Impoverishing Their Communities
The author takes a trip to Mexico to see the 'green revolution' firsthand -- and what she finds is shocking.
By Jill Richardson, AlterNet
Posted on August 6, 2010
The Obama administration's Feed the Future initiative promises a second Green Revolution that will feed a planet of nine billion people by doubling crop yields by 2050. But considering that we produce enough food to feed the planet today and a billion people still go hungry, are yields really the problem? And if they are, are providing Green Revolution technologies like hybrid and genetically engineered seeds, chemical fertilizer and pesticides to subsistence farmers the best way to achieve them? I visited subsistence farmers in Mexico to find out.
The homes of campesinos, peasant farmers, in the rural areas surrounding Cuquio, Mexico (about an hour from Guadalajara) no longer have dirt floors. The Mexican government initiated a program to replace them with cement floors in 2008 and now most homes sport a plaque celebrating their new piso firmes. Electricity came about 20 years ago. For many, running water and bathroom facilities are modern conveniences they do not yet have. The government has recently distributed composting toilets to many, but not all, families.
One of the tiny adobe homes is decorated by flowers growing in upside-down Coca-Cola bottles turned into flower pots. Another is located next to a fencepost sporting an empty bag of Monsanto corn seeds -- seeds presumably planted in the adjoining cornfield, or milpa. This little corner of the world and the people who live here seem to be forgotten by everyone except for Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and multinational agribusiness corporations like Monsanto and DuPont.
The campesinos here are easy prey for savvy, first-world corporate marketers. Many have only a sixth-grade education, and they know how to grow their traditional milpas of intercropped corn, beans and squash because they learned the techniques practiced by generations before them, often first handling a horse and plow at the tender age of 6. They know their lives are hard and that some years they don't produce enough food to eat. Moreover, they are desperate to give their children better lives through education, but subsistence farming does not come with a salary and many cannot afford the fees, supplies or uniforms required by schools. Several express regret (or even despair) that their children had to drop out of school to work at the local shoe factory for 500 pesos per week -- about $1.05 per hour with current exchange rates. A new technology that could provide enough food and perhaps some income would be welcome.
The tragedy is that a quick assessment of the soil reveals the causes of low corn yields and the problems are simple to fix. Mexican agronomist Juan Quesada Alba says the soils here are very acidic, with pHs as low as 4.2. Most crops prefer soil that is slightly acidic and can even tolerate a pH that isn't quite ideal, but 4.2 is extreme. The clay soil does not allow water penetration, magnifying the impacts of both droughts and floods. He finds that amending the soil with rich compost and a small amount of chemical fertilizer can easily increase yields. High amounts of organic matter in the soil act as a buffer against suboptimal soil pH. Adding "cal" -- the same slaked lime added to corn to make tortillas -- to the soil would raise its pH, also improving growing conditions for the corn.
Alba is a proponent of planting maiz criollo, the traditional Mexican corn seeds developed through millennia of careful seed selection, instead of the hybrid and genetically engineered seeds offered by the agribusiness giants. However, he recommends campesinos change how they select their seeds. While campesinos select for the biggest mazorcas (ears of dried corn), he says they should instead consider the qualities of the entire plant. Maiz criollo is much taller with bigger mazorcas compared to hybrid and transgenic strains, he says, and often they blow over in the wind. If campesinos knew to select seeds from plants with strong stalks that could withstand the wind, within a few years the majority of their corn would not blow over. When asked if campesinos could benefit from a new, genetically engineered drought-resistant corn (as biotech companies claim to be creating), Alba responded that there are already varieties of maiz criollo that can withstand an entire month without water.
A trip into one of the many agrochemical and seed retailers in the area provides very different solutions from those advocated by Alba. Products by Monsanto, DuPont, Dow, Bayer, Syngenta, and more are all available in this remote corner of Mexico. Monsanto's DeKalb brand advertises with an ear of corn with wings and the slogan "Un ángel en tu tierra" ("An angel in your land"), whereas DuPont's Pioneer brand offers "El más alto rendimiento" ("The highest performance") and "Buena calidad de grano" ("Good grain quality"). In addition to selling campesinos packages of seeds and accompanying agrochemicals, these corporations offer a chance at modernization, giving up the backward ways of the past to finally enter the 21st century of agricultural technology. At least, that is how the seeds and chemicals are sold and often perceived.
One woman named Lola says the hybrid Monsanto seeds, tractor and agrochemicals make growing corn less work than it used to be. However, she adds, the frogs have all died. She blames the pesticides, which her teenage sons apply without any protective clothing. Sometimes her younger children find the pesticide containers and play with them, and without frogs, the pond in her yard is full of mosquito larvae. A man in a nearby village tried planting hybrid seeds once. He was disgusted that he had to purchase so many expensive chemicals to go with them, and he wasn't happy with his crop. He's returned to planting maiz criollo, which he believes is tastier and healthier for his family. Another man says he grows maiz criollo only because he is too poor to afford hybrid seeds. Each year he hopes to grow enough to feed himself, his wife and the three of his 12 children who still live at home. Last year he did not grow enough.
Like so many campesinos in the area, his tiny 1.25 acre plot is surrounded by fields owned by rich men who grow corn or raise cattle for sale, not for subsistence. He inherited nearly four acres from his parents, but sold the rest to pay a debt a decade ago. His family has no fruit trees and no livestock, so they subsist entirely on a diet of corn, beans and some squash. One of his sons, Gustavo, age 23, lives a mile away with his girlfriend and three children. With no land of their own and little available work in the area, they often go hungry. Unfortunately, Gustavo's family is unable to provide much help.
Dr. Ann Lopez, author of The Farmworkers' Journey and founder of The Center for Farmworker Families, has been traveling to this part of Mexico for 12 years. She hasn't seen an improvement in quality of life due to Green Revolution technologies. "Once you degrade your soil with the chemicals," she says, "you need to use more chemicals each year to get the same yields." This phenomenon forces families who adopt the Green Revolution technologies onto a roller coaster of needing to come up with more money each year, either from selling corn or gathered wild tubers called camotes, or with money sent from relatives in the United States. (Finding a job locally is also an option but most people said there was no work. The shoe factory only employs perhaps 100 people.)
Increased corn yields could provide a family a surplus of corn to sell, but corn isn't worth very much in post-NAFTA Mexico. Before, NAFTA, farmers in this area could sell corn to the Mexican government for a fair price. Once Mexicans were forced to compete with subsidized U.S. corn farmers, the price of corn fell by about half. Lola, who uses hybrid seeds and agrochemicals, says the most she's ever earned in a year by selling corn is 800 pesos (a little less than $70).
Campesinos say they had few problems with pests prior to the adoption of agrochemicals. Today, many talk of of plagas, pest infestations, affecting their crops. In this environment of minimal education and lax regulation, the pesticides sold to defeat the pests present a severe human health and safety hazard. Ann Lopez reports that pesticides that are banned or designated as Restricted Use Pesticides in the United States are sold freely in Mexico. Paraquat, an herbicide so toxic that one teaspoonful can be fatal, is among the most widely used agrochemicals in this part of Mexico. The carcinogenic herbicide 2,4-D is also sold in Mexico, often in combination with 2,4,5-T. Together, a 50:50 mixture of the two chemicals constitutes Agent Orange.
The chemicals are so toxic a woman told Lopez her daughter became sterile just by working in an agrochemical retail shop among the fumes from closed bottles of chemicals. Yet, campesinos often apply the chemicals with backpacks and handheld pumps, wearing sandals and no protective clothing whatsoever. Some believe myths like "agrochemicals are only poisonous if the farmer is smoking cigarettes or drinking while applying them" or "insecticides are harmful but herbicides are safe." Warning labels on the bottles are of limited help as some people are in this part of Mexico are illiterate. The local doctor in Cuquio says that two of every 10 patients who visit him during the rainy season months of June through October each year are poisoned by agrochemicals. Three or four die each year.
The problem with using Green Revolution technologies to fight hunger is that the technologies do not address the root causes of low yields (poor soil), nor do they address the other root causes of poverty and suffering among subsistence farmers. Birth control, education, health care, sensible economic policy to create jobs, fair trade policies, uncorrupt governments, and simple public infrastructure like paved roads and trash collection are all necessary to raise the quality of lives of campesinos in west central Mexico. Foisting industrialized agriculture on an uneducated public has instead resulted in massive soil erosion, causing the rivers and streams to run brown with silt, and harmed the most valuable asset campesinos have: their land and its ability to produce food.
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Elizabeth Warren Uncovered What the Govt. Did to 'Rescue' AIG, and It Ain't Pretty
The government’s $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath.
By William Greider, The Nation
Posted on August 9, 2010
The government’s $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath. The story of American International Group explains the larger catastrophe not because this was the biggest corporate bailout in history but because AIG’s collapse and subsequent rescue involved nearly all the critical elements, including delusion and deception. These financial dealings are monstrously complicated, but this account focuses on something mere mortals can understand—moral confusion in high places, and the failure of governing institutions to fulfill their obligations to the public.
Three governmental investigative bodies have now pored through the AIG wreckage and turned up disturbing facts—the House Committee on Oversight and Reform; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which will make its report at year’s end; and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which issued its report on AIG in June.
The five-member COP, chaired by Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren, has produced the most devastating and comprehensive account so far. Unanimously adopted by its bipartisan members, it provides alarming insights that should be fodder for the larger debate many citizens long to hear—why Washington rushed to forgive the very interests that produced this mess, while innocent others were made to suffer the consequences. The Congressional panel’s critique helps explain why bankers and their Washington allies do not want Elizabeth Warren to chair the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
The report concludes that the Federal Reserve Board’s intimate relations with the leading powers of Wall Street—the same banks that benefited most from the government’s massive bailout—influenced its strategic decisions on AIG. The panel accuses the Fed and the Treasury Department of brushing aside alternative approaches that would have saved tens of billions in public funds by making these same banks “share the pain.”
Bailing out AIG effectively meant rescuing Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch (as well as a dozens of European banks) from huge losses. Those financial institutions played the derivatives game with AIG, the esoteric practice of placing financial bets on future events. AIG lost its bets, which led to its collapse. But other gamblers—the counterparties in AIG’s derivative deals—were made whole on their bets, paid off 100 cents on the dollar. Taxpayers got stuck with the bill.
“The AIG rescue demonstrated that Treasury and the Federal Reserve would commit taxpayers to pay any price and bear any burden to prevent the collapse of America’s largest financial institutions,” the COP report said. This could have been avoided, the report argues, if the Fed had listened to disinterested advisers with a less parochial understanding of the public interest.
Fed and Treasury officials dismiss this critique as second-guessing of tough decisions they had to make in the fall of 2008, amid the fast-moving global crisis. Yet two years later, those controversial decisions remain highly relevant. Public anger has not abated. It fuels the election turmoil that this year threatens to bring down incumbents in both parties who voted for bank bailouts.
Although the AIG bailout was carried out in the waning days of George W. Bush’s presidency, the popular sense of injustice has deeply scarred Barack Obama, since he too adopted a forgiving approach toward culpable financial interests. Obama came to office intent on restoring public trust in government. His indulgence of the mega-banks led to the opposite result.
More to the point, the AIG story raises real doubts and suspicions about how the government will respond next time. Or whether the new financial reform legislation actually corrects government’s deference to the pinnacles of private financial power. Massive federal intervention was certainly necessary, the Warren panel agrees, including quick action to forestall AIG’s bankruptcy. But government declined to demand anything in return.
The AIG rescue was done in ways that had “poisonous effects” on the financial marketplace and public opinion, the report concluded. Cynical expectations were confirmed, both for citizens and financial players. Some financial firms are simply “too big to fail,” it seems; Washington will not let them collapse, no matter what the president claims.
The most troubling revelation in this story is the astonishing weakness of the Federal Reserve and its incompetence as a faithful defender of the public interest. In the lore of central banking, the Fed is awesomely powerful and intimidating. As regulator of the banking system, it has life-and-death influence over banks. As manager of the economy, it has open-ended authority to intervene in the financial system to restore stability, as the central bank did massively during the crisis.
Yet the Fed was strangely passive and compliant when it came to demanding cooperation and sacrifice from the largest financial institutions. Timothy Geithner was then president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the lead regulator of Wall Street’s largest banks. He briefly insisted they must accept the burden of rescuing AIG. But the bankers called his bluff and blew him off—and Geithner deferred to their wishes. The taxpayer bailout followed. The episode is relevant to the future, because Geithner is now Obama’s Treasury Secretary and in charge of preventing the next taxpayer bailout.
In the early autumn of 2008, mayhem swept through global financial markets. It engulfed AIG on Monday morning, September 15. Lehman Brothers had just failed. Panicky credit markets were seizing up. American International Group, largest insurance company in the world, was hemorrhaging capital, rapidly sinking toward bankruptcy. At the New York Fed, Geithner had the problem covered, or so he thought.
Geithner informed top executives of Wall Street’s most important financial houses—Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs—that the banking industry, not the Federal Reserve, must step up and do the rescue. Geithner told them it was “inconceivable that the Federal Reserve could or should play any role in preventing AIG’s collapse.”
That Monday morning, Geithner summoned representatives from Goldman and the JPMorgan bank to Fed offices and told them to organize a private-sector consortium of major lenders to provide the emergency liquidity loans that would keep AIG afloat until things settled down. It was presumed JPMorgan would be the lead lender; Goldman, as an investment bank, could help AIG sell off assets to raise capital. Given the Fed’s blessing, other banks were expected to cooperate.
The New York Fed president did not need to threaten anyone. This was the gentlemanly way in which the central bank can invoke its informal authority, with numerous precedents in the past. Prodded by the Fed and Treasury, major banks had done something similar back in 1998 to save the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, whose collapse threatened a chain reaction on Wall Street. During the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Fed had used its overbearing influence to make leading US banks grant concessions and write down outstanding loans—a grudging “workout” that saved Mexico, Brazil and Argentina from default but also saved some famous New York banks from imploding.
This time, the entire system was at risk, so virtually everyone was vulnerable. Geithner expected the biggest banks to package a substantial bridge loan that would give AIG the time to sell assets and raise capital, an orderly resolution. After all, AIG was an insurance corporation, not a bank. The Fed had no direct regulatory authority over it. Geithner had gotten an early glimpse of AIG’s troubles in the summer, when its CEO approached him and asked for access to the Fed’s discount window, the place banks go for short-term liquidity loans. Geithner turned him down, but learned how deeply Wall Street and Europe’s leading banks were entwined in AIG’s troubles.
