable”.

A year later, Scarf published his counterexample showing how unjustified this conjecture was. The extreme conditions of GS and WARP turned out to be indispensable, at least with the market processes described by Arrow and his colleagues. The ordinary structural conditions of the general equilibrium model were not enough to ensure convergence.

Other aspects of the model leave much to be desired. Perfect competition implies that no firm is able to modify prices, so in models in this tradition (called tâtonnement models) price adjustment is the responsibility of a fictitious character called the auctioneer, an agent that is incompatible with the notion of a private and decentralized economy. Tâtonnement models exclude transactions out of equilibrium, so that agents are stupid and believe prices announced by the auctioneer are equilibrium prices (also, initial allocations of individual agents remain unchanged until equilibrium is attained).

In the sixties a different tack was followed. Trading models were developed by Hahn and Negishi, Fisher and others in which agents were allowed to engage in transactions during the price formation process (i.e. out of equilibrium). The conditions for stability are less stringent (no GS, no WARP), but an “orderly market hypothesis” is introduced and the fictitious auctioneer is still required. Because the process changes initial holdings, the arrival point of equilibrium is path-dependent. More important, trading out of equilibrium requires the introduction of money, a serious problem in general equilibrium theory. Typically, when confronted with this revelation, students are perplexed: What? Money was always absent in my microeconomics courses?

The stability debate reached its climax with the papers published by Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu in 1973-4. These results show that the usual assumptions of GET allow the dynamics of the classic tâtonnement process to be essentially arbitrary. To avoid this, additional restrictions must be imposed on excess demand functions.

The failure of stability theory is of relevance to macroeconomics. The notion that in the presence of rigidities markets fail to operate properly is the reciprocal of the belief that stability is a property of markets. The ‘rigidity’ view is pervasive in macroeconomics, from conventional Keynesianism to believers in the micro-foundations of macroeconomics and the new synthesis with its DSGE models (where transversality conditions impose stability).

This is what underlies Milton Friedman’s view that the natural rate of unemployment is “the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets”. Maintaining ignorance about the limitations of stability theory comes in handy when perpetuating the mythology of market theory.

As Mundell once remarked, stability analysis is the most successful failure of general economic theory. It is also the best example of how an academic community pushes the most serious problems of mainstream theory under the rug and gets away with it. Students should learn to look under the rug. The ability to improve our understanding of economic processes depends on efforts to uncover the failures of mainstream theoretical constructs.

LINKS AND REFERENCES
Arrow, K. and H. D. Block (1959)
http://www.jstor.org/pss/1907515
Arrow, K., H. D. Block and L. Hurwicz (1959)
http://www.jstor.org/pss/1907779
Debreu, G. (1974), “Excess demand functions”, Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1. (15-21)http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v1y1974i1p15-21.html
Fisher, F. (1983), Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics. Cambridge University Press.
Hahn and Negishi (1962)
http://www.jstor.org/pss/1909889
Hicks, John (1939), Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mantel, R. (1974), “On the characterization of aggregate excess demand,”  Journal of Economic Theory. 7. (348-353)http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejetheo/v_3a7_3ay_3a1974_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a348-353.htm
Samuelson, P. (1947), Foundations of Economic Analysis. Harvard University Press.
 Scarf, H. (1960), “Some examples of global instability of competitive equilibria”. International Economic Review, 1 [157 – 172]
Sonnenschein, H. (1973), “Do Walras’ identity and continuity characterize the class of community excess demand functions?” Journal of Economic Theory. 6. (345-354),http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v6y1973i4p345-354.html

Tuesday, May 3, 2011

Delivering Educational Products: The Job Formerly Known as Teaching

 
Hi, I’m Robert Jensen, a provider of educational products to consumers at the University of Texas at Austin.

I used to introduce myself as a UT professor, but that was before I attended a Texas Public Policy Foundation session last week offering more exciting “breakthrough solutions” to the problems of higher education.

At that session in a downtown Austin hotel, I learned that these very real problems—escalating costs and questionable quality of undergraduate instruction—can be solved in the “free market.” You know, the free market, that magical mechanism that gave us the housing bubble/credit derivative scam/financial meltdown. The free market that has produced growing inequality in the United States and around the world. That good old free market.

The solutions offered by representatives of the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom and the Center for College Affordability and Productivity in the morning’s first session focused on ending public subsidies for higher education and treating it like any other business. These insights come on the heels of the much-hyped “seven breakthrough solutions” that TPPF has been pushing. (Read about them here, and for a satirical treatment, watch this.