The problem was derivatives. During the housing bubble, AIG had reaped a fortune selling derivative contracts based on mortgage-backed securities—hedging devices that made investors feel safe holding these assets. When the bubble burst and housing securities plummeted in value, AIG’s derivatives became its instrument of self-destruction. The counterparties, as per their contract, demanded immediate payment to cover their losses—more and more capital, as housing prices continued to fall. Goldman Sachs, almost alone among big banks, had bet right on the housing bubble. Now it was aggressively collecting on its bet.
The bankers’ committee assembled at the Fed worked all day and into the night, joined by AIG, the New York State insurance regulators, with investment bank Morgan Stanley acting as Treasury’s new adviser. The group drafted a “term sheet” that toted up AIG’s exposure. It would need as much as $75 billion, they estimated.
In Washington, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson kept his distance, while fighting other bonfires. Paulson assured reporters the meeting under way at the New York Fed had nothing to do with a government bailout for AIG. “What’s going on in New York is a private-sector effort,” Paulson said.
Sometime after midnight, the bankers called to say, sorry, they were not interested. There would be no private-sector rescue. According to Thomas Baxter, general counsel at the New York Fed, notification came on Tuesday morning, not from the principal executives of Goldman and JPMorgan but from a bankruptcy lawyer, Marshall Huebner, advising JPMorgan on AIG’s problems. The New York Fed immediately hired him as its own lawyer and proceeded to do what the bankers had refused to do—bail out AIG.
JPMorgan and Goldman offered no public explanation for rejecting Geithner’s proposal. The public wasn’t ever told the banks were asked to do their part. Nor did Federal Reserve officials argue with the decision or try to apply persuasive pressures. It did not put the squeeze on to convince the bankers they must accept some kind of sacrifice in the interest of sharing the pain. Nor did Geithner threaten to pursue an alternative strategy that could have forced the banks to negotiate the terms. This was considered out of the question, though the central bank has employed all these tools on past occasions.
In a subsequent hearing, Damon Silvers, the AFL-CIO policy director who is a member of Warren’s oversight panel, asked Baxter, “When you’re pulling together the private sector to solve a problem that they’ve created of the type that AIG represented, is it typical to accept no for an answer?” Baxter fudged. “Well, I started out by saying there was nothing typical about the crisis,” he replied. He talked in circles and never answered the question.
If the bankers refused to participate, the Fed had to move fast to stanch the bleeding. AIG faced another downgrade from credit rating agencies (the same agencies that had given triple-A blessings to mortgage securities). The Fed adopted the bankers’ “term sheet” as its operating guide and swiftly created a revolving credit fund of $85 billion.
Late on Tuesday, the central bank lent $12 billion to AIG. The next day, it lent another $12 billion. This was only the beginning. The AIG operation became a gigantic spigot for circuitously distributing public money to private banking interests. As the New York Fed pumped more money into AIG, the insurance giant pumped it right out the door to satisfy the demands from counterparties like Goldman Sachs. Having helped scuttle the private rescue, Goldman collected $13 billion from this backdoor public assistance. The Fed did not stop AIG’s hemorrhage. It began financing it, with no questions asked.
The Fed has always insisted this financial daisy chain was not designed to pump more capital into the leading banks. “This was not about the banks,” a senior vice president of the New York Fed told the New York Times. If not, then why did the Federal Reserve work so hard to keep their names secret? Fed lawyers labored for months to prevent disclosure of the beneficiaries. Ranking Federal Reserve governors coldly rejected as “inappropriate” the repeated Congressional demands to know the names. If it wasn’t about helping those banks, why did the Fed not pause to reconsider its initial decision and develop a less costly approach? It became instead the paymaster for AIG’s failed derivative contracts—conducting business as usual in the midst of national emergency.
This process continued for nearly two months and swelled to horrendous proportions before the Federal Reserve finally figured out a way to turn off the spigot. In November, it arranged a complex swap, known as “Maiden Lane,” in which the government paid off counterparties, acquired the remaining derivative contracts and extinguished them. The bankers again collected roughly full value on assets that were then selling in financial markets for less than 50 cents on the dollar.
The Fed claimed victory for the public, but in reality the game was already lost, despite the generous public financing. AIG was facing another downgrade, and everyone understood this one would probably be fatal—triggering the bankruptcy the Fed had tried to avoid. After the bankers had gotten the money, they graciously agreed to settle.
Back in September, when the Federal Reserve hired JPMorgan’s lawyer as its own, there was no public outcry because the public didn’t know about it. Marshall Huebner of the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell was an expert in corporate bankruptcy and would help the Fed get up to speed quickly. The arrangement was not illegal and not unethical, given the precious distinctions the legal profession makes on ethics. JPMorgan gave its lawyer consent to switch sides, though Huebner’s firm continued to represent the Morgan bank (Davis Polk graciously gave the Fed a 10 percent discount of Huebner’s $1,000-an-hour billing rate). The Federal Reserve limited his advice to AIG matters. Huebner later also became Treasury’s lawyer when it added TARP funds to AIG, though the Fed and Treasury do not have identical interests.
What was troublesome about swapping lawyers? There was a “third client” in this matter—the American public—who faced huge exposure to losses but didn’t have its own lawyer in the room. The central bank, with its high sense of rectitude, would insist it represents the public interest. The Congressional Oversight Panel did not buy that.
The government, the Warren report said, “put the efforts to organize a private AIG rescue in the hands of only two banks, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs, institutions that had severe conflicts of interest as they would have been among the largest beneficiaries of taxpayer rescue.”
Once the immediate panic subsided, the Fed did not seek out alternative opinions and proposals on what to do next, either from independent debtor counsel or even from AIG’s bankruptcy lawyer. “By failing to bring in other players, the government neglected to use all of its negotiating leverage,” the report observed.
In fact, the Congressional Oversight Panel found an incestuous stew of private financial players in the AIG case, who switched their allegiance between public and private roles numerous times. Severely conflicted loyalties are commonplace on Wall Street. The Fed saw nothing wrong with it.
Goldman Sachs always claimed it was fully hedged against loss, even if AIG went bankrupt, but the oversight panel discovered a crucial gap in its protection. Goldman would have been more vulnerable if the Fed had succeeded in arranging a “voluntary” workout by the private banks. Such a deal could have compelled Goldman and other counterparties to make concessions—accept a “haircut,” as Wall Street financiers put it. Goldman helped dump that possibility.
Morgan Stanley, another investment bank that had its own near-death experience in the fall of 2008, got a similar though much smaller benefit while also acting as adviser to the Treasury Department. The Federal Reserve provided both Goldman and Morgan Stanley with shelter from the storm by designating each as a “bank holding company,” even though neither owned many retail banks. The status gave them access to emergency loans at the Fed’s discount window—just in case.
JPMorgan Chase was vulnerable in a different way. It was not a counterparty holding AIG derivatives, but the Morgan bank was itself the banking industry’s largest issuer of derivatives. It held $9.2 trillion in credit derivatives—four times its capital reserves—and many trillions more in other forms of derivatives. By its actions, the Fed greatly reduced the risks for the Morgan bank.
“The rescue of AIG distorted the marketplace by transforming highly risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations,” the COP explained. “The result was that the government backed up the entire derivatives market, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts.”
Bankers will be bankers. But what about the Federal Reserve? The oversight panel expressed sympathy for the circumstances Fed officials faced, but drew a harsh conclusion: “By adopting the term sheet developed by the private sector consortium and retaining most of its terms and conditions, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York chose to act, in effect, as if it were a private investor in many ways, when its actions also had serious public consequences whose full extent it may not have appreciated.”
That summarizes the moral confusion of the Federal Reserve. In a state of national emergency, it was acting under the business-as-usual expectations of the private financial system, while skipping lightly over the public consequences. This quality was most clearly demonstrated in the choices it did not make. The oversight report explains in detail the alternative approaches the Fed did not even explore. The central bank has insisted that none of these were pursued because they were either unworkable or prohibited. The explanations tend to be legalistic and narrowly argued in the logic of Wall Street investors.
To put it crudely, the Fed could have taken some key players in a back room and discreetly banged their heads together. Central bankers do this on occasion with uncooperative bankers. In extreme circumstances, the Fed can apply formidable powers of persuasion. Most bankers do not wish to provoke the Fed’s disfavor, especially when the system is wobbly and they might need the central bank’s help to survive. This time the Fed did not even try.
Timothy Geithner told panel members he does not think it is the Federal Reserve’s role to use the tools at its disposal to induce the banks it regulates to do something they do not want to do. That posture implicitly gives the high ground to the regulated banks—their choice, not the government’s.
Baxter, general counsel at the New York Fed, testified that the Fed did not seek to pressure banks into compromising on their contract rights. “We see that as an abuse of regulatory power,” he said. Scott Alvarez, general counsel for the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, testified, “We had no legal authority to force anyone to take actions they did not want to take and at this time in this economic circumstance, they did not want to provide assistance to a struggling firm. So there was nothing more that we could do.”
The oversight panel did not accept these claims of regulatory impotence. Neither do many Wall Street veterans familiar with the Fed’s potential power. Given the scale of the crisis, the Fed could have decided to organize a joint public-private consortium to handle emergency lending for AIG. That inevitably pushes counterparties to make their share of concessions, like the “haircuts” creditors typically accept to settle corporate bankruptcy cases.
The Fed could not force them to accept, but it could make refusal very awkward. Any holdouts could be “named and shamed” and held up for public scorn—as bankers who accepted public bailouts but refused to do their part. There’s nothing irregular about that. Such “workouts” are standard practice when major creditors have to resolve problems of indebted companies. Typically they will settle for less to avoid the enormous costs and delay of long-running bankruptcy litigation. Martin Beinenstock of the law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf testified: “A fundamental principle of workouts is shared sacrifice, especially when creditors are being made better off than they would be if AIG were left to file bankruptcy.”
The alternatives described by the COP report are variations on this same theme of accountability—the equity of threatened bankers stepping up to “share the pain” alongside their public benefactors. Any of these other solutions would have been difficult and involved mind-bending legal complications. But the reality was that the largest financial players were far more vulnerable and dependent on the government than they or the Fed would acknowledge.
Instead of pumping out more billions, the central bank could have supplied short-term credit to AIG, while announcing that this was only a temporary measure to get through the storm. The Fed could then have declared it was preparing the insurance company to file for regular bankruptcy. This would put creditors on notice: they faced a long and expensive legal tangle in which they were unlikely to get everything they wanted. That would give them a strong incentive to negotiate a settlement for something less than 100 percent. As leading creditor, the Federal Reserve would have a lot of influence on the parties the bankruptcy judge helped or penalized.
This approach was roughly the strategy for bailing out General Motors. Government expended billions, but it also claimed the role as the lead player and asserted control—demanding new management and a thorough reorganization of the corporation. In this “managed bankruptcy,” every GM stakeholder took a hit—the workers and shareholders, but also the creditors. Fed defenders cite legal obstacles that made the AIG case different. And the Fed was also reluctant to take control of AIG, even after it became 80 percent owner.
Citing legal inhibitions seems a strange excuse for the Federal Reserve to invoke. During the larger crisis, the central bank dispensed trillions of dollars in imaginative and unprecedented ways, often with no explicit authority. The law is deliberately vague and says the Fed can lend to virtually anyone in “exigent circumstances.” The Fed itself gets to define what that vague phrase means.
The Federal Reserve proved to be a weak and unreliable regulator for the public interest, but blamed its weakness on inadequate laws. That excuse has now been taken away by the new financial-reform legislation, which gives the central bank more explicit legal authority to intervene and take control of troubled financial institutions. The Fed has always been able to do this—if it had the nerve to use its implicit powers in strong-armed ways. For longstanding reasons, it has lacked the will.
The Fed is now in the crosshairs and will be tested by future events. Officials may issue threats and warnings, but market players and the general public will remain skeptical until the central bank actually seizes an errant financial institution, disassembles its dangerous elements and shuts it down. That alone is needed to destroy the cynical assumption among investors, depositors and bankers that the unacknowledged doctrine of “too big to fail” still reigns. Taking this action would of course deliver a great shock to the financial system. That is why I doubt the Fed will do it.
The Congressional Oversight Panel did not address the new law and its potential effectiveness. What follows is my analysis, based on many years of observing the central bank during its turmoil of the past generation. The Fed is weak for many reasons, some revealed in the AIG story, but like any proud institution, it dares not speak candidly about its predicament. The political system is likewise still too intimidated to challenge the myth and mystery, but sharp questions have been raised since the financial crisis. If I am right, a stronger reform critique will be forthcoming when the Fed fails again to put its public obligations ahead of the banks.
One weakness is embedded in the institutional culture of the Fed—its chummy relations with the most powerful institutions and the moral confusion between public purpose and private returns. In some ways, these traits date back to the Federal Reserve’s origins in 1913, when this hybrid government agency was created, melding public and private interests. Regulated bankers participate side by side with their regulators. The central bank’s obligation to protect the “safety and soundness” of the financial system often becomes a euphemism for defending bank profitability. These qualities might conceivably be bleached away with fundamental reform of the venerable institution. Ideally, it could start with the conflicted loyalties so obvious at the powerful New York Fed.
Even in that unlikely event, the Federal Reserve will still be handicapped by the other great source of its weakness—the structural imbalance of power in which the banking giants can easily outgun their principal regulator. We saw how that happened in the AIG story when the bankers called Geithner’s bluff, after which he retreated obediently.
The awkward secret, understood by savvy Fed governors, is that the central bank has been steadily weakened by the deregulation of banking and finance over the past generation. As the Fed was deprived of various control levers with which it used to discipline the banking system, private financial power accordingly became stronger—more reckless and more concentrated at the top. As the mega-banks allied themselves with unregulated hedge funds and leverage was multiplied through off-balance-sheet gimmicks, the system became more powerful yet also more fragile, a dangerous combination. Some leaks have been plugged, but not all of them. And bankers are good at finding new ones.
Savvy bankers understand what Fed officials understand—the central bankers are trapped in a game of chicken with important banks that can call their bluff. If the Fed acts in a prompt fashion to curb or punish reckless behavior before it get dangerous, the bankers will accuse it of stifling profit and progress. Bank examiners are chastened, told to back off.
If the Fed waits too long to intervene, as it regularly did during the past twenty-five years, then it may be faced with a far more dangerous situation: given the globalization of financial markets, the system now operates with a hair-trigger response to threatening rumors or disclosures. We saw it happen in the fall of 2008. A broad panic raced around the world, freezing credit markets, collapsing financial assets and bringing down major institutions.
This discreet power struggle is never candidly acknowledged by the governing institutions (who fear it would weaken them further), but it has fed the growing instability for several decades. Fed regulators have lacked the nerve (or the hard evidence) to stop dangerous practices by banks before they reach the crisis stage. Yet once calamity appears imminent, it’s feared that taking action might provoke a wider disaster—a global “run” by investors—since other banks are engaged in similar behavior.
We might feel more sympathy for the Federal Reserve, except its leaders have actively contributed to their predicament. Paul Volcker, Fed chairman in the Carter and Reagan era, privately grumbled that removing ceilings on interest rates would weaken the central bank’s hand, but he reluctantly supported it. His successor, Alan Greenspan, led cheers for liberating the banks from government regulation. The consequences are now fully visible.
The first “too big to fail” bailout, of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984, was supervised by Volcker in circumstances that would lead to other bailouts in later years. Volcker knew the Chicago bank was drowning in bad loans, so he demanded that the board of directors fire its go-go chairman, Roger Anderson, and start writing off the bad debt. The directors called Volcker’s bluff and did the opposite. At the climax, Volcker arranged a federal rescue because he feared several other major banks were similarly vulnerable. If the Fed didn’t rescue Continental, that could touch off something worse.
“Yeah, maybe we should have nailed them,” Michael Bradfield, Volcker’s general counsel, acknowledged afterward (reported in my book Secrets of the Temple). “What are you going to say? Goddamn it, as long as Roger Anderson is chairman of your bank, we’re not going to lend any money at the discount window? You can say it and it’s pretty intimidating, but the directors can call your bluff…. as a practical matter, you can’t. The consequences of refusing to supply liquidity support to a bank are too severe.”
In other words, the AIG case was not only about weak regulators. Geithner was weak and easily spun around by the bankers, but Volcker was a monumentally tough regulator, and he made similar decisions when his bluff was called. That comparison is my evidence for the structural causes beneath politics and personalities. Those deeper causes have not been fixed.
Lots of ordinary citizens have figured this out. If some banks are too big to fail, then government should compel them to become smaller banks. The harsh reality is that our bloated financial sector is too large for the economy it serves, its power too concentrated at the top. Neither the president nor either political party is yet ready to face the imperative of breaking up the mega-banks. Until they do, the system will remain unstable and prone to excesses, maybe worse.
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve’s dilemma has been made much larger. It has been given broad discretion to enforce many structural changes on the financial system. But discretion can be fatal for regulators, as AIG illustrated. It asks Fed leaders to get tough with their principal clients, when Congress didn’t have the nerve to do the same. Congress needs to write hard-nosed laws with concrete prohibitions and specific enforcement triggers, not wishful requests. If the Fed again fails to act, as I fear, another crisis becomes more likely. If that occurs, the Federal Reserve will be the next big subject for reform.
By William Greider, The Nation
Posted on August 9, 2010
The government’s $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath. The story of American International Group explains the larger catastrophe not because this was the biggest corporate bailout in history but because AIG’s collapse and subsequent rescue involved nearly all the critical elements, including delusion and deception. These financial dealings are monstrously complicated, but this account focuses on something mere mortals can understand—moral confusion in high places, and the failure of governing institutions to fulfill their obligations to the public.
Three governmental investigative bodies have now pored through the AIG wreckage and turned up disturbing facts—the House Committee on Oversight and Reform; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which will make its report at year’s end; and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which issued its report on AIG in June.
The five-member COP, chaired by Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren, has produced the most devastating and comprehensive account so far. Unanimously adopted by its bipartisan members, it provides alarming insights that should be fodder for the larger debate many citizens long to hear—why Washington rushed to forgive the very interests that produced this mess, while innocent others were made to suffer the consequences. The Congressional panel’s critique helps explain why bankers and their Washington allies do not want Elizabeth Warren to chair the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
The report concludes that the Federal Reserve Board’s intimate relations with the leading powers of Wall Street—the same banks that benefited most from the government’s massive bailout—influenced its strategic decisions on AIG. The panel accuses the Fed and the Treasury Department of brushing aside alternative approaches that would have saved tens of billions in public funds by making these same banks “share the pain.”
Bailing out AIG effectively meant rescuing Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch (as well as a dozens of European banks) from huge losses. Those financial institutions played the derivatives game with AIG, the esoteric practice of placing financial bets on future events. AIG lost its bets, which led to its collapse. But other gamblers—the counterparties in AIG’s derivative deals—were made whole on their bets, paid off 100 cents on the dollar. Taxpayers got stuck with the bill.
“The AIG rescue demonstrated that Treasury and the Federal Reserve would commit taxpayers to pay any price and bear any burden to prevent the collapse of America’s largest financial institutions,” the COP report said. This could have been avoided, the report argues, if the Fed had listened to disinterested advisers with a less parochial understanding of the public interest.
Fed and Treasury officials dismiss this critique as second-guessing of tough decisions they had to make in the fall of 2008, amid the fast-moving global crisis. Yet two years later, those controversial decisions remain highly relevant. Public anger has not abated. It fuels the election turmoil that this year threatens to bring down incumbents in both parties who voted for bank bailouts.
Although the AIG bailout was carried out in the waning days of George W. Bush’s presidency, the popular sense of injustice has deeply scarred Barack Obama, since he too adopted a forgiving approach toward culpable financial interests. Obama came to office intent on restoring public trust in government. His indulgence of the mega-banks led to the opposite result.
More to the point, the AIG story raises real doubts and suspicions about how the government will respond next time. Or whether the new financial reform legislation actually corrects government’s deference to the pinnacles of private financial power. Massive federal intervention was certainly necessary, the Warren panel agrees, including quick action to forestall AIG’s bankruptcy. But government declined to demand anything in return.
The AIG rescue was done in ways that had “poisonous effects” on the financial marketplace and public opinion, the report concluded. Cynical expectations were confirmed, both for citizens and financial players. Some financial firms are simply “too big to fail,” it seems; Washington will not let them collapse, no matter what the president claims.
The most troubling revelation in this story is the astonishing weakness of the Federal Reserve and its incompetence as a faithful defender of the public interest. In the lore of central banking, the Fed is awesomely powerful and intimidating. As regulator of the banking system, it has life-and-death influence over banks. As manager of the economy, it has open-ended authority to intervene in the financial system to restore stability, as the central bank did massively during the crisis.
Yet the Fed was strangely passive and compliant when it came to demanding cooperation and sacrifice from the largest financial institutions. Timothy Geithner was then president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the lead regulator of Wall Street’s largest banks. He briefly insisted they must accept the burden of rescuing AIG. But the bankers called his bluff and blew him off—and Geithner deferred to their wishes. The taxpayer bailout followed. The episode is relevant to the future, because Geithner is now Obama’s Treasury Secretary and in charge of preventing the next taxpayer bailout.
In the early autumn of 2008, mayhem swept through global financial markets. It engulfed AIG on Monday morning, September 15. Lehman Brothers had just failed. Panicky credit markets were seizing up. American International Group, largest insurance company in the world, was hemorrhaging capital, rapidly sinking toward bankruptcy. At the New York Fed, Geithner had the problem covered, or so he thought.
Geithner informed top executives of Wall Street’s most important financial houses—Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs—that the banking industry, not the Federal Reserve, must step up and do the rescue. Geithner told them it was “inconceivable that the Federal Reserve could or should play any role in preventing AIG’s collapse.”
That Monday morning, Geithner summoned representatives from Goldman and the JPMorgan bank to Fed offices and told them to organize a private-sector consortium of major lenders to provide the emergency liquidity loans that would keep AIG afloat until things settled down. It was presumed JPMorgan would be the lead lender; Goldman, as an investment bank, could help AIG sell off assets to raise capital. Given the Fed’s blessing, other banks were expected to cooperate.
The New York Fed president did not need to threaten anyone. This was the gentlemanly way in which the central bank can invoke its informal authority, with numerous precedents in the past. Prodded by the Fed and Treasury, major banks had done something similar back in 1998 to save the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, whose collapse threatened a chain reaction on Wall Street. During the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Fed had used its overbearing influence to make leading US banks grant concessions and write down outstanding loans—a grudging “workout” that saved Mexico, Brazil and Argentina from default but also saved some famous New York banks from imploding.
This time, the entire system was at risk, so virtually everyone was vulnerable. Geithner expected the biggest banks to package a substantial bridge loan that would give AIG the time to sell assets and raise capital, an orderly resolution. After all, AIG was an insurance corporation, not a bank. The Fed had no direct regulatory authority over it. Geithner had gotten an early glimpse of AIG’s troubles in the summer, when its CEO approached him and asked for access to the Fed’s discount window, the place banks go for short-term liquidity loans. Geithner turned him down, but learned how deeply Wall Street and Europe’s leading banks were entwined in AIG’s troubles.
The problem was derivatives. During the housing bubble, AIG had reaped a fortune selling derivative contracts based on mortgage-backed securities—hedging devices that made investors feel safe holding these assets. When the bubble burst and housing securities plummeted in value, AIG’s derivatives became its instrument of self-destruction. The counterparties, as per their contract, demanded immediate payment to cover their losses—more and more capital, as housing prices continued to fall. Goldman Sachs, almost alone among big banks, had bet right on the housing bubble. Now it was aggressively collecting on its bet.
The bankers’ committee assembled at the Fed worked all day and into the night, joined by AIG, the New York State insurance regulators, with investment bank Morgan Stanley acting as Treasury’s new adviser. The group drafted a “term sheet” that toted up AIG’s exposure. It would need as much as $75 billion, they estimated.
In Washington, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson kept his distance, while fighting other bonfires. Paulson assured reporters the meeting under way at the New York Fed had nothing to do with a government bailout for AIG. “What’s going on in New York is a private-sector effort,” Paulson said.
Sometime after midnight, the bankers called to say, sorry, they were not interested. There would be no private-sector rescue. According to Thomas Baxter, general counsel at the New York Fed, notification came on Tuesday morning, not from the principal executives of Goldman and JPMorgan but from a bankruptcy lawyer, Marshall Huebner, advising JPMorgan on AIG’s problems. The New York Fed immediately hired him as its own lawyer and proceeded to do what the bankers had refused to do—bail out AIG.
JPMorgan and Goldman offered no public explanation for rejecting Geithner’s proposal. The public wasn’t ever told the banks were asked to do their part. Nor did Federal Reserve officials argue with the decision or try to apply persuasive pressures. It did not put the squeeze on to convince the bankers they must accept some kind of sacrifice in the interest of sharing the pain. Nor did Geithner threaten to pursue an alternative strategy that could have forced the banks to negotiate the terms. This was considered out of the question, though the central bank has employed all these tools on past occasions.
In a subsequent hearing, Damon Silvers, the AFL-CIO policy director who is a member of Warren’s oversight panel, asked Baxter, “When you’re pulling together the private sector to solve a problem that they’ve created of the type that AIG represented, is it typical to accept no for an answer?” Baxter fudged. “Well, I started out by saying there was nothing typical about the crisis,” he replied. He talked in circles and never answered the question.
If the bankers refused to participate, the Fed had to move fast to stanch the bleeding. AIG faced another downgrade from credit rating agencies (the same agencies that had given triple-A blessings to mortgage securities). The Fed adopted the bankers’ “term sheet” as its operating guide and swiftly created a revolving credit fund of $85 billion.
Late on Tuesday, the central bank lent $12 billion to AIG. The next day, it lent another $12 billion. This was only the beginning. The AIG operation became a gigantic spigot for circuitously distributing public money to private banking interests. As the New York Fed pumped more money into AIG, the insurance giant pumped it right out the door to satisfy the demands from counterparties like Goldman Sachs. Having helped scuttle the private rescue, Goldman collected $13 billion from this backdoor public assistance. The Fed did not stop AIG’s hemorrhage. It began financing it, with no questions asked.
The Fed has always insisted this financial daisy chain was not designed to pump more capital into the leading banks. “This was not about the banks,” a senior vice president of the New York Fed told the New York Times. If not, then why did the Federal Reserve work so hard to keep their names secret? Fed lawyers labored for months to prevent disclosure of the beneficiaries. Ranking Federal Reserve governors coldly rejected as “inappropriate” the repeated Congressional demands to know the names. If it wasn’t about helping those banks, why did the Fed not pause to reconsider its initial decision and develop a less costly approach? It became instead the paymaster for AIG’s failed derivative contracts—conducting business as usual in the midst of national emergency.
This process continued for nearly two months and swelled to horrendous proportions before the Federal Reserve finally figured out a way to turn off the spigot. In November, it arranged a complex swap, known as “Maiden Lane,” in which the government paid off counterparties, acquired the remaining derivative contracts and extinguished them. The bankers again collected roughly full value on assets that were then selling in financial markets for less than 50 cents on the dollar.
The Fed claimed victory for the public, but in reality the game was already lost, despite the generous public financing. AIG was facing another downgrade, and everyone understood this one would probably be fatal—triggering the bankruptcy the Fed had tried to avoid. After the bankers had gotten the money, they graciously agreed to settle.
Back in September, when the Federal Reserve hired JPMorgan’s lawyer as its own, there was no public outcry because the public didn’t know about it. Marshall Huebner of the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell was an expert in corporate bankruptcy and would help the Fed get up to speed quickly. The arrangement was not illegal and not unethical, given the precious distinctions the legal profession makes on ethics. JPMorgan gave its lawyer consent to switch sides, though Huebner’s firm continued to represent the Morgan bank (Davis Polk graciously gave the Fed a 10 percent discount of Huebner’s $1,000-an-hour billing rate). The Federal Reserve limited his advice to AIG matters. Huebner later also became Treasury’s lawyer when it added TARP funds to AIG, though the Fed and Treasury do not have identical interests.
What was troublesome about swapping lawyers? There was a “third client” in this matter—the American public—who faced huge exposure to losses but didn’t have its own lawyer in the room. The central bank, with its high sense of rectitude, would insist it represents the public interest. The Congressional Oversight Panel did not buy that.
The government, the Warren report said, “put the efforts to organize a private AIG rescue in the hands of only two banks, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs, institutions that had severe conflicts of interest as they would have been among the largest beneficiaries of taxpayer rescue.”