Not surprisingly, both panelists spoke in the language of the market, turning education into a commodity. Panel moderator William Murchison, a conservative syndicated columnist, chimed in during the discussion, referring to “consumers of the educational product.”

I think that means students.

That pithy phrase led me to the microphone in the Q&A period, where I asked whether in this mad quest to turn higher education into a business the panelists might not be promoting efficiency so much as guaranteeing the final destruction of what’s left of real education. I said that I found it difficult to understand my teaching— which focuses on how citizens should understand concentrations of power in government and corporations, and on how journalists should respond—as “an economic exchange,” in the words of Cato’s Neal McCluskey.

Both McCluskey and Matthew Denhart from CCAP responded with more of the market mantra and didn’t seem to recognize, or care, that commodifying education might have implications not just for how we organize institutions and evaluate professors, but for learning itself. Denhart responded that the “product” doesn’t have to be solely job training, but would include instruction in “esoteric concepts.” Those apparently are the two alternatives in college classrooms: purely practical or interesting irrelevance.

That got me thinking about my favorite class, “Critical Issues in Journalism,” the large introductory course I teach in the School of Journalism. The course tries to examine—rigorously, but in plain language using clear concepts—the nature of democracy and the role of the news media. My goal is to model the critical thinking that is crucial for citizens and journalists in a world facing multiple crises (political and economic, cultural and ecological) with dwindling hopes for a smooth transition to a just and sustainable future. Rather than accept the shallow platitudes of American democracy or the self-serving claims of American mainstream journalism, I encourage students to challenge the conventional wisdom (and me).

My students can speak to how well I do that, but my interest here is in how I understand the nature of what I do. When I think of when the class seems to work best -- the moments that students seems to be most engaged with these crucial questions—it’s difficult to think of myself as delivering an educational product or of my students as consumers.

Instead, I’m happy with being a professor. I profess.

“Profess” can be used in different ways—to make a disingenuous statement (“He professed to like his boss”) or to announce religious commitments (“She professed her faith in God”). But I use it in the sense of making a public claim to knowledge, with an openness to respond to critiques of that claim. When it really works, students not only listen to professors but learn to profess themselves. When it works, I’m just an older—and, one hopes, at least slightly wiser—version of my students.

That experience can happen in vocational training as well as in courses more philosophically focused. Good journalism writing teachers, for example, know the joy of professing the love of the craft and helping students discover that joy. The presumed division between training and intellectual work occurs only when teachers accept that false divide and abandon efforts to bring the two together.

I don’t want to appear naïve; I realize that much of what happens in American college classrooms (including mine, of course) falls short of these ideals on any given day. The question is not whether we sometimes fail, as we all do, but why failure sometimes becomes routine. On this count, ironically, I agree with some of the critiques coming from the TPPF.

After 19 years of full-time teaching at the University of Texas, I’ve heard a lot of legitimate student complaints about professors who don’t care about teaching. I’ve complained myself about the irrelevance and inanity of so much of the “research” produced in the disciplines I know in the social sciences and humanities. I played that research game for my first six years to pass inspection and get tenure, but after that I dropped out of the scholarly publishing arena to concentrate on writing for a general audience. Shortly after that I stopped teaching graduate courses out of frustration with the self-indulgence of so much of the research/theory crowd in the study of media and mass communication. These days, I enjoy the challenge of connecting with undergraduates, writing about political and social matters, and speaking in public.

Let me be clear: This is not an anti-intellectual screed or an attack on systematic thinking and inquiry. I have learned a lot from the work of other scholars, which is reflected in the courses I teach, and such thinking and inquiry is more needed than ever to face these deepening crises. My writing for general audiences is rooted in research, defined more broadly. But the critics of the university have a point. Increasingly, the academic game that most professors play is so self-indulgent that ordinary people—not just reactionary ideologues with libertarian fantasies—will not, and should not, support it indefinitely. Education is not a commodity, but economics are relevant in the sense that we don’t live in a world of endless resources.

But here’s where I part company with the critics: Instead of pretending to be able to measure faculty output and draining the life from teaching, we need to embrace the ideals of the university rather than capitulate to the false promises of failed market ideology. The obsessions with measurement and testing have nearly destroyed K-12 public education, and if applied to higher education it will have similar effects.