Once the immediate panic subsided, the Fed did not seek out alternative opinions and proposals on what to do next, either from independent debtor counsel or even from AIG’s bankruptcy lawyer. “By failing to bring in other players, the government neglected to use all of its negotiating leverage,” the report observed.
In fact, the Congressional Oversight Panel found an incestuous stew of private financial players in the AIG case, who switched their allegiance between public and private roles numerous times. Severely conflicted loyalties are commonplace on Wall Street. The Fed saw nothing wrong with it.
Goldman Sachs always claimed it was fully hedged against loss, even if AIG went bankrupt, but the oversight panel discovered a crucial gap in its protection. Goldman would have been more vulnerable if the Fed had succeeded in arranging a “voluntary” workout by the private banks. Such a deal could have compelled Goldman and other counterparties to make concessions—accept a “haircut,” as Wall Street financiers put it. Goldman helped dump that possibility.
Morgan Stanley, another investment bank that had its own near-death experience in the fall of 2008, got a similar though much smaller benefit while also acting as adviser to the Treasury Department. The Federal Reserve provided both Goldman and Morgan Stanley with shelter from the storm by designating each as a “bank holding company,” even though neither owned many retail banks. The status gave them access to emergency loans at the Fed’s discount window—just in case.
JPMorgan Chase was vulnerable in a different way. It was not a counterparty holding AIG derivatives, but the Morgan bank was itself the banking industry’s largest issuer of derivatives. It held $9.2 trillion in credit derivatives—four times its capital reserves—and many trillions more in other forms of derivatives. By its actions, the Fed greatly reduced the risks for the Morgan bank.
“The rescue of AIG distorted the marketplace by transforming highly risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations,” the COP explained. “The result was that the government backed up the entire derivatives market, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts.”
Bankers will be bankers. But what about the Federal Reserve? The oversight panel expressed sympathy for the circumstances Fed officials faced, but drew a harsh conclusion: “By adopting the term sheet developed by the private sector consortium and retaining most of its terms and conditions, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York chose to act, in effect, as if it were a private investor in many ways, when its actions also had serious public consequences whose full extent it may not have appreciated.”
That summarizes the moral confusion of the Federal Reserve. In a state of national emergency, it was acting under the business-as-usual expectations of the private financial system, while skipping lightly over the public consequences. This quality was most clearly demonstrated in the choices it did not make. The oversight report explains in detail the alternative approaches the Fed did not even explore. The central bank has insisted that none of these were pursued because they were either unworkable or prohibited. The explanations tend to be legalistic and narrowly argued in the logic of Wall Street investors.
To put it crudely, the Fed could have taken some key players in a back room and discreetly banged their heads together. Central bankers do this on occasion with uncooperative bankers. In extreme circumstances, the Fed can apply formidable powers of persuasion. Most bankers do not wish to provoke the Fed’s disfavor, especially when the system is wobbly and they might need the central bank’s help to survive. This time the Fed did not even try.
Timothy Geithner told panel members he does not think it is the Federal Reserve’s role to use the tools at its disposal to induce the banks it regulates to do something they do not want to do. That posture implicitly gives the high ground to the regulated banks—their choice, not the government’s.
Baxter, general counsel at the New York Fed, testified that the Fed did not seek to pressure banks into compromising on their contract rights. “We see that as an abuse of regulatory power,” he said. Scott Alvarez, general counsel for the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, testified, “We had no legal authority to force anyone to take actions they did not want to take and at this time in this economic circumstance, they did not want to provide assistance to a struggling firm. So there was nothing more that we could do.”
The oversight panel did not accept these claims of regulatory impotence. Neither do many Wall Street veterans familiar with the Fed’s potential power. Given the scale of the crisis, the Fed could have decided to organize a joint public-private consortium to handle emergency lending for AIG. That inevitably pushes counterparties to make their share of concessions, like the “haircuts” creditors typically accept to settle corporate bankruptcy cases.
The Fed could not force them to accept, but it could make refusal very awkward. Any holdouts could be “named and shamed” and held up for public scorn—as bankers who accepted public bailouts but refused to do their part. There’s nothing irregular about that. Such “workouts” are standard practice when major creditors have to resolve problems of indebted companies. Typically they will settle for less to avoid the enormous costs and delay of long-running bankruptcy litigation. Martin Beinenstock of the law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf testified: “A fundamental principle of workouts is shared sacrifice, especially when creditors are being made better off than they would be if AIG were left to file bankruptcy.”
The alternatives described by the COP report are variations on this same theme of accountability—the equity of threatened bankers stepping up to “share the pain” alongside their public benefactors. Any of these other solutions would have been difficult and involved mind-bending legal complications. But the reality was that the largest financial players were far more vulnerable and dependent on the government than they or the Fed would acknowledge.
Instead of pumping out more billions, the central bank could have supplied short-term credit to AIG, while announcing that this was only a temporary measure to get through the storm. The Fed could then have declared it was preparing the insurance company to file for regular bankruptcy. This would put creditors on notice: they faced a long and expensive legal tangle in which they were unlikely to get everything they wanted. That would give them a strong incentive to negotiate a settlement for something less than 100 percent. As leading creditor, the Federal Reserve would have a lot of influence on the parties the bankruptcy judge helped or penalized.
This approach was roughly the strategy for bailing out General Motors. Government expended billions, but it also claimed the role as the lead player and asserted control—demanding new management and a thorough reorganization of the corporation. In this “managed bankruptcy,” every GM stakeholder took a hit—the workers and shareholders, but also the creditors. Fed defenders cite legal obstacles that made the AIG case different. And the Fed was also reluctant to take control of AIG, even after it became 80 percent owner.
Citing legal inhibitions seems a strange excuse for the Federal Reserve to invoke. During the larger crisis, the central bank dispensed trillions of dollars in imaginative and unprecedented ways, often with no explicit authority. The law is deliberately vague and says the Fed can lend to virtually anyone in “exigent circumstances.” The Fed itself gets to define what that vague phrase means.
The Federal Reserve proved to be a weak and unreliable regulator for the public interest, but blamed its weakness on inadequate laws. That excuse has now been taken away by the new financial-reform legislation, which gives the central bank more explicit legal authority to intervene and take control of troubled financial institutions. The Fed has always been able to do this—if it had the nerve to use its implicit powers in strong-armed ways. For longstanding reasons, it has lacked the will.
The Fed is now in the crosshairs and will be tested by future events. Officials may issue threats and warnings, but market players and the general public will remain skeptical until the central bank actually seizes an errant financial institution, disassembles its dangerous elements and shuts it down. That alone is needed to destroy the cynical assumption among investors, depositors and bankers that the unacknowledged doctrine of “too big to fail” still reigns. Taking this action would of course deliver a great shock to the financial system. That is why I doubt the Fed will do it.
The Congressional Oversight Panel did not address the new law and its potential effectiveness. What follows is my analysis, based on many years of observing the central bank during its turmoil of the past generation. The Fed is weak for many reasons, some revealed in the AIG story, but like any proud institution, it dares not speak candidly about its predicament. The political system is likewise still too intimidated to challenge the myth and mystery, but sharp questions have been raised since the financial crisis. If I am right, a stronger reform critique will be forthcoming when the Fed fails again to put its public obligations ahead of the banks.
One weakness is embedded in the institutional culture of the Fed—its chummy relations with the most powerful institutions and the moral confusion between public purpose and private returns. In some ways, these traits date back to the Federal Reserve’s origins in 1913, when this hybrid government agency was created, melding public and private interests. Regulated bankers participate side by side with their regulators. The central bank’s obligation to protect the “safety and soundness” of the financial system often becomes a euphemism for defending bank profitability. These qualities might conceivably be bleached away with fundamental reform of the venerable institution. Ideally, it could start with the conflicted loyalties so obvious at the powerful New York Fed.
Even in that unlikely event, the Federal Reserve will still be handicapped by the other great source of its weakness—the structural imbalance of power in which the banking giants can easily outgun their principal regulator. We saw how that happened in the AIG story when the bankers called Geithner’s bluff, after which he retreated obediently.
The awkward secret, understood by savvy Fed governors, is that the central bank has been steadily weakened by the deregulation of banking and finance over the past generation. As the Fed was deprived of various control levers with which it used to discipline the banking system, private financial power accordingly became stronger—more reckless and more concentrated at the top. As the mega-banks allied themselves with unregulated hedge funds and leverage was multiplied through off-balance-sheet gimmicks, the system became more powerful yet also more fragile, a dangerous combination. Some leaks have been plugged, but not all of them. And bankers are good at finding new ones.
Savvy bankers understand what Fed officials understand—the central bankers are trapped in a game of chicken with important banks that can call their bluff. If the Fed acts in a prompt fashion to curb or punish reckless behavior before it get dangerous, the bankers will accuse it of stifling profit and progress. Bank examiners are chastened, told to back off.
If the Fed waits too long to intervene, as it regularly did during the past twenty-five years, then it may be faced with a far more dangerous situation: given the globalization of financial markets, the system now operates with a hair-trigger response to threatening rumors or disclosures. We saw it happen in the fall of 2008. A broad panic raced around the world, freezing credit markets, collapsing financial assets and bringing down major institutions.
This discreet power struggle is never candidly acknowledged by the governing institutions (who fear it would weaken them further), but it has fed the growing instability for several decades. Fed regulators have lacked the nerve (or the hard evidence) to stop dangerous practices by banks before they reach the crisis stage. Yet once calamity appears imminent, it’s feared that taking action might provoke a wider disaster—a global “run” by investors—since other banks are engaged in similar behavior.
We might feel more sympathy for the Federal Reserve, except its leaders have actively contributed to their predicament. Paul Volcker, Fed chairman in the Carter and Reagan era, privately grumbled that removing ceilings on interest rates would weaken the central bank’s hand, but he reluctantly supported it. His successor, Alan Greenspan, led cheers for liberating the banks from government regulation. The consequences are now fully visible.
The first “too big to fail” bailout, of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984, was supervised by Volcker in circumstances that would lead to other bailouts in later years. Volcker knew the Chicago bank was drowning in bad loans, so he demanded that the board of directors fire its go-go chairman, Roger Anderson, and start writing off the bad debt. The directors called Volcker’s bluff and did the opposite. At the climax, Volcker arranged a federal rescue because he feared several other major banks were similarly vulnerable. If the Fed didn’t rescue Continental, that could touch off something worse.
“Yeah, maybe we should have nailed them,” Michael Bradfield, Volcker’s general counsel, acknowledged afterward (reported in my book Secrets of the Temple). “What are you going to say? Goddamn it, as long as Roger Anderson is chairman of your bank, we’re not going to lend any money at the discount window? You can say it and it’s pretty intimidating, but the directors can call your bluff…. as a practical matter, you can’t. The consequences of refusing to supply liquidity support to a bank are too severe.”
In other words, the AIG case was not only about weak regulators. Geithner was weak and easily spun around by the bankers, but Volcker was a monumentally tough regulator, and he made similar decisions when his bluff was called. That comparison is my evidence for the structural causes beneath politics and personalities. Those deeper causes have not been fixed.
Lots of ordinary citizens have figured this out. If some banks are too big to fail, then government should compel them to become smaller banks. The harsh reality is that our bloated financial sector is too large for the economy it serves, its power too concentrated at the top. Neither the president nor either political party is yet ready to face the imperative of breaking up the mega-banks. Until they do, the system will remain unstable and prone to excesses, maybe worse.
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve’s dilemma has been made much larger. It has been given broad discretion to enforce many structural changes on the financial system. But discretion can be fatal for regulators, as AIG illustrated. It asks Fed leaders to get tough with their principal clients, when Congress didn’t have the nerve to do the same. Congress needs to write hard-nosed laws with concrete prohibitions and specific enforcement triggers, not wishful requests. If the Fed again fails to act, as I fear, another crisis becomes more likely. If that occurs, the Federal Reserve will be the next big subject for reform.
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Why Washington Hates Hugo Chavez
Kill Hugo?
By MIKE WHITNEY
It's no fun being on Washington's enemies list. Just ask Hugo Chavez. Last week, the Venezuelan president had to cancel a trip to Cuba after he was told that a coup was underway and his life was in danger. The information came from an anonymous source who had delivered a similar warning prior to the failed coup in 2002. The letter said: “The execution phase is accelerating..… There is an agreement between Colombia and the US with two objectives: one is Mauricio and the other is the overthrow of the government.… They will hunt down ‘Mauricio’ (and) try to neutralize part of the Armed Forces.” ("Venezuela Pushes for Peace", Coral Wynter, Green Left News)
“Mauricio” is Chavez's codename. Whoever is behind the coup, wants to kill Chavez.
There's no way of knowing whether Chavez is really in danger or not, but we shouldn't be too surprised if he is. After all, the US claims it has the right to kill anyone it sees as a threat to its national security, and Chavez surely ranks high on its list of threats. So it's wise to be careful. In any event, the warnings coincide with other unsettling developments. At a recent meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), Colombian ministers charged Chavez with harboring guerrillas on Venezuelan territory. (The allegations could be used to justify a preemptive attack) Chavez reacted swiftly and broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia, but the row did not end there. Obama's nominee as US ambassador to Venezuela, Larry Palmer, threw a little gas on the fire by backing-up Colombia's claims. Now the two countries are at loggerheads which seems to be what the Obama administration had in mind from the very beginning. US policy towards Venezuela has changed at all under Obama. If anything, it's gotten worse.
US EXPANDS 7 BASES IN COLOMBIA
The Pentagon recently announced that it plans to expand 7 military bases in Colombia. State Dept officials said that the US merely wants to step up its counter-narcotics operations, but no one's buying it. Everyone knows the US wants to reestablish its control over the region. The military build up in Colombia is another way of ratcheting up the pressure on Chavez and fanning the flames of political instability in the hemisphere. Naturally, the base expansion has the region's leftist leaders worried that Latin America may be headed for another era of US-backed dirty wars.
Also, the internet is abuzz with stories that Obama is planning to deploy warships and ground troops to Costa Rica in the near-future. Here's an article on Alternet that lays out the basic theory:
"Rather than retooling its diplomatic approach to fit the new reality in Latin America, Washington is expanding its military footprint. It is will soon be operating out of seven military bases in Colombia and has reactivated its 4th Fleet, both highly unpopular moves in Latin America. Rather than taking the advice of countries in the region to demilitarize its war on drugs, the U.S. recently announced it is deploying 46 warships and 7,000 soldiers to Costa Rica to “interdict” drug traffic and money laundering." ("Recent Colombian Mass Grave Discovery May Be “False-Positives", Conn Hallinan, Alternet)
Although the rumors have not been verified, the anxiety is growing. The US has never played a constructive role in Latin America's affairs, and the prospect of more meddling and violence is frightening. The truth is, US intervention has continued even during relatively peaceful periods like the last decade. US intelligence agents and NGOs are sprinkled throughout the civilian population gathering information, swaying elections, and fomenting social unrest. Here's a clip from an article titled "America's Covert 'Civil Society Operations: US interference in Venezuela keeps growing" which shows how America's tentacles extend everywhere:
It's hard to believe that a two-year senator from Chicago with a background in "community organizing" presides over this elaborate and opaque system of imperial rule. He doesn't, of course. The real leaders remain hidden behind the cloak of democratic government and all of Washington's phony institutions. Obama is merely a public relations hologram, a friendly face that conceals the machinations of a global Mafia. Other people--whoever they may be--control the levers of power moving the pieces as needed to assure the best outcome for themselves and their constituents. Now, it appears this shadow government has its eyes on Latin America once again. That's bad news for Chavez and anyone else who hoped that political instability and US black ops were a thing of the past.
Washington hates Chavez because he's raised living standards for the poor. (and because he won't bow to the giant corporations) That's why he's pilloried in the media, because his socialist model of democracy doesn't jive with America's slash and burn-style of capitalism. Chavez has enacted land and oil industry reform, improved education and provided universal healthcare. He's introduced job training, subsidies to single mothers, drug prevention programs, and assistance for recovering addicts. Venezuelans are more educated than ever before. Illiteracy has been wiped out.
Chavez's policies have reduced ignorance, poverty, and injustice. The list goes on and on. Venezuelans are more engaged in the political process than anytime in the nation's history. That scares Washington. US elites don't want well-informed, empowered people participating in the political process. They believe that task should be left to the venal politicians chosen by corporate bosses and top-hat banksters. That's why Chavez has to go. He's given people hope for a better life.
Movie director, Oliver Stone, summed it up perfectly in a recent interview with Nathan Gardels. He said, "The US remains hostile to anyone on the left coming to power in their "backyard," anyone who thinks the resources of a country belong to its people....For the first time in modern history, much of South America is beyond US control.....It is also beyond the influence of the US-dominated IMF."
The people of Venezuela are better off under Chavez; better fed, better educated, and with better access to medical care. The government safeguards their civil liberties and political activism continues to grow. Democracy is thriving in Venezuela. Hurrah for Hugo Chavez!
By MIKE WHITNEY
It's no fun being on Washington's enemies list. Just ask Hugo Chavez. Last week, the Venezuelan president had to cancel a trip to Cuba after he was told that a coup was underway and his life was in danger. The information came from an anonymous source who had delivered a similar warning prior to the failed coup in 2002. The letter said: “The execution phase is accelerating..… There is an agreement between Colombia and the US with two objectives: one is Mauricio and the other is the overthrow of the government.… They will hunt down ‘Mauricio’ (and) try to neutralize part of the Armed Forces.” ("Venezuela Pushes for Peace", Coral Wynter, Green Left News)
“Mauricio” is Chavez's codename. Whoever is behind the coup, wants to kill Chavez.
There's no way of knowing whether Chavez is really in danger or not, but we shouldn't be too surprised if he is. After all, the US claims it has the right to kill anyone it sees as a threat to its national security, and Chavez surely ranks high on its list of threats. So it's wise to be careful. In any event, the warnings coincide with other unsettling developments. At a recent meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), Colombian ministers charged Chavez with harboring guerrillas on Venezuelan territory. (The allegations could be used to justify a preemptive attack) Chavez reacted swiftly and broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia, but the row did not end there. Obama's nominee as US ambassador to Venezuela, Larry Palmer, threw a little gas on the fire by backing-up Colombia's claims. Now the two countries are at loggerheads which seems to be what the Obama administration had in mind from the very beginning. US policy towards Venezuela has changed at all under Obama. If anything, it's gotten worse.
US EXPANDS 7 BASES IN COLOMBIA
The Pentagon recently announced that it plans to expand 7 military bases in Colombia. State Dept officials said that the US merely wants to step up its counter-narcotics operations, but no one's buying it. Everyone knows the US wants to reestablish its control over the region. The military build up in Colombia is another way of ratcheting up the pressure on Chavez and fanning the flames of political instability in the hemisphere. Naturally, the base expansion has the region's leftist leaders worried that Latin America may be headed for another era of US-backed dirty wars.
Also, the internet is abuzz with stories that Obama is planning to deploy warships and ground troops to Costa Rica in the near-future. Here's an article on Alternet that lays out the basic theory:
"Rather than retooling its diplomatic approach to fit the new reality in Latin America, Washington is expanding its military footprint. It is will soon be operating out of seven military bases in Colombia and has reactivated its 4th Fleet, both highly unpopular moves in Latin America. Rather than taking the advice of countries in the region to demilitarize its war on drugs, the U.S. recently announced it is deploying 46 warships and 7,000 soldiers to Costa Rica to “interdict” drug traffic and money laundering." ("Recent Colombian Mass Grave Discovery May Be “False-Positives", Conn Hallinan, Alternet)
Although the rumors have not been verified, the anxiety is growing. The US has never played a constructive role in Latin America's affairs, and the prospect of more meddling and violence is frightening. The truth is, US intervention has continued even during relatively peaceful periods like the last decade. US intelligence agents and NGOs are sprinkled throughout the civilian population gathering information, swaying elections, and fomenting social unrest. Here's a clip from an article titled "America's Covert 'Civil Society Operations: US interference in Venezuela keeps growing" which shows how America's tentacles extend everywhere:
"Foreign intervention is not only executed through military force. The funding of “civil society” groups and media outlets to promote political agendas and influence the “hearts and minds” of the people is one of the more widely used mechanisms by the US government to achieve its strategic objectives. In Venezuela, the US has been supporting anti-Chavez groups for over 8 years, including those that executed the coup d’etat against President Chavez in April 2002. Since then, the funding has increased substantially. A May 2010 report evaluating foreign assistance to political groups in Venezuela, commissioned by the National Endowment for Democracy, revealed that more than $40 million USD annually is channeled to anti-Chavez groups, the majority from US agencies....
A large part of NED funds in Venezuela have been invested in “forming student movements” and “building democratic leadership amongst youth”, from a US perspective and with US values....In the last three years, an opposition student/youth movement has been created with funding from various US and European agencies. More than 32% of USAID funding, for example, has gone to “training youth and students in the use of innovative media technologies to spread political messages and campaigns”, such as on Twitter and Facebook.
NED has also funded several media organizations in Venezuela, to aid in training journalists and designing political messages against the Venezuelan government. ..What these organizations really do is promote anti-Chavez messages on television and in international press, as well as distort and manipulate facts and events in the country in order to negatively portray the Chavez administration... Yet such funding is clearly illegal and a violation of journalist ethics. Foreign government funding of “independent” journalists or media outlets is an act of mass deception, propaganda and a violation of sovereignty. ("America's Covert 'Civil Society Operations: US interference in Venezuela keeps growing", Eva Golinger, Global Research)
It's hard to believe that a two-year senator from Chicago with a background in "community organizing" presides over this elaborate and opaque system of imperial rule. He doesn't, of course. The real leaders remain hidden behind the cloak of democratic government and all of Washington's phony institutions. Obama is merely a public relations hologram, a friendly face that conceals the machinations of a global Mafia. Other people--whoever they may be--control the levers of power moving the pieces as needed to assure the best outcome for themselves and their constituents. Now, it appears this shadow government has its eyes on Latin America once again. That's bad news for Chavez and anyone else who hoped that political instability and US black ops were a thing of the past.
Washington hates Chavez because he's raised living standards for the poor. (and because he won't bow to the giant corporations) That's why he's pilloried in the media, because his socialist model of democracy doesn't jive with America's slash and burn-style of capitalism. Chavez has enacted land and oil industry reform, improved education and provided universal healthcare. He's introduced job training, subsidies to single mothers, drug prevention programs, and assistance for recovering addicts. Venezuelans are more educated than ever before. Illiteracy has been wiped out.
Chavez's policies have reduced ignorance, poverty, and injustice. The list goes on and on. Venezuelans are more engaged in the political process than anytime in the nation's history. That scares Washington. US elites don't want well-informed, empowered people participating in the political process. They believe that task should be left to the venal politicians chosen by corporate bosses and top-hat banksters. That's why Chavez has to go. He's given people hope for a better life.
Movie director, Oliver Stone, summed it up perfectly in a recent interview with Nathan Gardels. He said, "The US remains hostile to anyone on the left coming to power in their "backyard," anyone who thinks the resources of a country belong to its people....For the first time in modern history, much of South America is beyond US control.....It is also beyond the influence of the US-dominated IMF."
The people of Venezuela are better off under Chavez; better fed, better educated, and with better access to medical care. The government safeguards their civil liberties and political activism continues to grow. Democracy is thriving in Venezuela. Hurrah for Hugo Chavez!
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Why I'm Not Hiring
When you add it all up, it costs $74,000 to put $44,000 in Sally's pocket and to give her $12,000 in benefits.
By MICHAEL P. FLEISCHER | AUGUST 9, 2010
With unemployment just under10% 19% and companies sitting on their cash, you would think that sooner or later job growth would take off. I think it's going to be later—much later. Here's why.
Meet Sally (not her real name; details changed to preserve privacy). Sally is a terrific employee, and she happens to be the median person in terms of base pay among the 83 people at my little company in New Jersey, where we provide audio systems for use in educational, commercial and industrial settings. She's been with us for over 15 years. She's a high school graduate with some specialized training. She makes $59,000 a year—on paper. In reality, she makes only $44,000 a year because $15,000 is taken from her thanks to various deductions and taxes, all of which form the steep, sad slope between gross and net pay.
Daniel Henninger discusses how Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan agree that Americans should send more of their paychecks to Washington. Also, Fannie and Freddie ask for more cash within weeks of an Obama pledge to end taxpayer rescues.
Before that money hits her bank, it is reduced by the $2,376 she pays as her share of the medical and dental insurance that my company provides. And then the government takes its due. She pays $126 for state unemployment insurance, $149 for disability insurance and $856 for Medicare. That's the small stuff. New Jersey takes $1,893 in income taxes. The federal government gets $3,661 for Social Security and another $6,250 for income tax withholding. The roughly $13,000 taken from her by various government entities means that some 22% of her gross pay goes to Washington or Trenton. She's lucky she doesn't live in New York City, where the toll would be even higher.
Employing Sally costs plenty too. My company has to write checks for $74,000 so Sally can receive her nominal $59,000 in base pay. Health insurance is a big, added cost: While Sally pays nearly $2,400 for coverage, my company pays the rest—$9,561 for employee/spouse medical and dental. We also provide company-paid life and other insurance premiums amounting to $153. Altogether, company-paid benefits add $9,714 to the cost of employing Sally.
Then the federal and state governments want a little something extra. They take $56 for federal unemployment coverage, $149 for disability insurance, $300 for workers' comp and $505 for state unemployment insurance. Finally, the feds make me pay $856 for Sally's Medicare and $3,661 for her Social Security.
When you add it all up, it costs $74,000 to put $44,000 in Sally's pocket and to give her $12,000 in benefits. Bottom line: Governments impose a 33% surtax on Sally's job each year.
Because my company has been conscripted by the government and forced to serve as a tax collector, we have lost control of a big chunk of our cost structure. Tax increases, whether cloaked as changes in unemployment or disability insurance, Medicare increases or in any other form can dramatically alter our financial situation. With government spending and deficits growing as fast as they have been, you know that more tax increases are coming—for my company, and even for Sally too.
Companies have also been pressed into serving as providers of health insurance. In a saner world, health insurance would be something that individuals buy for themselves and their families, just as they do with auto insurance. Now, adding to the insanity, there is ObamaCare.
Every year, we negotiate a renewal to our health coverage. This year, our provider demanded a 28% increase in premiums—for a lesser plan. This is in part a tax increase that the federal government has co-opted insurance providers to collect. We had never faced an increase anywhere near this large; in each of the last two years, the increase was under 10%.
To offset tax increases and steepening rises in health-insurance premiums, my company needs sustainably higher profits and sales—something unlikely in this "summer of recovery." We can't pass the additional costs onto our customers, because the market is too tight and we'd lose sales. Only governments can raise prices repeatedly and pretend there will be no consequences.
And even if the economic outlook were more encouraging, increasing revenues is always uncertain and expensive. As much as I might want to hire new salespeople, engineers and marketing staff in an effort to grow, I would be increasing my company's vulnerability to government decisions to raise taxes, to policies that make health insurance more expensive, and to the difficulties of this economic environment.
A life in business is filled with uncertainties, but I can be quite sure that every time I hire someone my obligations to the government go up. From where I sit, the government's message is unmistakable: Creating a new job carries a punishing price.
By MICHAEL P. FLEISCHER | AUGUST 9, 2010
With unemployment just under
Meet Sally (not her real name; details changed to preserve privacy). Sally is a terrific employee, and she happens to be the median person in terms of base pay among the 83 people at my little company in New Jersey, where we provide audio systems for use in educational, commercial and industrial settings. She's been with us for over 15 years. She's a high school graduate with some specialized training. She makes $59,000 a year—on paper. In reality, she makes only $44,000 a year because $15,000 is taken from her thanks to various deductions and taxes, all of which form the steep, sad slope between gross and net pay.
Daniel Henninger discusses how Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan agree that Americans should send more of their paychecks to Washington. Also, Fannie and Freddie ask for more cash within weeks of an Obama pledge to end taxpayer rescues.
Before that money hits her bank, it is reduced by the $2,376 she pays as her share of the medical and dental insurance that my company provides. And then the government takes its due. She pays $126 for state unemployment insurance, $149 for disability insurance and $856 for Medicare. That's the small stuff. New Jersey takes $1,893 in income taxes. The federal government gets $3,661 for Social Security and another $6,250 for income tax withholding. The roughly $13,000 taken from her by various government entities means that some 22% of her gross pay goes to Washington or Trenton. She's lucky she doesn't live in New York City, where the toll would be even higher.