That model may be particularly attractive to those on the right precisely because it is so effective at undermining the kind of critical thinking some of us are trying to encourage in our classes. As U.S. society has moved steadily to the right over the past three decades, conservatives have been eager to eliminate the few remaining spaces in the culture where critiques of power—especially concentrated economic power in a society marked by obscene wealth and indecent inequality—can flourish. Some parts of the modern university—especially those teaching business, advertising, and economics—are devoted to propping up that power, and much of the rest of the campus is not far behind. The corporatization of the modern university—both in internal organization and reliance on funding from corporations and corporate-based foundations—has done much to eliminate critical thinking that is connected to struggles for political and economic justice. The victory of the market model would be the end of real education, if by education we mean independent inquiry into the power that structures our lives.

I’m encouraged that UT President Bill Powers—who appeared on the second panel of the day, and had to endure the self-aggrandizing ramblings of fellow panelist and TPPF Senior Fellow Ronald Trowbridge—supports faculty in this debate and recognizes the threats to academic freedom embedded in this market madness. I have disagreements with the university administration about many things, but we faculty would make it easier for administrators in that debate if we not only press the institution to support us but engage in critical self-reflection about ourselves.

In hallway conversations, faculty members will express frustration about bad teachers (though there is not always agreement on which colleagues are the bad teachers) who are allowed to continue to muddle along. Many worry that the demands for scholarly production have become so focused on quantity rather than quality that much of what is published in academic journals is of little value, even for specialists in a disciple.

Acknowledging these systemic failures doesn’t detract from all the good teaching done in universities, nor does it lessen the value of the important research of many faculty members. Instead, it should simply remind us that we owe it to the state, our students, and ourselves to confront these issues. If we don’t, the reactionary forces that increasingly dominate the culture will take care of it for us, and instead of breakthroughs in higher education we will witness an accelerating breakdown.

Saturday, May 29, 2010

The Lost Soul of Higher Education

Corporatization: the Assault on Academic Freedom
and the End of the American University
Friday 28 May 2010
by: Eleanor J. Bader, t r u t h o u t | Book Review

Ellen Schrecker, a history professor at New York City's Yeshiva University, starts "The Lost Soul of Higher Education" with a blunt assessment: "In reacting to the economic insecurities of the past forty years, the nation's colleges and universities have adopted corporate practices that degrade undergraduate instruction, marginalize faculty members, and threaten the very mission of the academy as an institution devoted to the common good."

It's depressing stuff. And sadly, there is a wealth of evidence to support Schrecker's assertion. She starts by introducing the concept of academic freedom - the notion that teachers should be able to present ideas, both popular and not, without fear of reprisal.

Sounds great. Yet, reality, Schrecker writes, is somewhat different, for while rhetoric in support of academic freedom is plentiful, neither pedagogical nor personal autonomy have ever had free rein on campus. Howard Zinn, for one, was fired from Spellman College 50 years ago for supporting sit-ins against then-rampant racial segregation. More recently, Professor Norman Finkelstein, a prominent critic of Israel, was denied tenure at DePaul University following a campaign led by Harvard Professor Alan M. Dershowitz. Similarly, Native-American studies Professor Ward Churchill lost his post at the University of Colorado after a campaign by right-wing ideologues slammed his scholarship as inauthentic. Other examples abound and Schrecker makes clear that "tenure cannot protect a controversial professor when an institution wants him out ... Contrary to common assumptions, tenure does not grant its holders guaranteed life time employment."

Never was this clearer than during Joe McCarthy's witch hunts. Schrecker zeros in on three University of Washington professors who were fired because of purported ties to the Communist Party. Two of them admitted membership; the third, Ralph Gundlach, did not. Gundlach's dismissal, Schrecker writes, was the first test of academic freedom in the early 1950s. "Other institutions soon followed and before the anti-communist furor abated in the mid 1950's, more than one hundred college teachers lost jobs or were denied tenure because of their politics."

Two things are particularly striking about the University of Washington's actions. The first is that in none of the cases was teaching an issue. "It was the off-campus political activities of these men and particularly, their insistence that the institution's investigations not only violated their academic freedom but also interfered with their First Amendment freedom of speech and association that cost them their jobs," Schrecker concludes. Secondly, the fact that their colleagues allowed these dismissals to happen, with nary a peep of protest, is shameful. At the same time, Schrecker reminds us that despite right-wing assertions, the academy is not now and has never been a bastion of left-wing sentiment. In fact, only a handful of faculty members have ever been militant activists. "In an influential 1969 Carnegie Foundation study of the professoriate, Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset found that only five percent of the more than 60,000 professors they surveyed were willing to identify themselves as radical," she writes. Forty-one years later, there is nothing to suggest that the number has increased.