Employing Sally costs plenty too. My company has to write checks for $74,000 so Sally can receive her nominal $59,000 in base pay. Health insurance is a big, added cost: While Sally pays nearly $2,400 for coverage, my company pays the rest—$9,561 for employee/spouse medical and dental. We also provide company-paid life and other insurance premiums amounting to $153. Altogether, company-paid benefits add $9,714 to the cost of employing Sally.
Then the federal and state governments want a little something extra. They take $56 for federal unemployment coverage, $149 for disability insurance, $300 for workers' comp and $505 for state unemployment insurance. Finally, the feds make me pay $856 for Sally's Medicare and $3,661 for her Social Security.
When you add it all up, it costs $74,000 to put $44,000 in Sally's pocket and to give her $12,000 in benefits. Bottom line: Governments impose a 33% surtax on Sally's job each year.
Because my company has been conscripted by the government and forced to serve as a tax collector, we have lost control of a big chunk of our cost structure. Tax increases, whether cloaked as changes in unemployment or disability insurance, Medicare increases or in any other form can dramatically alter our financial situation. With government spending and deficits growing as fast as they have been, you know that more tax increases are coming—for my company, and even for Sally too.
Companies have also been pressed into serving as providers of health insurance. In a saner world, health insurance would be something that individuals buy for themselves and their families, just as they do with auto insurance. Now, adding to the insanity, there is ObamaCare.
Every year, we negotiate a renewal to our health coverage. This year, our provider demanded a 28% increase in premiums—for a lesser plan. This is in part a tax increase that the federal government has co-opted insurance providers to collect. We had never faced an increase anywhere near this large; in each of the last two years, the increase was under 10%.
To offset tax increases and steepening rises in health-insurance premiums, my company needs sustainably higher profits and sales—something unlikely in this "summer of recovery." We can't pass the additional costs onto our customers, because the market is too tight and we'd lose sales. Only governments can raise prices repeatedly and pretend there will be no consequences.
And even if the economic outlook were more encouraging, increasing revenues is always uncertain and expensive. As much as I might want to hire new salespeople, engineers and marketing staff in an effort to grow, I would be increasing my company's vulnerability to government decisions to raise taxes, to policies that make health insurance more expensive, and to the difficulties of this economic environment.
A life in business is filled with uncertainties, but I can be quite sure that every time I hire someone my obligations to the government go up. From where I sit, the government's message is unmistakable: Creating a new job carries a punishing price.
Posted by
spiderlegs
Labels:
cash reserves,
employers,
high unemployment,
not hiring
Iraq: Requiem for a Profound Misadventure
By JOE KLEIN Thursday, Aug. 05, 2010
It is a matter of some relief that Barack Obama did not announce the end of major combat operations in Iraq under a banner that said "Mission Accomplished." He did it in a speech to the Disabled American Veterans (DAV), the most grave and sober audience imaginable. And appropriately so, after a war that should never have been fought, a war that by some estimates will cost $3 trillion before it's done (including the health care services rendered to those represented by the DAV), a war whose casualties number in the hundreds of thousands. Iraq hasn't been much in the news over the past year, but this is an important milestone — even if our mission there will continue on a much smaller scale for 16 more months — a moment for reflection and humility in the face of a national embarrassment.
There is no "victory" in Iraq, nor will there be. There is something resembling stability, for now. There is a semblance of democracy, but that may dissolve over time into a Shi'ite dictatorship — which, if not well run, could yield to the near inevitable military coup. Yes, Saddam is gone — and that is a good thing. The Kurds have a greater measure of independence and don't have to live in fear of mass murder, which are good things too. But Iran's position in the region has been strengthened. Its Iraqi allies, especially Muqtada al-Sadr's populist movement, will play a major role — perhaps one more central than ours — in shaping the future of the country. Our attempt to construct an Iraq more amenable to our interests will end no better than the previous attempts by Western colonial powers. Even if something resembling democracy prevails, the U.S. invasion and occupation will not be remembered fondly by Iraqis. We will own the destruction in perpetuity; if the Iraqis manage to cobble themselves a decent society, they will see it, correctly, as an achievement of their own.
There are other consequences of this profound misadventure. The return of the Taliban in Afghanistan is certainly one. If U.S. attention hadn't been diverted from that primary conflict, the story in the Pashtun borderlands might be very different now. The sense of the U.S. as a repository of tempered, honorable actions may never recover from the images of the past decade, especially the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison.
The idea that it was our right and responsibility to rid Iraq of a terrible dictator — after the original casus belli of weapons of mass destruction evaporated — turned out to be a neocolonialist delusion. The fact that Bush apologists still trot out his "forward strategy of freedom" as an example of American idealism is a farce. That feckless exercise in naiveté brought us a Hamas government in Gaza, after a Palestinian election that no one but the Bush Administration wanted. It raised the hopes of reformers across the region, soon dashed when the Bush Administration retreated, realizing that the outcome of democracy in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be the installation of Islamist parties that might prove more repressive than the dictatorships they would replace. Freedom may well be "God's gift to humanity," as Bush insisted, radiating a simpleminded piety that never reflected another of God's greatest gifts — the ability to doubt, to think difficult thoughts and weigh conflicting options with clarity and subtlety. But I'm pretty sure God never designated the U.S. to impose that freedom violently upon others.
It is appropriate that Obama's speech to the DAV will not be remembered as vividly as George W. Bush's puerile march across the deck of an aircraft carrier, costumed as a combat aviator against a golden sunset, to announce — seven years and tens of thousands of lives prematurely — the "end of combat operations." Obama's announcement was no celebration. It was a somber acknowledgment that amends will be made to those whose lives were shattered and that their courageous service in an unnecessary cause will be honored. A national discussion about America's place in the world, and the military's excessive place in our foreign policy, would also be appropriate in the wake of this disaster, but I'm not holding my breath.
As for myself, I deeply regret that once, on television in the days before the war, I foolishly — spontaneously — said that going ahead with the invasion might be the right thing to do. I was far more skeptical in print. I never wrote in favor of the war and repeatedly raised the problems that would accompany it, but mere skepticism was an insufficient reaction too. The issue then was as clear as it is now. It demanded a clarity that I failed to summon. The essential principle is immutable: we should never go to war unless we have been attacked or are under direct, immediate threat of attack. Never. And never again.
It is a matter of some relief that Barack Obama did not announce the end of major combat operations in Iraq under a banner that said "Mission Accomplished." He did it in a speech to the Disabled American Veterans (DAV), the most grave and sober audience imaginable. And appropriately so, after a war that should never have been fought, a war that by some estimates will cost $3 trillion before it's done (including the health care services rendered to those represented by the DAV), a war whose casualties number in the hundreds of thousands. Iraq hasn't been much in the news over the past year, but this is an important milestone — even if our mission there will continue on a much smaller scale for 16 more months — a moment for reflection and humility in the face of a national embarrassment.
There is no "victory" in Iraq, nor will there be. There is something resembling stability, for now. There is a semblance of democracy, but that may dissolve over time into a Shi'ite dictatorship — which, if not well run, could yield to the near inevitable military coup. Yes, Saddam is gone — and that is a good thing. The Kurds have a greater measure of independence and don't have to live in fear of mass murder, which are good things too. But Iran's position in the region has been strengthened. Its Iraqi allies, especially Muqtada al-Sadr's populist movement, will play a major role — perhaps one more central than ours — in shaping the future of the country. Our attempt to construct an Iraq more amenable to our interests will end no better than the previous attempts by Western colonial powers. Even if something resembling democracy prevails, the U.S. invasion and occupation will not be remembered fondly by Iraqis. We will own the destruction in perpetuity; if the Iraqis manage to cobble themselves a decent society, they will see it, correctly, as an achievement of their own.
There are other consequences of this profound misadventure. The return of the Taliban in Afghanistan is certainly one. If U.S. attention hadn't been diverted from that primary conflict, the story in the Pashtun borderlands might be very different now. The sense of the U.S. as a repository of tempered, honorable actions may never recover from the images of the past decade, especially the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison.
The idea that it was our right and responsibility to rid Iraq of a terrible dictator — after the original casus belli of weapons of mass destruction evaporated — turned out to be a neocolonialist delusion. The fact that Bush apologists still trot out his "forward strategy of freedom" as an example of American idealism is a farce. That feckless exercise in naiveté brought us a Hamas government in Gaza, after a Palestinian election that no one but the Bush Administration wanted. It raised the hopes of reformers across the region, soon dashed when the Bush Administration retreated, realizing that the outcome of democracy in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be the installation of Islamist parties that might prove more repressive than the dictatorships they would replace. Freedom may well be "God's gift to humanity," as Bush insisted, radiating a simpleminded piety that never reflected another of God's greatest gifts — the ability to doubt, to think difficult thoughts and weigh conflicting options with clarity and subtlety. But I'm pretty sure God never designated the U.S. to impose that freedom violently upon others.
It is appropriate that Obama's speech to the DAV will not be remembered as vividly as George W. Bush's puerile march across the deck of an aircraft carrier, costumed as a combat aviator against a golden sunset, to announce — seven years and tens of thousands of lives prematurely — the "end of combat operations." Obama's announcement was no celebration. It was a somber acknowledgment that amends will be made to those whose lives were shattered and that their courageous service in an unnecessary cause will be honored. A national discussion about America's place in the world, and the military's excessive place in our foreign policy, would also be appropriate in the wake of this disaster, but I'm not holding my breath.
As for myself, I deeply regret that once, on television in the days before the war, I foolishly — spontaneously — said that going ahead with the invasion might be the right thing to do. I was far more skeptical in print. I never wrote in favor of the war and repeatedly raised the problems that would accompany it, but mere skepticism was an insufficient reaction too. The issue then was as clear as it is now. It demanded a clarity that I failed to summon. The essential principle is immutable: we should never go to war unless we have been attacked or are under direct, immediate threat of attack. Never. And never again.
The Law Of Civilization And Decay
08/09/2010 - Dave Cohen's "Decline of the Empire"
That's a very good question—who are these economists, anyway? I will go a small but significant way toward answering this question today in the first of a series of essays on where we stand in the Modern Age. I can only touch on the main concepts today.
The real meaning of Progress is defined by Lasch—
Starting mainly with Adam Smith, and with the amendments of many others during the 19th century, the idea that continuous "improvement" was possible came to be embodied in the type of political economy we have today. Lasch quotes from Simon Patten's The New Basis Of Civilization (1921) to describe our roots—
You can easily recognize the consumer society we live in today in Patten's views. The available "abundance" and our ability to consume are assumed to grow forever. Indeed, this is what Progress came to mean in the 20th century. Nothing has changed in this regard in 2010. That the available abundance might cease to grow or diminish in a new "age of deficit" is antithetical to our faith that Progress is inevitable & enduring.
The belief in this doctrine is nearly universal in our times. To dissent to the Progress paradigm in this day & age is to be cast as some kind of dystopian wacko. That there were other views of how the world works have long ago faded from memory. Simon Patten was responding to people like Henry George, who believed that the law of civilization and decay described below contradicted the notion of continuous improvement. Here is Lasch again, quoting from George's Progress And Poverty (1920)—
You will recall that Simon Patten's optimism required the "corollary assumption" that the growth of (wealth, income) inequality could be reversed. George did not think this was possible. In fact, it was the inevitable wealth inequality brought about by endless growth which "must bring progress to a halt"—
It is not an accident that this blog is called Decline Of The Empire. I do not believe in Progress, for History and Human Nature—no improvements have been "permanently fixed in mental organization"—argue strongly against it. I subscribe to the law of civilization and decay. Furthermore, I do my best to document the ubiquitous decay of American society everyday. This puts me in direct opposition to virtually every economist, every government official, every politician and every pundit in this Great Land Of Ours. I'm more or less comfortable in that role.
Henry George's point about "the evils arising from the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth" is well-taken. I myself have described it at great length, most recently in my post Trickle Down Economics. The tendency of wealth inequality to "bring progress to a halt" is obvious in the United States. See my posts The Meek Shall Inherit Nothingor Wiping Out The Middle Class. This deplorable trend is very far along, irreversible, and accelerating. Along with other disasters, it will be our undoing.
I have said little that might provide a direct answer to Galbraith's question who are these economists, anyway?But the answer should now be obvious: Economists are the High Priests of Progress who oversee & maintain Simon Patten's "superlative machine" to fuel ever-growing consumption. This goal is Holy, and the Sacred Obligation of economists is to make it so. I shall relate their role as Secular Priests to their manifest failure to understand why the superlative machine broke down later this week.
It just so happened that I've been reading Christopher Lasch's The True And Only Heaven: Progress and It's Criticswhen a friend sent me Philip Mirowski's The Great Mortification" Economist's Responses to the Crisis of 2007-(and counting). This latter article led me to James K. Galbraith's Who Are These Economists, Anyway?
That's a very good question—who are these economists, anyway? I will go a small but significant way toward answering this question today in the first of a series of essays on where we stand in the Modern Age. I can only touch on the main concepts today.
The real meaning of Progress is defined by Lasch—
Once we recognize the profound differences between the Christian view of history, prophetic or millennarian, and the modern conception of progress, we can understand what was so original about the latter: not the promise of a secular utopia that would bring history to a happy ending, but the promise of steady improvement with no foreseeable ending at all...
Starting mainly with Adam Smith, and with the amendments of many others during the 19th century, the idea that continuous "improvement" was possible came to be embodied in the type of political economy we have today. Lasch quotes from Simon Patten's The New Basis Of Civilization (1921) to describe our roots—
Patten's widely acclaimed treatise ... argued quite explicitly that the emergence of a "pleasure or surplus economy" effectively nullified the "ancient tragic model" of civilization and decay. "The story of the rise and fall of civilizations, repeated again and again, seems to justify the familiar conclusion that the decline of a society after an epoch of prosperity is a natural, incontrovertible law." But "those who would predict tomorrow's economic states from a study of the economic states of Rome or Venice" overlooked the unprecedented abundance made possible by the productive system, which placed civilization on a new basis. Their apprehensions belonged to a "vanishing age of deficit" ... On the contrary, man's dominion over nature put an end to the "reign of want." according to Patten. "The social surplus is the superlative machine brought forth in the machine age for the quickening of progress."
Patten's optimism required the corollary assumption, directly opposed to the linkage of poverty and progress made by Henry George and Brooks Adams, that the growth of inequality could be reversed...
You can easily recognize the consumer society we live in today in Patten's views. The available "abundance" and our ability to consume are assumed to grow forever. Indeed, this is what Progress came to mean in the 20th century. Nothing has changed in this regard in 2010. That the available abundance might cease to grow or diminish in a new "age of deficit" is antithetical to our faith that Progress is inevitable & enduring.
The belief in this doctrine is nearly universal in our times. To dissent to the Progress paradigm in this day & age is to be cast as some kind of dystopian wacko. That there were other views of how the world works have long ago faded from memory. Simon Patten was responding to people like Henry George, who believed that the law of civilization and decay described below contradicted the notion of continuous improvement. Here is Lasch again, quoting from George's Progress And Poverty (1920)—
George's offense ... lay in his insistence that the theory of continuous progress—the "hopeful fatalism" that "now dominates the world of thought"—was contradicted by the "rise and fall of nations", the "growth and decay of civilizations." George did not deny that "we of modern civilization" stood "far above those who proceeded us." What he denied was that the achievements of modern civilization could be attributed to improvements now "permanently fixed in mental organization."
History, he thought, did not support the "current view" that "improvement tends to go on unceasingly, to a higher and higher civilization." The modern world owed its wealth and power to the transmission of skills and knowledge from one generation to the next; but the delicate mechanism of cultural transmission had broken down many times in the past, and could easily break down in the future...
[My note: Brooks Adams wrote a book called The Law Of Civilization And Decay (1895). I am not referring to that book or its contents when I cite the general law of civilization and decay in this post.]
You will recall that Simon Patten's optimism required the "corollary assumption" that the growth of (wealth, income) inequality could be reversed. George did not think this was possible. In fact, it was the inevitable wealth inequality brought about by endless growth which "must bring progress to a halt"—
This truth [the law of civilization and decay] involves both a menace and a promise.
It shows that the evils arising from the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth, which are becoming more and more apparent as modern civilization goes on, are not incidents of progress, but tendencies which must bring progress to a halt; that they will not cure themselves, but, on the contrary, must, unless their cause is removed, grow greater and greater, until they sweep us back into barbarism by the road which every previous civilization has trod."
It is not an accident that this blog is called Decline Of The Empire. I do not believe in Progress, for History and Human Nature—no improvements have been "permanently fixed in mental organization"—argue strongly against it. I subscribe to the law of civilization and decay. Furthermore, I do my best to document the ubiquitous decay of American society everyday. This puts me in direct opposition to virtually every economist, every government official, every politician and every pundit in this Great Land Of Ours. I'm more or less comfortable in that role.
Henry George's point about "the evils arising from the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth" is well-taken. I myself have described it at great length, most recently in my post Trickle Down Economics. The tendency of wealth inequality to "bring progress to a halt" is obvious in the United States. See my posts The Meek Shall Inherit Nothingor Wiping Out The Middle Class. This deplorable trend is very far along, irreversible, and accelerating. Along with other disasters, it will be our undoing.
I have said little that might provide a direct answer to Galbraith's question who are these economists, anyway?But the answer should now be obvious: Economists are the High Priests of Progress who oversee & maintain Simon Patten's "superlative machine" to fuel ever-growing consumption. This goal is Holy, and the Sacred Obligation of economists is to make it so. I shall relate their role as Secular Priests to their manifest failure to understand why the superlative machine broke down later this week.
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spiderlegs
Labels:
american empire,
ancient rome,
civilization,
DECLINE,
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Google and Verizon Announce Net Neutrality Proposal
By MIGUEL HELFT
4:09 p.m. | Updated Our article on this news has been posted.
Google and Verizon held a conference call with the news media to discuss a joint proposal on net neutrality issues. Details in our live-blogging updates below, with the most recent updates at the top.
2:07 P.M. |Wrapping Up and a Reaction
The press conference concludes. First reactions from net neutrality advocates appear to be mixed. In a statement, Andrew Jay Schwartzman, senior vice president and policy director at the Media Access Project, said: “The plan raises as many questions as it answers. For example, it does not disclose the standard to be used in resolving consumer complaints. One question that the plan does definitively answer is that the non-discrimination proposal would never apply to wireless. That alone makes this arrangement a non-starter.”
2:01 P.M. |On New Services
Another question is asked about what is different about these new services that would not be on the Internet. Mr. Seidenberg mentions the FiOS TV service as an example.
Asked about other examples of new entertainment services, Mr. Seidenberg says that for example the Metropolitan Opera may want to broadcast its entire archive in 3-D, and they may choose do so over a new type of service.
Mr. Schmidt reiterates: “This is not a deal. This is a joint policy announcement.” He says that Google and Verizon are committed to playing by these rules.
(This is the relevant portion of the companies’ announcement: “Fifth, we want the broadband infrastructure to be a platform for innovation. Therefore, our proposal would allow broadband providers to offer additional, differentiated online services, in addition to the Internet access and video services (such as Verizon’s FiOS TV) offered today. This means that broadband providers can work with other players to develop new services. It is too soon to predict how these new services will develop, but examples might include health care monitoring, the smart grid, advanced educational services, or new entertainment and gaming options. Our proposal also includes safeguards to ensure that such online services must be distinguishable from traditional broadband Internet access services and are not designed to circumvent the rules. The FCC would also monitor the development of these services to make sure they don’t interfere with the continued development of Internet access services.”)
1:55 P.M. |No Business Deal
A question is asked about whether the companies ran this proposal by the F.C.C. and whether there is a business arrangement between the two companies that is behind this announcement.
Mr. Schmidt: “There is no business arrangement.” He says any reports that say there is an arrangement are false and misleading. He also says that they have run this by the F.C.C.
Mr. Seidenberg emphasizes that there is no business deal and that this is merely a proposal to move the policy debate forward.
1:53 P.M. |Investment Incentives
Mr. Schmidt adds that there would be an incentive for carriers to continue investing in the “open Internet” since that’s what customers want. He also reiterates that YouTube and other Google services would remain on the open Internet, not on one of the new paid and prioritized channels.
1:50 P.M. |Prioritizing Traffic
Mr. Seidenberg fields a question about the distinction between the neutral public Internet and the new services that could be prioritized. “Under the principles, there is no prioritization of traffic that comes from Google over the Internet, period,” he said. It is not entirely clear how these new services would work, but Mr. Schmidt said that Google has no plans to offer any of these enhanced services.
Mr. Seidenberg said that carriers would add enough capacity so that none of the new services would degrade their ability to deliver existing Internet services.
1:44 P.M. |Verizon’s Take
Ivan Seidenberg takes over. He says that he agrees with the rules outlined by Mr. Schmidt but that carriers should be able to offer new types of services that are not part of the open Internet, like sophisticated health care monitoring systems or new forms of entertainment. He says these new services should not be used to circumvent the kinds of rules they are proposing.
Wireless services would be exempt from major net neutrality rules, but carriers would be required to be transparent about what they do in terms of managing traffic.
Verizon will post these principles on its Web site and plans to abide by them.
Question and answers now.
1:41 P.M. |Some Details
Highlights: Mr. Schmidt recommends principles that allow for enforcing net neutrality rules on landline communications. He also calls for more enforceable rules and more transparency from carriers.
A post about this is up on the Google Public Policy Blog.
1:39 P.M. |A New Proposal
They are releasing a detailed joint policy proposal.
Mr. Schmidt says Google has benefited from an open Internet. “More importantly, an open Internet allows for the next Google to be created.” He adds that just about everything that has been in the press on this topic recently was completely wrong.
1:37 P.M. |Google-Verizon Call Begins
Eric Schmidt and Ivan Seidenberg are leading the conference call. Mr. Schmidt says the two companies spent a long time trying to find common ground. He was pleasantly surprised that there was a lot of common ground. He says the two companies are dependent upon each other.
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Labels:
Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
Net Neutrality,
Verizon-Google plan
Google-Verizon NN pact riddled with gaping loopholes
By Matthew Lasar | Ars Technica | Aug. 9, 2010
Even before Google and Verizon published their sweeping new Internet proposals for Congress, the net neutrality troops were out in force against the alliance.
"DON'T BE EVIL," proclaimed the Monday morning banner headline announcing the delivery of a petition signed by 300,000 people urging the search engine giant to back away from its alliance with Verizon.
"Google has always presented itself as a different kind of corporate entity," warned Justin Ruben, executive director of MoveOn.org. "The fact that they are involved in a deal that would kill Internet freedom directly contradicts this image. We hope that Google will reconsider before they are seen as just another giant corporation out to make a buck regardless of the consequence."
Shortly after the plan was unveiled, Public Knowledge damned it as a package that "does almost nothing to preserve an open Internet."
But we don't need these press releases to report the obvious. The Google/Verizon manifesto claims to preserve "transparency" on the 'Net, but the only really transparent thing about the plan is that it is packed with so many loopholes, a deep packet inspection powered P2P blocker the size of an M1 Abrams tank could roll through it without disturbing a telco executive's nap.
Meaningful harm
Sure, the Google/Verizon press release proclaims that the proposal means that "for the first time, wireline broadband providers would not be able to discriminate against or prioritize lawful Internet content, applications or services in a way that causes harm to users or competition."
But the legislative document itself says the following (all italics are ours):
"In providing broadband Internet access service, a provider would be prohibited from engaging in undue discrimination against any lawful Internet content, application, or service in a manner that causes meaningful harm to competition or to users."
So who is going to decide what kind of harm is "meaningful"? Presumably the Federal Communications Commission, which gets to issue $2 million fines—except that under this plan the agency would enforce its components "through case-by-case adjudication, but would have no rulemaking authority with respect to those provisions."
"Parties would be encouraged to use nongovernmental dispute resolution processes established by independent, widely-recognized Internet community governance initiatives," the proposal continues, "and the FCC would be directed to give appropriate deference to decisions or advisory opinions of such groups."
In other words, some kind of organization dominated by Google and Verizon would decide what constitutes "meaningful harm," and the FCC would do what it tells them to do.
Rebut me
And yes, the "new nondiscrimination principle" the companies advocate "includes a presumption against prioritization of Internet traffic—including paid prioritization."
Except when it doesn't.
"Prioritization of Internet traffic would be presumed inconsistent with the non-discrimination standard, but the presumption could be rebutted," the fine print says.
And the scheme's definition of "reasonable network practices" includes "any technically sound practice... to address traffic that is unwanted by or harmful to users, the provider's network, or the Internet..." and... "to prioritize general classes or types of Internet traffic, based on latency; or otherwise to manage the daily operation of its network."
We're sorry, but we're seeing prioritization arrangements all over this language—from Comcast's plain old P2P blocking, which was clearly "unwanted" by that provider's network, to Cox cable's traffic prioritization experiment, in which the company notified users that "less time-sensitive traffic, such as file uploads, peer-to-peer and Usenet newsgroups," would be delayed during periods of congestion.
And we haven't even gotten to this canyon-sized loophole in the Verizon/Google plan:
A provider that offers a broadband Internet access service complying with the above principles could offer any other additional or differentiated services. Such other services would have to be distinguishable in scope and purpose from broadband Internet access service, but could make use of or access Internet content, applications or services and could include traffic prioritization.
The FCC would be allowed to publish an annual survey "on the effect of these additional services" and "immediately report if it finds at any time that these services threaten the meaningful availability of broadband Internet access services or have been devised or promoted in a manner designed to evade these consumer protections."
But what exactly will these "additional or differentiated" services that ISPs could charge content providers extra cash for be? IP Video? The latest, coolest live conferencing app?
And to whom would the Commission "report"? We don't know. But again, since the proposal forbids the FCC from making any rules, we fear that the complaint will go to Verizon and Google and the rest of the winners circle, who will decide what these exemptible services will be, then give the Commission its marching orders.
Transparency except...
Finally, the Verizon/Google plan has a mechanism for transparency. "Providers of broadband Internet access service would be required to disclose accurate and relevant information in plain language about the characteristics and capabilities of their offerings, their broadband network management, and other practices necessary for consumers and other users to make informed choices..."
...which is the sole part of the whole shebang to which Verizon Wireless or any other wireless provider would have to adhere:
"Because of the unique technical and operational characteristics of wireless networks, and the competitive and still-developing nature of wireless broadband services, only the transparency principle would apply to wireless broadband at this time."
Decision time
Let's not forget something here—wireless broadband is the future. The FCC's National Broadband Plan cites studies projecting that with the next five years, the quantity of mobile data traffic in North America will jump by a factor 20 to 40 times the amount measured in 2009.
Agree or disagree about net neutrality, but surely nondiscrimination rules that do not cover wireless broadband delivery systems will become meaningless as 4G sweeps the country and most mobiles become application-packed smartphone devices.
As we write this, our Inbox continues to fill with outrage over the plan. Some praise came from the Technology Policy Institute.
"In my view, new regulation is not needed to preserve the open Internet," declared its president Thomas Lenard. "Nevertheless, the Verizon-Google proposal has to be viewed as a serious and constructive effort to address the policy impasse that the FCC has created for itself."
We asked the FCC for comment on the proposal. "Decline to comment at this time," came the response.
"Some will claim this announcement moves the discussion forward," Copps warned. "That's one of its many problems. It is time to move a decision forward—a decision to reassert FCC authority over broadband telecommunications, to guarantee an open Internet now and forever, and to put the interests of consumers in front of the interests of giant corporations."
Posted by
spiderlegs
Labels:
Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
Net Neutrality,
Verizon-Google plan
Monday, August 9, 2010
Abedin: The Illusion of a ‘limited war’ against Iran
(F*ck!!!)
The Illusion of a ‘limited war’ against Iran
Posted on August 9, 2010 by Juan
The frank admission by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America’s highest ranking officer, that the U.S. has plans to attack Iran to prevent that country from acquiring nuclear weapons, is being treated with the utmost seriousness in political, intelligence and military circles in Tehran.
This is the first time that a high-ranking U.S. official has spoken about the existence of military plans to prevent the Islamic Republic from crossing the nuclear threshold. There is considerable evidence that Mullen’s frank statement, coupled with the Obama Administration’s increasingly hostile and dismissive attitude towards Iran, and reinforced by the fourth round of United Nations sanctions imposed in June (followed by even harsher unilateral sanctions imposed by both the European Union and the United States), has radically altered the Tehran regime’s strategic calculations on the possibility of a military confrontation with the United States.