Schrecker's sweeping historical overview also makes another important point: Unlike the politically reactionary 1950s, the 1960s gave rise to numerous social movements which led to unprecedented campus activism. These movements made it possible for at least some faculty members to voice political opinions and speak out about issues like the Vietnam War, racism and educational equity.

Call it the heyday of academic freedom, a time when a cadre of professors and graduate teaching assistants - prompted by student activists - took it upon themselves to push for the creation of ethnic and women's studies departments and classes in such fast-developing disciplines as queer theory. Furthermore, alongside student groups, they demanded expanded financial aid and open enrollment. Their goal, they argued, was to literally change the complexion of higher education.

Not surprisingly, a few years down the road, the backlash that led Richard Nixon into the White House hit academia and, almost overnight, nontraditional courses were under attack for promoting specious, "dumbed down," intellectual discourse.

A small number of university faculty members opted to unionize - or try - as a way of maintaining their toehold on power, but most did not. As a result, by the mid-1970s, campus activism was waning and men like Allan Bloom, Donald Kagan and James Reston found media outlets eager for their audience-grabbing rants about on-campus immorality and the left-wing indoctrination of unsuspecting kids. Conservative donors were overjoyed by this outpouring and rushed to create groups including The American Enterprise Institute, The National Association of Scholars [NAS], The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and the American Council of Trustees and Alumni [ACTA]. Schrecker calls this confluence a catalyst and writes that it "accelerated the rate at which neoconservative and market-oriented studies were produced and gave them far more visibility and influence than they night otherwise have received."

Suddenly, the term "political correctness" was part of everyday discourse and "white man as endangered species" went from punch line to cause for alarm. A host of right wingers grabbed prime-time slots on both the radio airwaves and TV news hours.

Flash forward three decades and a racist, anti-immigrant backlash is in full flower.

So, too, are attacks on the many academic programs that have brought black, brown and Asian students and faculty into campus life. ACTA's campaign against Ward Churchill, Schrecker writes, is but one example. His outspoken critique of US foreign policy following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 "gave Colorado's partisans of traditional higher education a perfect opportunity to take on an unpopular department," she continues. While Schrecker acknowledges that Churchill's scholarship was oft times faulty, she notes that numerous faculty members at other schools - people she characterizes as plagiarists and charlatans - were not fired, but were instead given short-term suspensions.

But another change was also brewing. On top of selective crackdowns on leftists, feminists, ethnic studies proponents and queer theorists that began in the 1970s, colleges across the country were simultaneously being hit with budget cuts. Thanks to state and city budget shortfalls, government investment in higher education was dwindling and schools - even those with huge endowments - were scrambling for funding. Despite hefty tuition hikes, trustees and administrators were wringing their hands at the calamities that would ensue if more money was not forthcoming. "As colleges and universities struggled to keep afloat, they looked to the business sector for financial solutions, often bringing in managers from private companies to handle their affairs," Schrecker writes.

The price, of course, has been steep. Some corporations, she reports, require grant recipients to stifle findings that might damage their bottom line. Others limit research to subjects that have potential remunerative value. Equally appalling, as full-time faculty seek outside finding to support their research - or in some cases to insure that they receive tenure - upwards of 70 percent of teaching has shifted to part-time contingent faculty who typically juggle multiple adjunct jobs to make ends meet.

On the losing end are students who often can't find their teachers to discuss ideas or get in-person clarification of what is expected for completion of the next assignment.

"The Lost Soul of Higher Education" posits no solutions for loosening the corporate hold on education or for ensuring that a wide cross section of students are given the means to enroll. Likewise, it does not suggest ways to restructure higher ed to ensure that good teaching is ranked above grant acquisition or publishing, or for getting faculty members to understand the importance of collective bargaining.

All told, it's a grim read. But don't be deterred. Schrecker shines a bright light - one that should not be ignored - on everything that is wrong with the academy. If history teaches us anything, it's that social movements have the power to force social change. As Frederick Douglass reminded us more than 100 years ago, "power concedes nothing without demand." The question is what to ask for first.