Hitherto the conventional wisdom amongst strategic policy makers in the Islamic Republic was that the U.S. would adhere to the ‘no war no peace’ policy, irrespective of the bellicose rhetoric of American leaders and officials. The policy of ‘no war no peace’ has characterized Iranian-American relations since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979.
The basic premise of this policy is that at different stages Iran and America edge towards war or peace – depending on the prevailing strategic scenario in the region – but never quite actually achieve either. The result is that most of the time the two states are somewhere in the middle conducting a Cold War, in which leaders and officials from both sides trade insults and engage in ideological and political grandstanding, but stop well short of the point where further escalation of tensions might trigger a hot war.
For the past thirty-one years this policy has benefited most of the key stakeholders, including hardline political factions in both countries, the regional Arab states, Turkey, Pakistan and Israel. All have benefited from this Iranian-American Cold War, insofar as the paucity of diplomatic and political relations between Iran and America has continuously opened up a wide range of strategic, political and economic benefits. By the same token, these stake holders would have much to lose if Iran and America actually engaged in real fighting. While this argument has manifold shortcomings, nonetheless it does capture a large part of the reality of Iranian-American relations since 1979. In any case it is what key Iranian strategic policy makers have believed all along. Until now that is.
Despite the fact that a few days before Mullen’s statement, the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC—Sepah-e-Pasdaran in Persian), Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jafari, dismissed U.S. threats, claiming that America “would not dare to attack Iran”, other IRGC leaders have in recent months continuously warned of the immediate and long-term fallout of any military confrontation. The head of the IRGC’s political-ideological unit recently warned of “dire” threats to regional security in the event of an American military attack. Meanwhile Ahmad Vahidi, Iran’s defence minister and a former commander of the IRGC’s elite Qods Force (responsible for special foreign operations), has pledged a “robust” response to any American military aggression against Iran.
It has been clear for months that the mood of IRGC commanders has been changing and Mullen’s statement appears to lend credence to the strategic calculations of the Revolutionary Guard commanders. This development is of the utmost significance, since in the event of an Iranian-American military confrontation, the IRGC is expected to be at the forefront of containing the American assault and retaliating with military measures of its own.
In fact, in the event of a military confrontation Iranian leaders are likely to relieve the regular Iranian military from fighting, so as to keep them out of harm’s way and maintain the integrity and fighting strength of the regular armed forces. There is another reason for this decision and that has to do with the depleted capabilities of the national military; in the past thirty years the national armed forces have insidiously lost power and prestige to the IRGC. It is worth noting that Iran is the only country in the world that operates two completely independent military commands; one centred on the regular armed forces, and the other on the IRGC, which operates its own ground forces, navy and air force, as well as a myriad of intelligence and security services. Moreover, the IRGC controls all of Iran’s strategic military assets, including mid-range ballistic missile capability.
It has become fashionable to paint the IRGC as an economic conglomerate more interested in making money than fighting for the values of the Islamic Revolution. Much of the reporting on IRGC economic activity is inaccurate and disingenuous and is indicative of the faux-naif style of analysis often employed by Western journalists and analysts.
The truth is that whilst the IRGC has a sizeable economic wing centred on the Khatam ol-Anbia complex (Qarargah-e Khatam ol-Anbia), its economic and financial activities are kept strictly separate from its fighting units. In any case, the IRGC is foremost an ideological army that is totally and unequivocally committed to the survival of the Islamic Revolution, and the political-religious system that emerged from that revolution. Even former reformist president (and now opposition leader) Mohammad Khatami referred to the IRGC as the “most ideological armed force in the world.”
American political and military leaders would be mistaken if they believed they could get away with a “limited” military strike on Iran, designed to destroy that country’s nuclear infrastructure. Any military strike on Iran by the United States will be interpreted by Iran’s rulers, and their IRGC enforcers, as a direct assault on the integrity and the very existence of the Islamic Republic. From a strategic point of view, IRGC commanders will interpret any American strike as the beginning of an existential conflict, and will respond appropriately.
A top priority for the IRGC high command is to respond so harshly and decisively so as to deter the Americans from a second set of strikes at a future point. The idea here is to avoid what happened to Iraq in the period 1991-2003, when the former Baathist regime was so weakened by sanctions and repeated small-scale military attacks that it quickly collapsed in the face of American and British invading armies.
The range of predictable responses available to the IRGC high command include dramatic hit ad run attacks against military and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the use of mid-range ballistic missiles against American bases in the region and Israel and a direct assault on American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. All these options are likely to be used within 48 hours of the start of hostilities.
What is less predictable is the response of the IRGC Qods Force, which is likely to be at the forefront of the Pasdaran’s counter-attack. One possible response by the Qods force is spectacular terrorist-style attacks against American intelligence bases and assets throughout the region. The IRGC Qods Force is believed to have identified every key component of the American intelligence apparatus in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are likely to put this information to good use, especially since the Qods Force suspects that the CIA had a hand in last October’s Jundullah-organised suicide bombing targeting IRGC commanders in Iran’s volatile Sistan va Baluchistan province.
The IRGC navy will also play a key asymmetrical role in the conflict by organising maritime suicide bombings on an industrial scale. By manning its fleet of speedboats with suicide bombers and ramming them into American warships and even neutral commercial shipping, the Pasdaran will hope to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 40 percent of world crude oil supplies pass.
The combination of these asymmetrical forms of warfare with more conventional style missile and even ground force attacks on American bases in the region will likely result in thousands of American military casualties in the space of a few weeks. The IRGC has both the will and wherewithal to inflict a level of casualties on American armed forces not seen since the Second World War.
Even if the United States manages to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and much of the country’s military assets, the IRGC can still claim victory by claiming to have given the Americans a bloody nose and producing an outcome not dissimilar from the Israeli-Hezbollah military engagement in the summer of 2006.
The political effect of this will likely be even more explosive than the actual fighting. Not only will it awaken the sleeping giant of Iranian nationalism, thus aligning the broad mass of the people with the regime, it will also shore up Iran’s image in the region and prove once and for all that the Islamic Republic is prepared to fight to the death to uphold its principles. Suddenly Iran’s allies in the region – particularly non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas – would stand ten feet tall.
Ironically U.S. military aggression will likely accelerate the actualisation of the very scenario that American political and military leaders insist they are determined to prevent, i.e. a nuclear armed Iran. Even if we accept the contentious proposition that Iran’s nuclear programme has a military dimension, the immediate reaction of Iran’s rulers to military aggression would be to start a crash programme to produce a nuclear weapon, as a means of deterring future aggression.
Contrary to what Mike Mullen and other American military commanders appear to believe, a military attack on Iran really is the very worst option. Its consequences for Iran, the region and the United States are dangerously unpredictable, to the extent that any decision to attack would be nothing less than stunningly reckless and quite possibly the worst strategic mistake in American military history. Responsible actors in the international system should exert the maximum effort to avoid an Iranian-American War.
The Illusion of a ‘limited war’ against Iran
Posted on August 9, 2010 by Juan
The frank admission by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America’s highest ranking officer, that the U.S. has plans to attack Iran to prevent that country from acquiring nuclear weapons, is being treated with the utmost seriousness in political, intelligence and military circles in Tehran.
This is the first time that a high-ranking U.S. official has spoken about the existence of military plans to prevent the Islamic Republic from crossing the nuclear threshold. There is considerable evidence that Mullen’s frank statement, coupled with the Obama Administration’s increasingly hostile and dismissive attitude towards Iran, and reinforced by the fourth round of United Nations sanctions imposed in June (followed by even harsher unilateral sanctions imposed by both the European Union and the United States), has radically altered the Tehran regime’s strategic calculations on the possibility of a military confrontation with the United States.
Hitherto the conventional wisdom amongst strategic policy makers in the Islamic Republic was that the U.S. would adhere to the ‘no war no peace’ policy, irrespective of the bellicose rhetoric of American leaders and officials. The policy of ‘no war no peace’ has characterized Iranian-American relations since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979.
The basic premise of this policy is that at different stages Iran and America edge towards war or peace – depending on the prevailing strategic scenario in the region – but never quite actually achieve either. The result is that most of the time the two states are somewhere in the middle conducting a Cold War, in which leaders and officials from both sides trade insults and engage in ideological and political grandstanding, but stop well short of the point where further escalation of tensions might trigger a hot war.
For the past thirty-one years this policy has benefited most of the key stakeholders, including hardline political factions in both countries, the regional Arab states, Turkey, Pakistan and Israel. All have benefited from this Iranian-American Cold War, insofar as the paucity of diplomatic and political relations between Iran and America has continuously opened up a wide range of strategic, political and economic benefits. By the same token, these stake holders would have much to lose if Iran and America actually engaged in real fighting. While this argument has manifold shortcomings, nonetheless it does capture a large part of the reality of Iranian-American relations since 1979. In any case it is what key Iranian strategic policy makers have believed all along. Until now that is.
Despite the fact that a few days before Mullen’s statement, the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC—Sepah-e-Pasdaran in Persian), Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jafari, dismissed U.S. threats, claiming that America “would not dare to attack Iran”, other IRGC leaders have in recent months continuously warned of the immediate and long-term fallout of any military confrontation. The head of the IRGC’s political-ideological unit recently warned of “dire” threats to regional security in the event of an American military attack. Meanwhile Ahmad Vahidi, Iran’s defence minister and a former commander of the IRGC’s elite Qods Force (responsible for special foreign operations), has pledged a “robust” response to any American military aggression against Iran.
It has been clear for months that the mood of IRGC commanders has been changing and Mullen’s statement appears to lend credence to the strategic calculations of the Revolutionary Guard commanders. This development is of the utmost significance, since in the event of an Iranian-American military confrontation, the IRGC is expected to be at the forefront of containing the American assault and retaliating with military measures of its own.
In fact, in the event of a military confrontation Iranian leaders are likely to relieve the regular Iranian military from fighting, so as to keep them out of harm’s way and maintain the integrity and fighting strength of the regular armed forces. There is another reason for this decision and that has to do with the depleted capabilities of the national military; in the past thirty years the national armed forces have insidiously lost power and prestige to the IRGC. It is worth noting that Iran is the only country in the world that operates two completely independent military commands; one centred on the regular armed forces, and the other on the IRGC, which operates its own ground forces, navy and air force, as well as a myriad of intelligence and security services. Moreover, the IRGC controls all of Iran’s strategic military assets, including mid-range ballistic missile capability.
It has become fashionable to paint the IRGC as an economic conglomerate more interested in making money than fighting for the values of the Islamic Revolution. Much of the reporting on IRGC economic activity is inaccurate and disingenuous and is indicative of the faux-naif style of analysis often employed by Western journalists and analysts.
The truth is that whilst the IRGC has a sizeable economic wing centred on the Khatam ol-Anbia complex (Qarargah-e Khatam ol-Anbia), its economic and financial activities are kept strictly separate from its fighting units. In any case, the IRGC is foremost an ideological army that is totally and unequivocally committed to the survival of the Islamic Revolution, and the political-religious system that emerged from that revolution. Even former reformist president (and now opposition leader) Mohammad Khatami referred to the IRGC as the “most ideological armed force in the world.”
American political and military leaders would be mistaken if they believed they could get away with a “limited” military strike on Iran, designed to destroy that country’s nuclear infrastructure. Any military strike on Iran by the United States will be interpreted by Iran’s rulers, and their IRGC enforcers, as a direct assault on the integrity and the very existence of the Islamic Republic. From a strategic point of view, IRGC commanders will interpret any American strike as the beginning of an existential conflict, and will respond appropriately.
A top priority for the IRGC high command is to respond so harshly and decisively so as to deter the Americans from a second set of strikes at a future point. The idea here is to avoid what happened to Iraq in the period 1991-2003, when the former Baathist regime was so weakened by sanctions and repeated small-scale military attacks that it quickly collapsed in the face of American and British invading armies.
The range of predictable responses available to the IRGC high command include dramatic hit ad run attacks against military and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the use of mid-range ballistic missiles against American bases in the region and Israel and a direct assault on American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. All these options are likely to be used within 48 hours of the start of hostilities.
What is less predictable is the response of the IRGC Qods Force, which is likely to be at the forefront of the Pasdaran’s counter-attack. One possible response by the Qods force is spectacular terrorist-style attacks against American intelligence bases and assets throughout the region. The IRGC Qods Force is believed to have identified every key component of the American intelligence apparatus in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are likely to put this information to good use, especially since the Qods Force suspects that the CIA had a hand in last October’s Jundullah-organised suicide bombing targeting IRGC commanders in Iran’s volatile Sistan va Baluchistan province.
The IRGC navy will also play a key asymmetrical role in the conflict by organising maritime suicide bombings on an industrial scale. By manning its fleet of speedboats with suicide bombers and ramming them into American warships and even neutral commercial shipping, the Pasdaran will hope to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 40 percent of world crude oil supplies pass.
The combination of these asymmetrical forms of warfare with more conventional style missile and even ground force attacks on American bases in the region will likely result in thousands of American military casualties in the space of a few weeks. The IRGC has both the will and wherewithal to inflict a level of casualties on American armed forces not seen since the Second World War.
Even if the United States manages to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and much of the country’s military assets, the IRGC can still claim victory by claiming to have given the Americans a bloody nose and producing an outcome not dissimilar from the Israeli-Hezbollah military engagement in the summer of 2006.
The political effect of this will likely be even more explosive than the actual fighting. Not only will it awaken the sleeping giant of Iranian nationalism, thus aligning the broad mass of the people with the regime, it will also shore up Iran’s image in the region and prove once and for all that the Islamic Republic is prepared to fight to the death to uphold its principles. Suddenly Iran’s allies in the region – particularly non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas – would stand ten feet tall.
Ironically U.S. military aggression will likely accelerate the actualisation of the very scenario that American political and military leaders insist they are determined to prevent, i.e. a nuclear armed Iran. Even if we accept the contentious proposition that Iran’s nuclear programme has a military dimension, the immediate reaction of Iran’s rulers to military aggression would be to start a crash programme to produce a nuclear weapon, as a means of deterring future aggression.
Contrary to what Mike Mullen and other American military commanders appear to believe, a military attack on Iran really is the very worst option. Its consequences for Iran, the region and the United States are dangerously unpredictable, to the extent that any decision to attack would be nothing less than stunningly reckless and quite possibly the worst strategic mistake in American military history. Responsible actors in the international system should exert the maximum effort to avoid an Iranian-American War.
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